Easley v. Dretke

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
F I L E D
February 15, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-41495
BETTY CARLENE JOHNSON EASLEY
Petitioner - Appellant
v.
DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION
Respondent - Appellee
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas, Marshall
No. 00-CV-198
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Betty Carlene Johnson Easley, a state prisoner convicted of
murdering her husband, appeals the district court’s denial of her
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. After denying Easley’s habeas petition in all respects,
the district court granted her application for certificate of
appealability. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
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court’s denial of Easley’s petition.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 9, 1996, Betty Easley (“Easley”) killed her
husband, Jimmy Wayne Easley, by shooting him several times with a
single-shot shotgun. On the night of the murder, Easley made a
number of inculpatory statements to the police, including telling
them “I meant to kill him.” She also claimed that her husband
had been trying to kill her.
At trial, Easley testified that the night before the murder,
her husband drugged her and tried to force her to have oral sex.
When she refused, her husband allegedly shoved more pills down
her throat, saying that he would leave her alone if she took
them. When Easley awoke, she allegedly heard her husband yelling
at her from outside her bedroom, locked her bedroom door, and
tried to use the bedroom telephone, but the line was dead. The
next thing she allegedly remembers was her husband knocking on
the door. She then recalls waking up in the hospital under
arrest. At the hospital, doctors found a toxic level of
butalbital, a barbituate, in her stomach. While Easley claimed
that her husband had forced her to take the butalbital, medical
evidence presented at trial suggested that she herself took it
shortly before heading to jail (the arresting officers recalled
letting her take a pill for her nerves before transporting her).
At trial, Easley’s lawyer, Christina Wedding, told the jury
that throughout her adult life Easley had made poor judgments
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regarding her significant others. Easley then took the stand and
testified about her past abusive relationships. She testified
that she married Jimmy Wayne Easley on three separate occasions
and that he tore up her furniture, beat her, pulled a gun on her,
threatened to burn down their house, was arrested for assaulting
her, and burned down his mother’s house. Easley also testified
about her marriages to four other men. Her marriage to one of
these men, Michael Chatham, ended when both Easley and Chatham
were life-flighted to the hospital after they stabbed each other
following a violent night of drinking.
After Easley testified, Wedding called Stephanie Carter,
Easley’s daughter, to the stand. Carter attempted to testify
about the abuse suffered by Easley in the past but was stopped
when the prosecution objected to this testimony, arguing that
only testimony related to Jimmy Wayne Easley’s abuse was relevant
to the murder. Wedding responded that the testimony was
necessary to show Easley’s state of mind on the night of the
killing. The trial court disagreed, noting that Easley
previously had testified that she did not remember her state of
mind when she killed her husband. Wedding also stated that the
prosecution would call Michael Chatham as a witness, and she said
that if Easley’s witnesses could not testify about past abuse,
Chatham should not be allowed to testify about past abuse either.
The trial court again disagreed, finding that Easley had opened
the door to Chatham’s impeachment and rebuttal testimony through
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her own testimony.
After Carter testified about Jimmy Wayne Easley’s
abusiveness, the prosecution called Michael Chatham as a rebuttal
witness. Chatham testified about his marriage to Easley, saying
that Easley was the aggressor on the night of the stabbing. He
denied stabbing Easley, testifying instead that he “was told”
that Easley inflicted a knife wound on herself that night.
Chatham also stated that Easley told him that she had beaten a
prior boyfriend, Bill Gordon, senseless with a baseball bat after
a fight.
The jury convicted Easley of murder. During the penalty
phase, Easley was the only defense witness called to testify.
She expressed remorse, saying that she would not have shot Wayne
“in my right mind” and that she “did not take the pills myself.”
After hearing her testimony, the jury sentenced her to life in
prison.
Easley appealed her conviction and sentence, which the state
appellate court affirmed. Easley v. State, 978 S.W.2d 244 (Tex.
App.--Texarkana 1998). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
refused her petition for discretionary review. With the
assistance of new counsel, Easley then filed a state habeas
application, asserting that Wedding rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. The trial court recommended that
Easley’s request be denied, and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied her application. Again with the assistance of
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counsel, Easley filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, raising the
same arguments that she raised in her state court habeas
application. A federal magistrate judge reviewed Easley’s § 2254
petition and conducted an evidentiary hearing as to whether
Easley’s trial counsel inappropriately failed to investigate and
discover that Easley suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”). The magistrate judge recommended that Easley’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied. After conducting a
de novo review, the district court denied her petition.
