Brandon v. Lockheed Martin Corp

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No.00-30626
Summary Calendar
____________________
ALFRED E BRANDON
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, ET AL
Defendants
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION
Defendant - Appellee
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
No. 99-CV-3513-C
_________________________________________________________________
July 6, 2001
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JONES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Alfred E. Brandon appeals from the
district court’s grant of summary judgment on his wrongful
discharge, discrimination, and retaliation claims in favor of
Defendant-Appellee Lockheed Martin Corporation. For the
following reasons, we AFFIRM.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant Alfred E. Brandon, an African-American
male, began working for Defendant-Appellee Lockheed Martin
Corporation, Michoud Space Systems (“Lockheed”) on November 14,
1977. He was terminated from Lockheed, effective September 21,
1998, for allegedly sleeping at work and eating lunch during his
scheduled work time. At the time of his termination, Brandon was
a member of Local No. 1921 of the International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (the “Union”), and his employment with Lockheed was
governed by the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (the
“CBA”) between Lockheed and the Union.1
On January 13, 1998, Brandon received a Notice of
Disciplinary Action as a result of having been caught watching
“Monday Night Football” on television during his scheduled work
hours. The Notice stated:
This is a very serious violation of company rules which
forbid leaving your work area without authorization,
idling/loafing by watching television during work hours
and the use of government/company equipment for other
than official business. Normally, discipline for this
offense is discharge. However, the company is willing,
on a non-precedent setting basis, to reduce the
discharge to a thirty (30) work day suspension without
pay . . . . Any future same or similar act(s) will
result in your immediate discharge.
1
According to Article I of the CBA, the Union is the
“exclusive representative for all production and maintenance
employees of” Lockheed “for the purpose of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other
conditions of employment.”
2
On September 16, 1998, Brandon was allegedly caught sleeping
in his work area, and, on September 18, 1998, he was allegedly
caught eating lunch outside of his assigned eating period. On
September 21, 1998, Brandon attended an investigative hearing
with human resources personnel, in which he was informed of the
allegations that he had broken company rules and was suspended
pending an investigation.
According to Lockheed, a letter, which Brandon asserts he
never received,2 was sent to Brandon’s home address on September
24, 1998, which stated that he was terminated effective September
21, 1998. Additionally, a copy of the letter was placed in the
Union’s in-plant mailbox.3
Brandon filed two grievances with the Union. In the first
grievance (“Grievance I”), filed on October 5, 1998, he argued
that Lockheed had not notified him in writing of the outcome of
the investigation within the ten-day limit required by the CBA.
2
However, Brandon admits he received notice of his
termination on October 21, 1998. This notice stated that he was
“[d]ischarged for violation of prior disciplinary action
agreement concerning future conduct” and did not mention the
alleged offenses of September 16 and 18. Therefore, he maintains
that the notice did not meet the requirements of the CBA. He
asserts that the first written notice he received regarding his
alleged offenses was from the state of Louisiana and sent in
relation to an unemployment benefits hearing.
3
According to Lockheed, the letter was sent from
Lockheed’s mailroom to Brandon’s home address by certified mail
on September 30, 1998. After an investigation, the United States
Postal Service concluded that the letter was irretrievably lost
and issued a refund to Lockheed.
3
Lockheed rejected Grievance I, stating that it had mailed the
notification letter to Brandon’s home address on the sixth day of
the ten-day period. Brandon filed a second grievance (“Grievance
II”), on October 27, 1998, challenging his termination on the
merits. Lockheed denied Grievance II as untimely on November 10,
1998.
