Bridgers v. Dretke

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 2, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
05-70020
ALLEN BRIDGERS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
DOUG DRETKE, Director,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas
Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner Allen Bridgers, convicted of capital murder in
Texas and sentenced to death, appeals the denial of federal habeas
relief. Bridgers contends that the warnings he received prior to
his custodial interrogation were inadequate to apprise him of his
constitutional rights, and thus, the resulting confession was
admitted at trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The
district court granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) with
respect to this claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). Additionally,
Bridgers requests a COA with respect to his Fourth Amendment claim.
We decide that Bridgers has not shown that the state court’s
decision that he was adequately advised of his Fifth Amendment
rights is objectively unreasonable and affirm the district court’s
denial of federal habeas relief. Finding his Fourth Amendment
claim barred, we deny the request for a COA.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 25, 1997, the body of Mary Amie was discovered by her
niece at her home in Tyler, Texas.1 That same day Bridgers flew
from the Dallas-Fort Worth airport to Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
Three days later on May 28, Detective Charles Morrow of the Fort
Lauderdale Police Department received information from Crime
Stoppers regarding a possible suspect wanted in Texas for murder.
Detective Morrow had no prior knowledge of the Texas murder and did
not contact Texas authorities. Rather, he accompanied the
individual who had provided the information to Crime Stoppers to
the Holiday Park area of Fort Lauderdale. The confidential
informant pointed out Bridgers as the person who admitted that he
had murdered a woman in Texas.
Detective Morrow waited for additional detectives to arrive
1
The facts are taken largely verbatim from the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals’ opinion on Bridgers’s direct appeal. Bridgers
v. State of Texas, No. 73,112 at 2-4 (Tex. Crim. App. October 25,
2000) (unpublished).
2
and then approached Bridgers, who was lying in the grass.
Detective Morrow testified that there were seven plainclothes
officers in the vicinity but could not remember how many approached
Bridgers. Morrow testified that his badge, gun, and handcuffs were
displayed and that it was obvious he was a police officer. Upon
approaching Bridgers, Detective Morrow stated that he was
conducting an investigation and asked Bridgers to accompany him to
the police station. At the suppression hearing, Detective Morrow
testified that Bridgers was “nervous, but cooperative” and agreed
to go to the police station for questioning, saying “Okay. That’s
fine. Let’s go.” He also testified that if Bridgers had refused
to accompany him to the station, he would have detained Bridgers
and questioned Bridgers in the park. Bridgers was handcuffed and
transported to the station in an unmarked car.
Upon arrival at the Fort Lauderdale police station, Detective
Morrow obtained Bridgers’s driver’s license which identified him as
Allen Bridgers. Next, Detective Morrow took him to the interview
room to meet with Detectives Jack King and Jack Gee. Detective Gee
had obtained a fax of a warrant for Bridgers’s arrest dated May 27
from the Smith County Sheriff’s Department. According to Detective
Morrow’s testimony, it was at this point that Bridgers was under
arrest.
When the detectives entered the room, they introduced
themselves to Bridgers, and Detective King warned Bridgers from a
card issued by the Fort Lauderdale Police Department. The card
3
read as follows:
You have the right to remain silent. Do you understand?
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a
court of law. Do you understand?
You have the right to the presence of an attorney/lawyer
prior to any questioning. Do you understand?
If you cannot afford an attorney/lawyer, one will be
appointed for you before any questioning if you so
desire. Do you understand?
Bridgers responded affirmatively to each question posed to
him. He indicated that he was not sure whether he wanted an
attorney. He did ask and was permitted to speak to his mother.
After he received the warnings, Bridgers was asked if he knew why
he was there and responded that Texas thought he had killed
someone. Detective King asked, “Did you?” and Bridgers said, “Yes,
you’ve got the right guy.”
After Bridgers finished talking with his mother, the
detectives activated the tape recorder and administered the
warnings a second time. Then Bridgers gave the audio taped
confession at issue in which he admitted murdering Mary Amie and
taking her purse, jewelry, and car. He requested two short stops
and both requests were honored. Both Detectives King and Gee
testified that Bridgers did not appear to be under the influence of
any substances and his mental capacity did not seem diminished in
any way. They also denied threatening Bridgers or promising him
anything in return for his statement.
