Miranda v. National Postal Mail

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 30, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
))))))))))))))))))))))))))
No. 06-50460
Summary Calendar
))))))))))))))))))))))))))
MANUEL BANLES MIRANDA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NATIONAL POSTAL MAIL, National Postal Mail Handlers Union;
NATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION, LOCAL 311,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
No. MO-06-CV-012
Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Manuel Banles Miranda (“Miranda”)
appeals a district court order granting summary judgment to
Defendants-Appellees National Postal Mail Handlers Union
(“NPMHU”) and its Local 311 (collectively, “Defendants”). For the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT
RULE 47.5.4.
1
reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Miranda has been an employee of the United States Postal
Service (“USPS”) since 1981. He began there in a mail handler
position in the Odessa, Texas post office and in 1989 was
transferred to a mail handler position at the Midland Processing
and Distribution Facility. Defendant NPMHU is the exclusive
bargaining representative for members of the mail handler craft
employed by USPS, and Defendant Local 311 represents the mail
handlers at the Midland facility.
In June 2001, Miranda voluntarily transferred to a letter
carrier position in Odessa, Texas, a position outside the mail
handler craft. In January 2002, however, he returned to a mail
handler position in Midland, Texas. Sometime after Miranda’s
return, he discovered that he had lost his seniority due to his
transfer. Because he returned to a mail handler position within
one year of his transfer out, Miranda believed that he should
have retained his seniority. Miranda filed a grievance through
his union steward. USPS initially complied with Miranda’s
request, restoring his seniority date to 1981.
Sometime in the fall of 2003, however, Local 311 official
Robert Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) contacted USPS management,
claiming that the restoration of Miranda’s seniority had been in
2
error. According to Rodriguez, the collective bargaining
agreement between NPMHU and USPS provided that seniority could be
restored only for persons in management positions. Miranda’s
seniority was again rescinded, and a seniority list reflecting
this correction was posted on the employee bulletin board in
November 2003. Miranda claims that the loss of his seniority has
prevented him from obtaining vacation time during Thanksgiving
week and has precluded him from successfully bidding on certain
jobs. Miranda also claims that Rodriguez “used intimidation
tactics against him” by convincing management to schedule Miranda
for work on December 25, 2004, after Miranda had initially be
given that day off.
Miranda filed suit against the Defendants for breach of
fiduciary duty in Texas state court on December 27, 2005.
Defendants filed a notice of removal to federal court on January
20, 2006. Subsequently, Defendants moved for summary judgment on
the basis of untimeliness. Defendants argued that Miranda’s state
law claim was preempted by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., and that a six-month statute of
limitations applied. The district court determined that removal
to federal court was proper under this court’s holding in
Richardson v. United Steel Workers of America, 864 F.2d 1162,
1170 (5th Cir. 1989). Finding that Miranda’s claim was cognizable
only as a duty of fair representation claim under the NLRA, the
district court concluded that a six-month limitation period
3
applied. Because none of the instances of Defendants’ purported
breach of duty occurred within six months of the date Miranda
filed his suit, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.1 On appeal, Miranda does not renew his
objection to the removal of his suit, and only challenges the
district court’s granting of summary judgment.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court has jurisdiction
over an appeal from a grant of summary judgment. We review a
district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Dallas County
Hosp. Dist. v. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan, 293 F.3d 282, 285
(5th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings,
discovery responses, and affidavits show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A dispute
about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable fact-finder could return a verdict for the non-moving
party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). When deciding whether there is a genuine issue of
material fact, this court must view all evidence in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Daniels v. City of
Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2001).
1
The district court also granted Defendants’ summary
judgment motion as to a claim for retaliation that Miranda
alleged for the first time in his response. Miranda has not
raised this issue on appeal.
4
III. DISCUSSION
Miranda maintains that his claim against the Defendants is a
state law claim for breach of fiduciary duty. It is clear from
Supreme Court and this court’s caselaw, however, that Miranda’s
claim is cognizable only as a duty of fair representation claim
under the NLRA. As such, it is timed barred under the applicable
six-month statute of limitations.
