Pompey v. Chaney

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 23, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-20388
Summary Calendar
CHARLES JAMES POMPEY;
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRENDA CHENEY, ETC., ET AL.
Defendants,
DOUGLAS APPEL, ETC., O.D. Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Southern District of Texas
(4:03-CV-1543)
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dr. Douglas Appel appeals from the district court’s order
denying him qualified immunity. The plaintiff, Charles James
Pompey, sued Dr. Appel under section 1983 for deliberate
indifference to his medical needs while incarcerated, as proscribed
by the Eight Amendment’s right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment. The district court denied Appel’s motion for summary
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
judgment based on qualified immunity. Because the district court
applied an incorrect legal standard, we vacate and remand.
In reviewing an officer’s assertion of qualified immunity, a
court first determines whether the plaintiff alleges a violation of
a constitutional right. Here Pompey alleges deliberate
indifference, for which the appropriate mens rea is subjective
recklessness.1 That is, “[f]or an official to act with deliberate
indifference, the official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”2
Yet the district court found a constitutional violation based
on objective recklessness, ruling that Appel knew or should have
known that Pompey faced a substantial risk of harm. This error
improperly broadened the scope of Appel’s liability. We VACATE and
REMAND.
1
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–47 (1994).
2
See Smith v. Brenoettsy, 158 F.3d 908, 912 (5th Cir. 1998). Under
exceptional circumstances, a prison official’s knowledge of a substantial risk
of harm may be inferred by the obviousness of the substantial risk. Reeves v.
Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1983). The district court did not apply
this inference.
2