Prior to trial, Bridgers filed a motion to suppress his
confession. The state trial court held a hearing on the motion and
4
denied it. Ultimately, Bridgers’s audio taped confession was
admitted at trial over objection. The jury convicted Bridgers of
capital murder, and he was sentenced to death. On his automatic
direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his
conviction and sentence. Bridgers v. State of Texas, No. 73,112
(Tex. Crim. App. October 25, 2000) (unpublished).
Bridgers also filed an application for writ of habeas corpus
in state court, and the Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief.
Ex Parte Bridgers, No. 45,179-01 (Tex. Crim. App. May 31, 2000).
Bridgers now appeals the district court’s denial of federal habeas
relief.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Fifth Amendment
1. Standard of Review
Bridgers filed his section 2254 petition for a writ of habeas
corpus after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). The petition, therefore, is subject to
AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068
(1997). Pursuant to the federal habeas statute, as amended by
AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we defer to a state court's
adjudication of a petitioner's claims on the merits unless the
state court's decision was: (1) "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
5
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States;" or (2)
"resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding." A state court's decision is deemed
contrary to clearly established federal law if it reaches a legal
conclusion in direct conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme
Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme
Court based on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404-08, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519-20 (2000). A
state court's decision constitutes an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law if it is objectively unreasonable.
Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. at 1521. Additionally, pursuant to section
2254(e)(1), state court findings of fact are presumed to be
correct, and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting the
presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. See
Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 947 (5th Cir. 2001).
2. Inadequate Warnings
Bridgers argues that the warnings given to him by Florida law
enforcement officers prior to custodial interrogation were
insufficient to protect his Fifth Amendment rights, rendering his
murder confession inadmissible. More specifically, Bridgers
contends that the warnings he received were inadequate under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), because
6
although the above-quoted warnings explained that he had a right to
the presence of counsel “prior to” questioning, they did not
explicitly state that he had a right to consult an attorney during
questioning. On direct appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
rejected this argument, opining that:
Certainly, the right to the presence of an attorney
during questioning is a crucial vehicle for safeguarding
the privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda,
384 U.S. at 470. However, we do not think that the above
warning is susceptible to the interpretation [Bridgers]
advances. The detectives did not tell [Bridgers] that he
had the right to consult or speak to an attorney before
questioning, which might have created the impression that
the attorney could not be present during interrogation.
They told him that he had the right to the presence of an
attorney before any questioning commenced. We think that
this conveyed to [Bridgers] that he was entitled to the
presence of an attorney before questioning and that this
attorney could remain during questioning.
Bridgers v. State of Texas, No. 73,112 at 8 (Tex. Crim. App.
October 25, 2000) (unpublished) (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, the question is whether the Court of Criminal
Appeals’s conclusion—that the warnings adequately advised Bridgers
of the right to have his attorney present during the
interrogation—was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law as determined by
the Supreme Court.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held, among other things, that
“an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that
he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer
7
with him during interrogation.” 384 U.S. at 471, 86 S.Ct. at 1626
(emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court “has never indicated
that the ‘ridigity’ of Miranda extends to the precise formulation
of the warnings given a criminal defendant.” California v.
Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S. Ct. 2806, 2809 (1981). Indeed,
the High Court has explained that we “need not examine Miranda
warnings as if construing a will or defining the terms of an
easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably
‘conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.’”
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203, 109 S. Ct. 2875, 2880 (1989)
(brackets in original) (quoting Prysock, 453 U.S. at 361, 101 S.Ct.
at 2810).