A. Preemption Under the Duty of Fair Representation
The duty of fair representation is a duty held by the
Supreme Court to be implied in the NLRA. See, e.g., Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Because the NLRA
empowers a union to become the exclusive bargaining agent of all
employees in a bargaining unit, whether or not members of the
union, it correspondingly implies a duty of fair representation
by the union of all those employees. Bass v. Int’l Bhd. of
Boilermakers, 630 F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir. 1980). The duty of
fair representation requires the union “fairly to represent all
of those employees, both in its collective bargaining with [the
employer] . . . and in its enforcement of the resulting
collective bargaining agreement” and “to serve the interests of
all [bargaining unit] members without hostility or discrimination
toward any.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
In Richardson v. United Steel Workers of America, 864 F.2d
5
1162, 1166 (5th Cir. 1989), this court interpreted Vaca as
holding that the federal duty of fair representation preempts
state substantive law. In Richardson, as in the instant case, we
faced an appeal by plaintiffs who brought a claim against their
representative union for breach of a “Texas common-law tort duty
owed by a union to its members.” Id. at 1164. We explained that
“[b]ecause the plaintiffs in this case alleged that the Union
breached a duty that arose from its status as their exclusive
collective bargaining agent under the NLRA, Vaca requires that
this duty be defined by federal law.” Id. at 1166-67. We held
that “[t]he Union’s right to act as plaintiffs’ bargaining agent
is conferred by the NLRA, and . . . the duties corresponding to
this right conferred by federal labor law are likewise defined
solely by federal labor law.” Id. at 1165. Thus, though the
appellants had depicted their claims as state law claims, we
affirmed the district court’s characterization of those claims as
“NLRA duty of fair representation claims.” Id. at 1167.
The circumstances of this case and those in Richardson are
fundamentally alike. As in Richardson, the duty allegedly
breached by the Defendants arises from their status as Miranda’s
collective bargaining representatives, thus compelling the
conclusion that Miranda’s claims are also properly characterized
as duty of fair representation claims.
B. Attempts to Distinguish Richardson
6
Miranda does not address Richardson directly, but he does
make arguments that appear to be implicit attempts to distinguish
that case.
1. Defendants’ Conduct as Bargaining Agent
In Richardson, the plaintiffs acknowledged explicitly that
the union’s duties stemmed from its status “as the bargaining
agent for Plaintiffs.” Id. at 164. Miranda, however, argues that
he “is not complaining of the Union’s representation against him
against the employer” and that “the Union was not acting as the
exclusive bargaining representative on conditions of employment
for Miranda.” Rather, Miranda proposes that he “is complaining of
the insular conduct of the Union” and that “[Rodriguez] acted
unilaterally to rescind the seniority to [his own] advantage.”
This characterization of Miranda’s claim is inaccurate. Rodriguez
was acting in his capacity as collective bargaining agent when he
persuaded USPS management to rescind Miranda’s seniority in
accordance with Rodriguez’s interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. That Rodriguez’s action may have been
improperly motivated by hostility, bias, or self-interest does
not imply that Rodriguez did not act as collective bargaining
representative. Rodriguez’s motivations go to the merits of
Miranda’s claim but do not change the fact that this claim is
properly characterized as a duty of fair representation claim.
2. Independent State-Law Duty
7
Our opinion in Richardson acknowledged that that case did
not “present the question of whether the Union was subject to an
independent state-law duty of care . . . arising simply from the
relationship of the union to its members” and not preempted by
the NLRA. Id. at 1167 (internal quotation marks omitted).2 The
Richardson plaintiffs’ petition “did not even allege that
plaintiffs are or were members of the union.” Id.
