Major v. Hoechst Celanese

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-40698
Summary Calendar
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VICKI MAJOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(C-95-CV-382)
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February 5, 1997
Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Vicki Major appeals a summary judgment on her claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“i.i.e.d.”) against
Hoechst Celanese Corporation (“HCC”). Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Major was employed by HCC as a technical document entry clerk
in the company's library. She was instructed by her supervisor,
Marsha Wilson, to destroy a reel of microfilm that Wilson indicated
did not contain technical information and therefore was no longer
needed pursuant to HCC’s document retention policy. Major
expressed concern about the destruction of the film, disbelieving
Wilson’s conclusion that the film contained no technical in-
formation.
At an HCC meeting two months later, Ruth Umfleet, Major’s
second supervisor, asked Major whether she had complied with
Wilson’s instruction. Major indicated that she had not, but rather
that she had placed the film in a safe placeSSher home. Wilson
informed Major that it was theft to take company property home and
instructed her to return the film to HCC. Major complied and was
not disciplined in any manner.
Major filed suit in Texas state court, alleging i.i.e.d. The
gravamen of her complaint was that she was ordered erroneously to
destroy documents containing technical information and that she was
accused by Wilson of theft following her refusal to comply. HCC
removed the case to federal court. The district court granted
summary judgment for HCC.
II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Hanks v.
2
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 953 F.2d 996, 997 (5th Cir.
1992). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
To recover for i.i.e.d., a plaintiff must prove that
(1) defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) defendant’s
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) defendant caused the
plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress was
severe. See Randall’s Food Mkts. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644
(Tex. 1995). Extreme and outrageous conduct is that which is “'so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.'” Id. (citing
Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex. 1993)). An ordinary
employment dispute is not actionable as i.i.e.d. See Atkinson v.
Denton Publishing Co., 84 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1996).
Assuming arguendo that Wilson accused Major of stealing HCC
property, such conduct is not extreme and outrageous.2 Further
2
See, e.g., MacArthur v. University of Texas Health Ctr., 45 F.3d 890,
898-99 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that employer’s intemperate and rude reprimand
and overreaction in falsely accusing plaintiff of sabotaging laboratory
experiment did not demonstrate outrageous conduct); Diamond Shamrock Refining &
Marketing Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. 1992) (holding that employer’s
falsely depicting plaintiff as a thief was not outrageous conduct). The parties
disagree as to whether Wilson told Major that it was company policy not to steal
(continued...)
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more, Major’s reliance upon Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885 F.2d
300, 307 (5th Cir. 1989), is misplaced. We explained in Dean that
it was the defendant’s intentional placing of checks in the
plaintiff’s purse in an effort to frame her for theft that took
“this case beyond the realm of an ordinary employment dispute and
into the realm of an outrageous one.” Id.Major next alleges that, in addition to the microfilm
incident, her employment conditions at HCC were so “unreasonable”
and “horrible” that the conditions themselves support her inten-
tional infliction claim. According to Major, she was subject to
constant criticism, stressful conversations, mistrust, and even a
co-worker’s looking through her desk for documents and other
materials that had not been filed. Complaints regarding ordinary
employment disputes do not give rise to claims for i.i.e.d.3
AFFIRMED.
2
(...continued)
or actually accused Major of stealing. We need not resolve this factual dispute.
3
See, e.g., Atkinson, 84 F.3d at 151 (holding that superiors’ alleged
displays of disrespect and rudeness toward plaintiff are not extreme and
outrageous); MacArthur, 45 F.3d at 899 (holding that employer’s intemperate and rude
reprimands are not extreme and outrageous); Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827
S.W.2d 361, 368-70 (Tex. App.SSSan Antonio 1992, writ denied) (holding that “an
exchange of insults, indignities, annoyances, and other trivialities,” including
defacing plaintiff’s family pictures and frightening her by placing rattlesnake
rattlers on her desk, did not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous”).
4