In this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied
controlling Supreme Court precedent and properly recognized that
Miranda required advising a suspect that he is entitled to have
counsel present during interrogation. Therefore, the Court of
Criminal Appeals did not reach a decision that was contrary to
Supreme Court precedent. We must now determine whether the Court
of Criminal Appeals’s conclusion was an unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent. As previously set forth, a state court’s
decision constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly
established law if it is objectively unreasonable.2
2
On Bridgers’s direct criminal appeal, the Supreme Court
denied certiorari. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and
Souter, issued a statement indicating that because the warnings
8
As set forth above, the Supreme Court “h[e]ld that an
individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he
has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with
him during interrogation.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 471, 86 S. Ct. at
1626 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court, however, also directed
that “[p]rior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. at
444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612 (emphasis added). The latter warnings do not
explicitly state that a suspect has a right to counsel during
questioning, indicating that the warnings provided to Bridgers are
adequate.3
Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court expressly found
that the warnings employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
“say nothing about the lawyer’s presence during interrogation . .
. they apparently leave out an essential Miranda element.”
Bridgers v. Texas, 532 U.S. 1034, 121 S. Ct. 1995, 1996 (2001)
(citation omitted). Obviously, this statement by the three
Justices does not demonstrate that the Supreme Court would hold
that Bridgers’s warning was insufficient. Moreover, we agree with
the Director that because the statement was made with respect to
Bridgers’s direct criminal appeal, it does not address whether
those three Justices believed that the state court decision was an
objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent
under AEDPA.
3
In pertinent part, the warnings given to Bridgers provided
that: “You have the right to the presence of an attorney/lawyer
prior to any questioning. Do you understand?”
9
(FBI) at the time of its decision were “consistent with the
procedure which we delineate today.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 483-84,
86 S.Ct. at 1632-33. Although the pre-Miranda FBI warnings
provided that the suspect had a right to counsel, they did not
explicitly state that counsel may be present during interrogation.4
Indeed, Justice Clark’s dissent noted that “the FBI does not warn
that counsel may be present during custodial interrogation.” 384
U.S. at 500 n.3, 86 S. Ct. at 1641 n.3 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Justice Clark believed the FBI’s warnings were not as stringent as
the warnings imposed by the majority opinion. Id.
In any event, what is clear from the majority opinion is that
a suspect has the right to counsel during custodial interrogation
and must be so informed. What is not clear from the majority
opinion is whether informing the suspect that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney prior to questioning adequately conveys
that counsel may remain during questioning.
Indeed, there is a split among the circuits with respect to
whether the warning must explicitly provide that a suspect is
entitled to the presence of counsel during interrogation. On one
hand, this Court, like the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, has
4
“The standard warning long given by Special Agents of the
FBI to both suspects and persons under arrest is that the person
has a right to say nothing and a right to counsel, and that any
statement he does make may be used against him in court.” Miranda,
384 U.S. at 484, 86 S.Ct. at 1633 (internal quotations marks
omitted). Additionally, a suspect was advised of “his right to
free counsel if he [was] unable to pay . . . .” Id.
10
interpreted Miranda to require a more explicit warning indicating
that a suspect is entitled to counsel during questioning. See
e.g., Atwell v. United States, 398 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Tillman, 963 F.2d 137, 140-42 (6th Cir. 1992);
United States v. Noti, 731 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 672-74 (10th Cir. 1981).
On the other hand, the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits under various circumstances have held that warnings are
adequate without explicitly stating that the right to counsel
includes having counsel present during the interrogation. See
United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1968);
United States v. Frankson, 83 F.3d 79, 81-82 (4th Cir. 1996); cf.
United States v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357, 361-62 (7th Cir. 1973)
(finding warning adequate but stating that warnings provided to
suspects on the street are not expected to be as precise as those
given at the police station); United States v. Caldwell, 954 F.2d
496, 500-04 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no plain error when warning
omitted right to counsel during interrogation).
As previously set forth, the Supreme Court has instructed
reviewing courts to determine whether the warnings reasonably
convey to the suspect his rights as set forth in Miranda. That is
the analysis the Court of Criminal Appeals conducted in the instant
11
case.5 In light of the Court of Criminal Appeals’s apparent
adherence to the proper inquiry, the Supreme Court’s endorsement of
the FBI warnings that did not expressly state there is a right to
counsel during interrogation, and the circuit split regarding
whether Miranda requires explicitly informing the suspect that he
has the right to counsel during interrogation, we hold that the
Court of Criminal Appeals’s conclusion that the warnings adequately
conveyed the right to counsel during interrogation was not
objectively unreasonable.6 Therefore, we affirm the district
court’s denial of relief with respect to Bridgers’s Fifth Amendment
claim.
