Sanders v. AT&T

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT May 2, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-30847
Summary Calendar
WANDA SANDERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AT&T; METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(2:05-CV-2633)
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Wanda Sanders appeals the summary judgment awarded
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (MetLife) on her termination-
of-benefits claim under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (She does not appeal the summary
judgment awarded AT&T.)
As an active employee at AT&T, Sanders took medical leave, for
a mental disability, under its short-term-disability benefits plan.
AT&T was the plan administrator; MetLife, the claims administrator.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
A medical evaluation of Sanders’ case, performed on behalf of
MetLife toward the end of the 52 week period of short-term
benefits, concluded that Sanders was not capable of returning to
work. Based on MetLife’s finding her disabled under the plan,
Sanders was no longer considered an active employee of AT&T upon
expiration of the 52 week period.
Sanders filed a claim for long-term-disability benefits, which
was granted. Several months later, however, MetLife terminated
those benefits after determining Sanders did not qualify for them.
Sanders unsuccessfully administratively appealed the termination.
In May 2005, Sanders filed this action for, inter alia,
damages against AT&T and MetLife, pursuant to ERISA, claiming,
inter alia, the administrator had abused its discretion in
terminating her benefits. The district court awarded summary
judgment to AT&T and MetLife.
A summary judgment is reviewed de novo, viewing the record in
the light most favorable to the non-movant and applying the same
standards as did the district court. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); e.g.,
Bolton v. City of Dallas, 472 F.3d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 2006). Such
judgment is proper if the pleadings and discovery on file show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c);
e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
2
“When[, as here,] ... the language of the plan grants
discretion to an administrator to interpret the plan and determine
eligibility for benefits, a court will reverse an administrator’s
decision only for abuse of discretion.” High v. E-Systems Inc.,
459 F.3d 573, 576 (5th Cir. 2006). “The law requires only that
substantial evidence support a plan fiduciary’s decisions,
including those to deny or to terminate benefits, not that
substantial evidence (or, for that matter, even a preponderance)
exists to support the employee’s claim of disability.” Ellis v.
Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 394 F.3d 262, 273 (5th Cir.
2004).
Sanders claims MetLife, as claims administrator, conducted
only a limited review of her record, and “cherry picked” it to
justify the termination of benefits. Essentially for the reasons
stated by the district court in its well-reasoned and thorough
opinion, MetLife did not abuse its discretion in terminating
Sanders’ long-term benefits. A plan administrator’s
reconsideration of its prior decision is sufficient to meet ERISA’s
“full and fair review” requirement. Sweatman v. Commercial Union
Ins. Co., 39 F.3d 594, 598 (5th Cir. 1994). MetLife met this
requirement by reviewing Sanders’ medical files, obtaining
independent medical review, reviewing the claim following appeal,
and obtaining review by physician consultants in addition to the
one who initially reviewed the claim.
3
Any remaining claims were not raised in district court.
Accordingly, we decline to review them. E.g., Terrell Equip. Co.
Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 343 F.3d 478, 482 n.11 (5th
Cir. 2003).
AFFIRMED
4