Easley filed a timely notice of appeal and an application
for a certificate of appealability (COA) with the district court.
The district court granted the COA on all issues presented in
Easley’s § 2254 petition. According to the district court, the
issues set forth in Easley’s petition are at least debatable in
light of the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Paine v. Massie, 339
F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that trial counsel’s failure
to offer expert evidence at trial that the petitioner suffered
from battered woman syndrome may have constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because Easley’s federal habeas corpus petition was filed in
September 2000, it is subject to review under the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). 28 U.S.C.
5
§ 2254; Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under AEDPA,
a federal court may only grant a habeas petition to an individual
convicted in state court if the state-court judgment:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly
established federal law if “the state court arrives at a
conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a
question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
than [the] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts.” Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations in original). A
decision is an unreasonable application of federal law if “the
state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
. . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Id. In a habeas corpus appeal, this court
reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error and
its conclusions of law de novo. Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708,
713 (5th Cir. 2004).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated
under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under this test, the petitioner can only
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prevail by showing: (1) that her counsel’s performance was
deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness;
and (2) that her counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced her
defense. Id. at 687-94.
When analyzing an attorney’s performance, this court is
“highly deferential” and applies a “strong presumption” that
counsel rendered an adequate performance and that the conduct was
part of a reasoned strategy. Id. at 689. As for the prejudice
prong of the Strickland test, “[t]he defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Id. at 694. If the petitioner fails to
establish either the performance or prejudice prong of the
Strickland test, her ineffective assistance of counsel claim
fails. Id. at 687-94.
III. ANALYSIS
Easley argues on appeal that she was denied effective
assistance of counsel because her trial counsel failed to: (1)
discover and present evidence of her PTSD; (2) provide
documentary proof that Easley was no-billed for assaulting
Chatham; (3) investigate and present certain evidence regarding
her PTSD, diminished capacity, and past abuse during the penalty
phase; (4) object to Chatham’s hearsay testimony; (5) ask for a
limiting instruction regarding Chatham’s testimony; and (6)
7
object to certain of the prosecutor’s closing remarks.
A. Failure To Discover Easley’s PTSD
Easley’s primary argument on appeal is that Wedding failed
to provide her with effective assistance of counsel because she
did not hire an expert to discover and present evidence of the
fact that Easley suffered from PTSD. Easley contends that such
evidence would have shown the jury that she thought she had to
kill her husband and would have helped the jury to understand her
history of substance abuse and bad relationships. Easley also
contends that Wedding knew before trial that she would insist on
testifying about her prior abusive relationships, and the only
way that Wedding could have redeemed this testimony was by having
an expert witness place it into context.
In response, Wedding submitted an affidavit in the state
habeas proceeding stating that she had obtained a court order for
a mental health examination of Easley and that the court’s
neutral expert, Dr. William Crommack, found that Easley did not
suffer from PTSD. Additionally, Wedding reviewed Easley’s
medical records and applications for Social Security benefits,
none of which indicated that she suffered from PTSD. Based on
this evidence, the state habeas court denied Easley’s petition
for writ of habeas corpus, finding that Wedding had thoroughly
investigated Easley’s case and had no information that “would
alert [her] to the possibility that [Easley] had [PTSD] or that
8
would otherwise justify expert testimony at trial” regarding
PTSD. The district court denied Easley’s habeas petition for
similar reasons, finding that Wedding sufficiently discussed
trial options with Easley, sufficiently investigated Easley’s
state of mind, and justifiably concluded that the available
medical evidence indicated that Easley was not suffering from
PTSD.
On appeal, Easley relies primarily on the Tenth Circuit’s
holding in Paine, 339 F.3d at 1197, in which the court found that
plaintiff’s counsel may have rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to use expert testimony to support her claim of self-
defense based on battered woman syndrome (“BWS”). In reaching
this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the applicable
Oklahoma law on self-defense and BWS, noting that in Bechtel v.
State, 840 P.2d 1, 8, 10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992), Oklahoma’s
highest criminal court held that the failure to have an expert
witness testify about an abused woman’s BWS at trial is
reversible error in Oklahoma, since such testimony is necessary
to establish a self-defense claim in Oklahoma based on BWS.
Paine, 339 F.3d at 1201-02 (holding that “counsel failed to do
something that the [Oklahoma court in Bechtel] said was necessary
to mount an effective self-defense claim given the jury’s likely
misconceptions about BWS”).