B. Fourth Amendment
1. COA Standard of Review
5
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that Bridgers had not
only been informed that he had the right to consult with an
attorney before questioning but also that he “had the right to the
presence of an attorney before any questioning began.” Bridgers,
No. 73,112 at 8 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that
this “conveyed to [Bridgers] that he was entitled to the presence
of an attorney before questioning and that this attorney could
remain during questioning.” Id. We note that the warnings further
advised Bridgers he was entitled to have counsel appointed prior to
questioning if he could not afford one.
6
We recognize that this Circuit has held that a suspect must
be explicitly warned that he has the right to counsel during
interrogation. Atwell, 398 F.2d at 510. That case was a direct
criminal appeal reviewed de novo. Here, in contrast, pursuant to
AEDPA, we have determined that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals’s decision was not an objectively unreasonable application
of Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, Atwell remains binding
precedent for cases on direct appeal in this Circuit.
12
The district court denied a COA with respect to Bridgers’s
Fourth Amendment claim. Under AEDPA, a petitioner must obtain a
COA before he can appeal the district court's denial of habeas
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039 (2003) ("[U]ntil a COA has
been issued federal courts of appeals lack jurisdiction to rule on
the merits of appeals from habeas petitioners.").
The COA determination under § 2253(c) requires an overview of
the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their
merits. We look to the district court's application of AEDPA to
petitioner's constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution
was debatable among jurists of reason. This threshold inquiry does
not require full consideration of the factual or legal bases
adduced in support of the claims. In fact, the statute forbids it.
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S.Ct. at 1039. A COA will be
granted only if the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of
reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his
constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327, 123 S.Ct. at 1034.
Where the district court has denied claims on procedural
grounds, a COA should issue only if it is demonstrated that
13
"jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of a denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000). "The question is
the debatability of the underlying constitutional claim, not the
resolution of that debate." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 342, 123 S.Ct.
at 1042. "Indeed, a claim can be debatable even though every jurist
of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case
has received full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail."
Id. at 338, 123 S.Ct. at 1040. Moreover, "[b]ecause the present
case involves the death penalty, any doubts as to whether a COA
should issue must be resolved in [petitioner's] favor." Hernandez
v. Johnson, 213 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2000).
2. Unlawful Arrest
Bridgers contends that Florida law enforcement officers
arrested him unlawfully in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
rendering his subsequent confession to murder inadmissible. The
Director responds that the district court correctly found that
Bridgers had had an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
this claim in the Texas state courts and, as a result, Bridgers is
precluded from any federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to Stone
v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
14
When a petitioner raises a Fourth Amendment claim during a
federal habeas corpus proceeding, “our initial inquiry is whether
the state provided an opportunity for a full and fair hearing” with
respect to the claim. Swicegood v. Alabama, 577 F.2d 1322, 1324
(5th Cir. 1978). It is undisputed that Bridgers raised this issue
in a pretrial suppression motion, and the Texas state trial court
held a hearing during which six witnesses testified, including
Florida law enforcement officers involved in the initial encounter
with Bridgers. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and
Bridgers renewed the objection at trial. On his automatic direct
appeal Bridgers raised this claim, and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals overruled it, finding that he “was not seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Bridgers, No. 73,112 at 7.
Nevertheless, Bridgers argues that he was denied a full and
fair opportunity to litigate because the trial court wrongly
concluded that Bridgers was not seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. We have rejected such an argument, explaining that
“[i]f the term ‘fair hearing’ means that the state courts must
correctly apply federal constitutional law, Stone becomes a
nullity.” Swicegood, 577 F.2d at 1324.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Bridgers
was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth
Amendment claim in state court and conclude that reasonable jurists
would not find it debatable whether the district court was correct
15
in finding that Stone bars any federal habeas review of the instant
claim. See Hughes v. Dretke, 412 F.3d 582, 596 (5th Cir. 2005)
(declining to issue a COA because the petitioner had been afforded
a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim
in state court). Thus, we decline to issue a COA.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The request
for a COA is DENIED.
16