The Union accepted Lockheed’s position regarding Grievance
II, but brought Grievance I to arbitration, maintaining that
Brandon had not been presented with the reprimand in writing
within ten days. The arbitrator found in favor of Lockheed,
deciding that, although notice to the Union does not normally
constitute notice to the employee, when, as in this case, the
Union forwards the company’s decision to the employee within the
ten-day period presentation is perfected.4
Brandon filed a charge of discrimination with the Louisiana
Commission on Human Rights and the EEOC on September 3, 1999,
alleging that he believed he was discharged because of his race
4
The arbitrator relied on statements from Bargaining
Committee Chair Benny McCormick to find that Brandon had actual
knowledge of the termination. McCormick stated that, sometime on
or before October 1, he contacted Brandon to ask him to come to
the Union office. When Brandon came, McCormick read him the
termination letter and described the grievance McCormick had
already drafted on the merits. Instead of submitting that
grievance, McCormick and Brandon decided to wait until Brandon
received the notice himself. The arbitrator found the actual
date of this meeting to be unclear, but noted that McCormick had
indicated to the NLRB that the conversation happened on October 1
and that two other Union employees indicated on October 2 that
the meeting had already occurred.
4
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title
VII”). On September 3, 1999, the EEOC issued Brandon a right-to-
sue letter, but declined to investigate Brandon’s charge “because
it was not filed within the time limit required by law.”
On October 21, 1999, Brandon filed suit in Civil District
Court for the Parish of Orleans, alleging discrimination.5 The
suit was removed to federal court on November 18, 1999 based on
federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Lockheed moved for
summary judgment on March 1, 2000, and the motion was granted by
the district court on April 18, 2000.
5
From the face of Brandon’s complaint, it is difficult to
determine the basis of his claims. He states in his complaint:
VIII.
During all relevant times, Defendant maintained a
grievance procedure for alleged violations of policy.
Defendant denied petitioner due process by summarily
dismissing petitioner without affording him an
opportunity to address the faceless allegations of
Defendant. Defendant’s decision to terminate
Petitioner was pre-textural [sic] in nature and was not
contemporaneous to the alleged violations. Petitioner
had long since been warned and counseled by Defendant
and had not engaged in any form of violation prior to
being wrongfully terminated.
IX.
Defendant discriminated against the Petitioner when
he was denied due process to address the allegations of
violations of policy outside of the grievance period.
When questioned as to the bases of his complaints during the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Brandon’s counsel
agreed that, with the exception of his Title VII claim, all other
claims were preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”), but also indicated that his claim included a state law
wrongful discharge claim.
5
The district court first noted that Brandon conceded at oral
argument that any claim he might have had for a deprivation of
due process within the grievance procedure is barred either by
the preemption of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”) or the binding decision of the arbitrator on the issue.
The district court recognized that Brandon also conceded at oral
argument that he had no claim against the Union for breach of the
duty of fair representation.
Second, the court dismissed Brandon’s claim for wrongful
discharge under Louisiana state law because binding arbitration
had already determined that the discharge was proper. Further,
§ 301 of the LMRA would preempt Brandon’s state claim because
Brandon’s employment was governed by a CBA.
Third, although noting that federal labor law did not
preclude Brandon’s race discrimination claims, the district court
dismissed Brandon’s state and federal race discrimination claims
because there were no genuine issues of material fact that would
support the claims. The court found that Brandon failed to
establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment and that,
even if he had, his claims were time-barred because he did not
file his EEOC charge within the time limit required by Title VII.
Finally, the district court dismissed Brandon’s claim that
Lockheed had retaliated against him for his union and political
activity because such claims fell under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (the “NLRB”),
6
and therefore, the district court found it was without
jurisdiction to hear them.
Brandon timely appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment. See Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d 586, 588 (5th
Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the record
shows “‘that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.’” Allen v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 204 F.3d 619, 621 (5th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 93 F.3d
155, 161 (5th Cir. 1996)). “‘If the moving party meets the
initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material
fact, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce
evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Taylor, 93 F.3d at 161).
“Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts . . . will
not prevent an award of summary judgment; the plaintiff [can]not
rest on his allegations . . . to get to a jury without any
significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.”
Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5th Cir. 2001)
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d
7698, 713 (5th Cir. 1994)). “Instead, Rule 56(e) . . . requires
the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own
affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324
(1986)). “[W]e must view all facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant.” Cardinal Towing & Auto Repair, Inc. v. City
of Bedford, Tex., 180 F.3d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1999).
III. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIM
Brandon alleges that the district court erred in dismissing
his state law wrongful discharge claim as preempted by § 301 of
the LMRA (“§ 301”). One difficulty in determining whether the
district court erred is that Brandon is unclear about the basis
of his state-law wrongful discharge claim, i.e., whether it is
statutory or common law.
To the extent that Brandon’s state wrongful termination
claims arise from Lockheed’s violation of the due process
guaranteed to him by the CBA, we agree with the district court
that those claims are preempted by § 301.6 “Preemption is a
6
Brandon argues at length that Lockheed failed to follow
the procedures required by the CBA, that the grievance and
arbitration procedures failed to address his central issues, and
that he should have the opportunity to present his claims to a
trial court. As explained infra in the text, these claims all
pertain to guarantees under the CBA and are preempted by § 301.
8
question of law, which we review de novo.” Meredith v. La. Fed’n
of Teachers, 209 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 2000).
Section 301 provides in relevant part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter
. . . may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without
regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1998). Regarding § 301 preemption of state
law claims, the Supreme Court has stated that “if the resolution
of a state-law claim depends upon the meaning of a collective-
bargaining agreement, the application of state law . . . is pre-
empted and federal labor-law principles . . . must be employed to
resolve the dispute.” Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 U.S. 399, 405-06 (1988). A state-law remedy is “independent”
of the CBA for § 301 preemption purposes if “resolution of the
state-law claim does not require construing the collective-
bargaining agreement.” Id. at 407.
Where Brandon relies on Lockheed’s failure to follow the
disciplinary notice procedures required by the CBA, or any of the
other procedures or requirements of the CBA, to support his
wrongful discharge claims, Brandon’s claim would require
construing the CBA and is therefore preempted by § 301.7
7
We note that Brandon did not challenge the district
court’s finding that he had conceded his claims under the LMRA
itself. Therefore, that claim is abandoned. See Evergreen
Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 918 (5th Cir.
9
To the extent that Brandon’s state-law wrongful discharge
claims rely on some other legal theory that may be independent of
the CBA, such as retaliation or harassment, he has pled
insufficient facts to survive summary judgment. “[O]ne of the
principle [sic] purposes of summary judgment is to isolate and
dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule
should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this
purpose.” Melton v. Teacher’s Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 114 F.3d
557, 559 n.1 (5th Cir. 1997). “[U]nsupported allegations in
pleadings are insufficient to prevent the grant of summary
judgment.” Bagby v. Gen. Motors Corp., 976 F.2d 919, 921 (5th
Cir. 1992). Brandon has submitted no evidence in support of his
claims and has pled no facts that could support a state-law
wrongful discharge claim.
2000).
Even had he not abandoned those claims, Brandon is bound to
the result of the arbitration proceedings under the LMRA. While
an individual may bring suit against his employer for breach of a
CBA, he is required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or
arbitration remedies provided in the collective bargaining
agreement. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S.
151, 163 (1983). “Subject to very limited judicial review, he
will be bound by the result according to the finality provisions
of the agreement.” Id. The CBA stated that the grievance and
arbitration procedure was final and binding. The exception to
the limited review applies when “the union representing the
employee in the grievance/arbitration procedure acts in such a
discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory fashion as
to breach its duty of fair representation.” Id. This argument
was waived by Brandon in the district court.
10
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
in favor of Lockheed on Brandon’s state law wrongful discharge
claims.
IV. DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
The district court dismissed Brandon’s federal and state
race discrimination claims, finding that there were no genuine
issues of material fact that would support the race
discrimination claims and that Brandon had failed to establish a
prima facie case of disparate treatment race discrimination.
