United States v. Edmonson

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-60110
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KENNY FRANKLIN EDMONSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:01-CR-27-ALL-BN
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January 8, 2003
Before JONES, STEWART, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kenny Franklin Edmonson appeals his conviction for using
unauthorized access devices with intent to defraud and, by such
conduct, obtaining things of value aggregating more than $1,000
during a one-year period, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2).
Edmonson argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at his competency hearing; that his waiver of his right to
counsel was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made; and
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-60110
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that the district court abused its discretion in admitting certain
evidence.
Although this court generally does not review claims regarding
counsel’s assistance on direct appeal, the record herein provides
sufficient detail regarding the attorney’s conduct to allow this
court to consider the merits of Edmonson’s denial of counsel claim.
See United States v. Saenz-Forero, 27 F.3d 1016, 1021 n.7 (5th Cir.
1994). Contrary to Edmonson’s contentions, the record reflects
that Attorney Christopher Holt provided “some meaningful
assistance” to Edmonson on the issue of his competency. Gochicoa
v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2001).
The record also demonstrates that Edmonson’s waiver of his
right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The
district court’s colloquy with Edmonson was extremely detailed and
covered all of the issues necessary for a valid waiver. United
States v. Davis, 269 F.3d 514, 518 (5th Cir. 2001).
This court reviews the district court’s evidentiary rulings
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380,
391 (5th Cir. 1996). In reviewing the district court’s application
of the residual hearsay exceptions, this court “will not disturb
[the district court’s ruling] absent a definite and firm conviction
that the court made a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it
reached based upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” Page v.
Barko Hydraulics, 673 F.2d 134, 140 (5th Cir. 1982). Based on the
circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the district
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court made a clear error of judgment in admitting the records
containing the statements of BellSouth Mobility customers. See
Ismoila, 100 F.3d at 391; Page, 673 F.2d at 140.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion in
admitting, pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 404(b), the extrinsic evidence
of uncharged crimes allegedly committed prior to the time period
alleged in the indictment. See United States v. Guerrero, 169 F.3d
933, 943 (5th Cir. 1999). Edmonson’s challenges to the
Government’s other evidence regarding his intent and to the
credibility of its witnesses, as well as his denial of guilt,
“increase[d] the incremental probity of the extrinsic evidence.”
United States v. LeBaron, 156 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted). Furthermore, the district court minimized the
danger of undue prejudice by twice instructing the jury that the
evidence of Edmonson’s extrinsic acts was admitted for the limited
purpose of proving Edmonson’s intent to commit the crimes charged
in the indictment. See United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832,
871 (5th Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.