By contrast, Miranda’s complaint and appeal do state that he
is a member of the NPMHU and its Local 311. To the extent that
Miranda attempts to establish an independent state-law duty of
care on this basis, however, his argument is woefully
unsupported. Miranda claims that the Defendants “breached a
fiduciary duty” toward him. To demonstrate that this duty exists,
Miranda cites to a single Texas case, Fitz-gerald v. Hull, 237
S.W.2d 256, 261 (Tex. 1951), for the proposition that “Texas
courts have found a fiduciary duty when one person trusts or
relies in another.” However, in addition to being an older case
that concerns the relationship of parties to a joint venture,
rather than that of union member to union, Fitz-gerald nowhere
indicates that subjective trust and reliance alone are sufficient
to create a fiduciary relationship under Texas law. Miranda has
failed to establish an independent state tort duty that would
2
We also noted that state law actions that involve strong
state interests such as “the health and well-being of its
citizens” and are only peripherally related to the NLRA are not
preempted by the NLRA. Id.
8
escape preemption by the NLRA.
3. Preemption Under § 301
Finally, Miranda proposes a standard for preemption
different from that established by this court in Richardson.
Miranda argues that whether a state law claim is preempted by
§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 185, depends upon whether “resolution of the state claim
requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.”
Wells v. Gen. Motors Corp., 881 F.2d 166, 173 (5th Cir. 1989)
(emphasis omitted). Arguing that his claim against the Defendants
does not require interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement between the union and USPS, Miranda therefore contends
that his state law claim is not preempted.
While Miranda correctly articulates the standard for
preemption under § 301, he fails to recognize that this standard
does not apply to his case. LMRA § 301 provides a cause of action
for suits to enforce the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement. Miranda’s suit is not correctly categorized as a § 301
breach-of-contract claim, as he is not suing USPS for a failure
to uphold its responsibilities under the collective bargaining
agreement. Instead, Miranda’s claim is properly characterized as
a duty of fair representation claim, as he is suing his union for
its failure to represent him faithfully in its dealings with
USPS. See, e.g., DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164
(1983) (distinguishing between a § 301 claim against an employer
9
and a duty of fair representation claim against a union).3
Consequently, the appropriate standard for preemption is whether
Miranda is alleging that “the Union breached a duty that arose
from its status as [his] exclusive collective bargaining agent
under the NLRA.” Richardson, 864 F.2d at 1167. Despite his
protestations to the contrary, Miranda is indeed alleging the
breach of such a duty.
C. Statute of Limitations for Duty of Fair Representation Claim
In DelCostello, the Supreme Court held that the six-month
statute of limitations of NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b),
applies to a “hybrid § 301/fair representation claim,” that is, a
suit that combines a § 301 claim against the employer with a duty
of fair representation claim against the union. 462 U.S. at 163-
64, 171-72. In Richardson, 864 F.2d at 1167, and in Smith v.
3
In DelCostello, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a duty
of fair representation suit against a union was “inextricably
interdependent” with a § 301 suit against the employer, for “the
case [the employee] must prove is the same whether he sues one,
the other, or both.” 462 U.S. at 164-65. In order to prove injury
in a duty of fair representation suit against the union, an
employee must show that the employer violated the collective
bargaining agreement, and an employee normally cannot bring a
§ 301 action against his employer unless he can show that the
union breached its duty of fair representation in handling his
grievance. Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564 (1990).
Nevertheless, Richardson did not adopt the § 301 standard for
preemption analysis for duty of fair representation claims, and
we are bound to follow Richardson’s approach here.
Even if we did apply the § 301 standard to Miranda’s claims,
however, it would be clear that his claims are preempted. In
order to show injury from the Defendants’ actions, Miranda would
have to demonstrate that USPS’s adjustment of his seniority
violated the collective bargaining agreement. This demonstration
would require interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, thus satisfying the test for preemption under § 301.
10
International Organization of Masters, 296 F.3d 380, 382 (5th
Cir. 2002), this court held that the same statute of limitations
applies to duty of fair representation claims brought
independently.
Miranda filed suit against the Defendants on December 27,
2005. Each of the supposed instances of breach of duty by the
Defendants, the last of which is alleged to have occurred in
December 2004, took place more than six months before Miranda
filed suit. Miranda’s claims are therefore untimely. See 29
U.S.C. § 160(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
Because we agree with the district court that Miranda’s
claims against the Defendants are time barred, we AFFIRM the
order of the district court granting summary judgment to the
Defendants.
AFFIRMED.
11