Paine is readily distinguishable from the present case.
First, Paine is not controlling precedent in this circuit.
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Second, Paine turns on the fact that under Oklahoma state law,
expert testimony is necessary to support a BWS defense. See
Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 8, 10. No such requirement exists under
Texas state law for a PTSD defense, making Paine’s holding
inapplicable in Texas. Third, Paine does not address trial
counsel’s duty to use an expert to investigate possible defenses
prior to trial, but only discusses the use of an expert once a
BWS defense already has been raised at trial. In the present
case, no PTSD defense was ever raised at trial and, accordingly,
Paine is not directly on point.
While Paine is distinguishable from the present case,
several courts have addressed factual scenarios similar to the
case at hand, concluding that counsel’s failure to discover that
a defendant suffered from PTSD was not ineffective assistance of
counsel under Strickland when counsel, like Wedding, had
investigated the defendant’s history and had no reason to suspect
the existence of PTSD. See, e.g., Campbell v. Coyle, 260 F.3d
531 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that counsel’s failure to
investigate and discover petitioner’s PTSD was not ineffective
assistance of counsel when a clinical psychologist failed to
diagnose the petitioner as suffering from PTSD and when counsel
investigated the petitioner’s history); Taylor v. Mitchell, 296
F. Supp. 2d 784 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that counsel’s failure
to investigate and discover petitioner’s PTSD was not ineffective
assistance of counsel after a forensic psychologist failed to
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diagnose him as suffering from PTSD). Additionally, in those
cases in which Texas appellate courts have reversed convictions
because trial counsel failed to request or were not provided with
a mental health expert, evidence already existed indicating that
the defendant’s mental health would be a significant factor at
trial. See, e.g., Woods v. State, 59 S.W.3d 833, 837-38 (Tex.
App.--Texarkana 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 108 S.W.3d 314
(Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (trial counsel was aware that the
defendant had a history of commitment to mental health hospitals
since age thirteen and there was evidence that he heard voices
and suffered hallucinations); In re R.D.B., 20 S.W.3d 255, 256-
57, 261 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2000) (the defendant had a frontal
lobe brain injury, was taking medication for it, and a
psychiatric evaluation indicated that the injury may have
contributed to his behavior). Likewise, in all cases where this
circuit has held that a trial counsel’s performance was
ineffective for failing to investigate properly an insanity
defense, trial counsel knew that their clients had serious mental
disorders. See, e.g., Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 596-
97 (5th Cir. 1990) (counsel’s failure to investigate a possible
insanity defense was unreasonable because the defendant told him
that he had been institutionalized several times and was taking
medication for mental problems); Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d
1245, 1247-49 (5th Cir. 1987) (counsel’s failure to investigate
an insanity defense was unreasonable because counsel knew that
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the defendant previously had been adjudicated insane and the only
viable defense was insanity). Conversely, as both the state
habeas court and the district court have noted in the present
case, Wedding had no evidence of Easley’s PTSD. To the contrary,
all information available to Wedding (e.g., Dr. Crommack’s
evaluation of Easley and Easley’s prior medical records)
suggested that Easley did not suffer from PTSD.
Additionally, in Black v. Collins, 962 F.2d 394, 401 (5th
Cir. 1992), this court found that the petitioner’s trial counsel,
who knew of the petitioner’s PTSD, was not ineffective for
failing to investigate and present evidence of his PTSD, since
counsel did not believe that his crime fit with the
characteristics of PTSD and made a strategic choice not to pursue
a PTSD trial strategy. If the trial counsel in Black was not
ineffective in choosing not to use documented proof of his
client’s PTSD, Wedding cannot be faulted for failing to pursue a
PTSD defense, especially in light of the fact that Dr. Crommack’s
evaluation and Wedding’s reasonable investigation indicated that
Easley did not suffer from PTSD. Accordingly, the district court
correctly found that the state habeas court did not err when it
concluded that Wedding did not render ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to investigate further a PTSD defense.
B. Failure To Offer Documentary Proof That Easley Was No-
Billed For Stabbing Chatham
Easley next claims that Wedding provided ineffective
12
assistance of counsel by failing to introduce at trial evidence
that a grand jury in Galveston chose to no-bill her for stabbing
Michael Chatham. The state habeas court and the district court
found that Wedding did not render ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to introduce this evidence because Easley
testified at trial that she was no-billed. Because Easley’s
testimony on this issue was uncontested, and because additional
evidence of this fact would have been cumulative, the district
court did not err when it concluded that the state habeas court
correctly found that Wedding did not render ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to introduce such evidence. See
TEX. R. EVID. 403 (stating that Texas law does not permit the
“needless presentation of cumulative evidence”).