Further, the district court found that, even if Brandon had
established a prima facie case of race discrimination, his claims
were time-barred because he failed to file his EEOC charge within
the required time limit. Brandon argues that the district court
erred in dismissing his race discrimination claims.8
8
Brandon’s arguments regarding why the district court
decision was in error are unclear. To the extent he argues that
the district court erred in finding that the arbitrator’s
decision was binding on his race discrimination claims and thus
precluded his race discrimination claims, we hold that the
district court made no such finding. In fact, the district court
stated that “[n]ormally exclusive arbitration provisions must
give way to certain statutory rights, such as the anti-
discrimination provisions in Title VII.” The district court
dismissed Brandon’s race discrimination claims on other grounds.
To the extent that Brandon argues that removal from federal
to state court was improper because his claims did not arise
under federal law, we disagree. Brandon argues that his original
complaint did not state a federal question and, under the “‘well
plead complaint rule,’” should not have been removed to federal
court. However, Brandon admits that he “sought relief for
wrongful termination and the denial of due process to address the
allegations of violations of policy outside of the grievance
11
We agree with the district court that Brandon has not met
his burden of “produc[ing] evidence or designat[ing] specific
facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial” on
either his state or federal racial discrimination claims. Allen,
204 F.3d at 621 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Taylor, 93
F.3d at 161).9 Claims of racial discrimination supported by
period.” This latter claim arises under the CBA, see supra Part
III, and is subject to removal based on the “complete preemption”
doctrine.
While federal courts typically ascertain the existence
of federal question jurisdiction by applying the
familiar “well-pleaded complaint” rule, there exists a
“corollary” to this rule, which is most frequently
referred to as the doctrine of “complete preemption.”
This doctrine has been used to define limited
categories of state law claims that are “completely
preempted” such that “any civil complaint raising this
select group of claims is necessarily federal in
character,” no matter how it is characterized by the
complainant in the relevant pleading. . . . Because
they are recast as federal claims, state law claims
that are held to be completely preempted give rise to
“federal question” jurisdiction and thus may provide a
basis for removal. The Supreme Court has held the
doctrine of complete preemption applicable to certain
claims preempted by ERISA, as well as to certain claims
preempted by the LMRA.
McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 512 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citations and footnotes omitted).
Further, removal in this case was premised not only on the
federal question presented by the preemption of § 301 of the LMRA
but also on diversity jurisdiction.
9
Brandon makes race discrimination claims under both
federal and state law. Because of the similarity between Title
VII and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1006, Louisiana’s anti-
discrimination statute, courts appropriately look to federal
jurisprudence to interpret Louisiana discrimination laws. See
King v. Phelps Dunbar, L.L.P., 98-1805, at 7 (La. 6/4/99), 743
So. 2d 181, 187; see also Nichols v. Lewis Grocer, 138 F.3d 563,
12
circumstantial evidence are analyzed under the framework set out
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
“First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.” See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
120 S. Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000). Once the plaintiff satisfies this
prima facie burden, the burden shifts to the employer to produce
a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.”
Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 222 (5th Cir.
2000). “If the defendant can articulate a reason that, if
believed, would support a finding that the action was
nondiscriminatory, ‘the mandatory inference of discrimination
created by the plaintiff’s prima facie case drops out of the
picture and the factfinder must decide the ultimate question:
whether [the] plaintiff has proved [intentional
discrimination].’” Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 350
(5th Cir. 2001) (alterations in original) (some internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Russell, 235 F.3d at 222). “In the
context of a claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must adduce
evidence that the justification was a pretext for racial and age
discrimination.” Id. at 351. “In making this showing, the
566 (5th Cir. 1998); Hicks v. Cen. La. Elec. Co., 97-1232 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 5/15/98), 712 So. 2d 656, 658 (“Because of the
substantial similarities between state and federal
anti-discrimination laws, courts may appropriately consider
interpretations of federal statutes when construing Louisiana
law.”). Our finding that the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment on Brandon’s federal discrimination
claims applies as well to Brandon’s state discrimination claims.
13
plaintiff can rely on evidence that the employer’s reasons were a
pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Russell, 235 F.3d at 222.
