United States v. Henderson

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 11, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-20628
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GEORGE HENDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(No. 4:05-MC-0073)
Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
George Henderson appeals from the district court’s enforcement of an administrative
summons from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). We affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 19, 2004, the IRS served an administrative summons on Henderson to gather
evidence related to Henderson’s tax liability for 1999, 2000, and 2001. Henderson did not comply
with the summons, and the United States sought enforcement of the summons in district court. The
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
district court issued an enforcement order against Henderson, which he appeals to this court.
Henderson argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction over him and that his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination was violated by the summons.
II. DISCUSSION
We review both of Henderson’s challenges de novo. See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State
Univ., 213 F.3d 858, 869 (5th Cir. 2000) (de novo review of jurisdictional issues); FDIC v. Fid. &
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 45 F.3d 969, 977 (5th Cir. 1995) (de novo review of legal issues, including
Fifth Amendment challenges). The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
is an Article III court established by Congress. See 28 U.S.C. § 124. The IRS has authority under
26 U.S.C. § 7602(a) to issue an administrative summons in order to “determin[e] the liability of any
person for any internal revenue tax” and to seek enforcement of that summons in federal court under
26 U.S.C. § 7604. Both of these statutes are federal laws that the district court has jurisdiction to
consider under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The court had personal jurisdiction over Henderson because of
his domicile in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940); see also
26 U.S.C. § 7604(a).1 Thus, the district court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction over
the enforcement action brought by the IRS. We also note that the IRS summons was valid under
United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). See also United States v. Wyatt, 637 F.2d 293,
300 (5th Cir. 1981).
The district court’s enforcement of the summons did not violate Henderson’s Fifth
Amendment right to not incriminate himself. An administrative summons implicates the Fifth
1
Henderson’s claim that he is not a citizen of the United States is frivolous. See, e.g., United
States v. Price, 798 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1986).
2
Amendment if its sole purpose is to build a criminal case. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845,
852 (5th Cir. 1969). There is no indication that the government’s sole purpose in enforcing the
summons was to gather evidence to bring criminal charges against Henderson; instead, the purpose
of the summons, partially if not entirely, was to assess Henderson’s tax liability. Therefore, the
enforcement of the summons did not violate the Fifth Amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
3