C. Failure To Introduce Mitigating Evidence During The
Penalty Phase
Easley additionally claims that she was denied effective
assistance of counsel because Wedding failed to investigate and
present evidence that could have been used at the penalty phase
to mitigate her sentence. Specifically, Easley claims that
Wedding failed to: (1) present evidence of her PTSD during the
penalty phase; (2) interview all of her daughters and several of
her friends and have them testify during the penalty phase about
Wedding’s violent past; and (3) present evidence at the penalty
phase that she killed her husband while in a dissociative state
caused by her PTSD, the drugs in her system, and her husband’s
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actions.
Because, as we have already held, Wedding did not provide
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to discover Easley’s
PTSD, the district court correctly concluded that the state court
reasonably found that her failure to address PTSD at the penalty
phase did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. With
respect to Easley’s other claims, this court has held that “a
tactical decision not to pursue and present potential mitigating
evidence on the grounds that it is double-edged in nature is
objectively reasonable, and therefore does not amount to
deficient performance.” Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 564
(5th Cir. 1997). Similarly, the Supreme Court stated in
Strickland that when a defendant has provided her lawyer with a
reason to think that pursuing a certain investigation would be
fruitless or harmful, “counsel’s failure to pursue those
investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Under this standard, the district
court did not err when it concluded that the state habeas court
correctly found that Wedding did not act unreasonably when she
chose to minimize testimony regarding Easley’s violent past and
her mental state on the night of the murder.1
1
In her brief, Easley relies on Anderson v. Johnson, 338
F.3d 382, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2003), for the proposition that
Wedding should have interviewed all of her potential witnesses.
Anderson, however, only pertains to the failure to interview
eyewitnesses to a crime--it does not address the failure to
interview character witnesses. See id. at 391.
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D. Easley’s Remaining Arguments
In Easley’s three remaining arguments, she claims that
Wedding improperly failed to: (1) object to Michael Chatham’s
hearsay statement regarding her self-inflicted knife wounds; (2)
ask for a limiting instruction regarding Chatham’s testimony; and
(3) object to remarks made by the prosecutor during his closing
argument about physical violence in Easley’s past relationships.
Easley claims that when these errors are examined cumulatively,
there is a reasonable probability that she would have been
acquitted but for them.
In this circuit, the cumulative error doctrine only applies
when the errors themselves involve matters of constitutional
dimension and “so infected the entire trial that the resulting
conviction violates due process.” Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d
1453, 1454 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc). When this court evaluates
whether the cumulative error doctrine applies to a set of facts,
it “review[s] the record as a whole to determine whether the
errors more likely than not caused a suspect verdict.” Spence v.
Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 1001 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In this circuit, “[m]eritless claims or claims
that are not prejudicial cannot be cumulated, regardless of the
total number raised.” Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726 (5th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Derden, 978 F.2d at 1461). In the present
case, the errors that Wedding may have committed in no way cast
15
doubt on the jury’s verdict. The evidence presented at trial was
simply overwhelming. For example, Easley herself admitted more
than once to shooting her husband. The gun that killed him was
found not far from where she was found. Easley admitted that her
husband had not threatened to kill her on the night of the
murder. She further claimed to not recall her state of mind when
she killed him. Moreover, aspects of Easley’s account of the
night in question were inconsistent with the available evidence
(e.g., she claimed her husband tried to break into her room and
that he forced her to take pills, but no evidence of an attempted
break in was found and the medical evidence suggested that Easley
voluntarily took the pills after killing her husband). This
court has held on several occasions that overwhelming evidence of
a defendant’s guilt supports the conclusion that she suffered no
prejudice as a result of her counsel’s performance and mistakes.
See, e.g., United States v. Royal, 972 F.2d 643, 651 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Oakley, 827 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir.
1987) (per curiam). Because of the overwhelming evidence against
Easley, no reason exists for thinking that the jury would have
acquitted her had Wedding objected to Chatham’s hearsay
testimony, asked for a limiting instruction, and objected to the
prosecutor’s closing remarks. Accordingly, the district court
did not err when it concluded that the state habeas court
correctly found that Easley’s remaining ineffective assistance of
counsel claims fail because any error regarding them was
16
harmless.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court AFFIRMS the judgment
of the district court.
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