“However, as the Court stated in Hicks, a showing of pretext does
not automatically entitle an employee to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Id. at 223. While a showing of pretext will more
likely than not lead to an inference of discrimination, see id.,
a showing of pretext by the plaintiff will not always be
sufficient to infer discrimination. For example, “if the record
conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory reason for
the employer’s decision, or if the plaintiff created only a weak
issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was untrue and
there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that
no discrimination had occurred,” the employer would still be
entitled to summary judgment. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2109.
We agree with the district court that Brandon has failed to
establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. If
Brandon’s claim is construed as a claim of discriminatory
termination, to establish his prima facie case he must establish:
“(1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) that he was
qualified for the position held; (3) that he was discharged from
the position; and (4) that he was replaced by someone outside of
the protected group.” Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209
F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2000). It is uncontroverted that Brandon
is a member of a protected group and that he was discharged from
his position; however, he has failed to present any evidence
14
either that he was qualified for the position or that he was
replaced by someone outside the protected group.
Alternatively, Brandon’s claim may be interpreted as an
allegation of discriminatory discipline. “In work-rule violation
cases, a Title VII plaintiff may establish a prima facie case by
showing ‘either that he did not violate the rule or that, if he
did, white employees who engaged in similar acts were not
punished similarly’.” Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d
1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Green v. Armstrong Rubber
Co., 612 F.2d 967, 968 (5th Cir. 1980)). Again, Brandon has
failed to establish the requisite prima facie case. When asked
to identify employees who were treated differently, Brandon
alleges that three other employees, all African-American men,
received only a ten-day disciplinary suspension whereas he
received a thirty-day suspension for his behavior. The treatment
of these three African-American men does not create a prima facie
case of racial discrimination.
Because we agree with the district court that Brandon failed
to meet his prima facie burden, we need not address whether his
EEOC charge was timely filed. We find that the district court
did not err in granting summary judgment on Brandon’s race
discrimination claims.
V. RETALIATION CLAIM
15
The district court dismissed Brandon’s retaliation claim,
finding that it did not have jurisdiction because the claim fell
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Brandon argues
that the district court’s finding was error.10 We disagree.
The NLRB has primary jurisdiction to decide what constitutes
unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act
(the “NLRA”). See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 83
(1982); United Food & Commercial Workers Union AFL-CIO v.
Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., 193 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1999). “As a
general rule, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over
activity which ‘is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the [NLRA],’
and they ‘must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board.’” See Kaiser Steel Corp., 455 U.S. at 83
(citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236,
245 (1959)). There are exceptions to this general rule, see
e.g., United Food, 193 F.3d at 331; Tamburello v. Comm-Tract
Corp., 67 F.3d 973, 977-78 (1st Cir. 1995), none of which applies
to this case.
Further, an unfair labor practice is defined in § 8 of the
NLRA. Section 8 states in relevant part: “[i]t shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to interfere with,
10
Brandon argues that the district court erred when it
dismissed his claim for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. We construe Brandon’s argument to refer
to his claim that Lockheed retaliated against him for his union
activities, which the district court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
16
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7] of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1998). Moreover, § 8 of the NLRA provides that “[i]t shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization.” Id. § 158(a)(3). Further, “an employer
violates Section 8(a)(3) by taking adverse employment action
against an employee in retaliation for his union activities or
sympathies.” New Orleans Cold Storage & Warehouse Co. v. NLRB,
201 F.3d 592, 600 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Marshall Durbin
Poultry Co. v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 1312, 1318 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Section
8(a)(3) proscribes employer reprisals against an employee for
engaging in Union activity.”).
Brandon alleges that he was terminated in retaliation for
his role as a union representative and for speaking up for the
rights of his co-workers. This allegation would constitute an
unfair labor practice under § 8 of the NLRA and falls under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. Therefore, we find that the
district court did not err in finding it was without jurisdiction
to hear the retaliation claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
17
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
18