Murray v. Earle

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED APRIL 13, 2005
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 31, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-51379
LACRESHA MURRAY, ET AL
Plaintiffs
LACRESHA MURRAY
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
RONNIE EARLE, etc.; ET AL
Defendant
DAYNA BLAZEY, Individually and as an Assistant District Attorney of
Travis County, Texas; STEPHANIE EMMONS, Individually and as an
Assistant District Attorney of Travis County, Texas; ANGELA MCGOWN,
Individually and as Supervisor of the Travis County Child
Protective Services; HECTOR REVELES, Individually and as a
Detective of the Austin Police Department; ERNEST PEDRAZA,
Individually and as a Detective of the Austin Police Department;
ALBERT EELS, Individually and as a Detective of the Austin Police
Department
Defendants-Appellants.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(A-02-CV-552-SS)
--------------------
Before WIENER and PRADO, Circuit Judges, and KINKEADE,* District
Judge.
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-appellants Dayna Blazey, Stephanie Emmons, Hector
*
District Judge, Northern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
Reveles, Angela McGown, Ernest Pedraza and Albert Eells appeal the
district court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment on the
grounds of immunity under federal and state law. They contend on
appeal that they should not be held liable for coercing a
confession from the minor plaintiff-appellee, LaCresha Murray,
which ultimately led to her later-reversed conviction (and lengthy
incarceration) for injury to a child.1 We reverse.
I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This case arises out of the investigation of plaintiff-
appellee LaCresha Murray’s (“LaCresha”) involvement in the death of
Jayla Belton, age two, in 1996. At the time of these events,
LaCresha was eleven years old. She and her siblings lived with her
grandparents, R.L. and Shirley Murray, who were her adoptive
parents, as well. The Murrays also provided daycare in their home
for several other children.
Late in May of 1996, Jayla, who was routinely cared for by the
Murrays, was dropped off at the Murray home by her mother’s
boyfriend. During the course of the day, Jayla appeared to be ill.
After she vomited at the lunch table, LaCresha’s older sister,
Shawntay, gave Jayla some medication and put her to bed. No one
checked on Jayla until later that day. R.L. Murray testified that,
late in the afternoon, LaCresha came in from outside and went to
1
In Texas, juvenile criminal adjudications are civil in
nature, therefore, LaCresha’s conviction is for a civil, not
criminal, offense.
2
the back of the house, near the bedroom where Jayla was sleeping.
R.L. then heard “thumping noises,” but he assumed that LaCresha was
playing with a ball and told her to stop. Shortly after that,
LaCresha told R.L. that Jayla was throwing up and shaking. He
asked her to bring Jayla to the front of the house, where he
observed that Jayla appeared ill. He told Lacresha to take Jayla
outside to warm her up.
At 5:00 p.m., another parent arrived to collect her children
and noticed that Jayla was sweating profusely. That parent urged
R.L. to call 911, but he declined to do so. R.L. took Jayla to the
hospital, however; she was pronounced dead at approximately 5:30
p.m.
An autopsy conducted the following day revealed that Jayla had
suffered a severe liver injury caused by a blunt blow to the
abdomen. This trauma had broken four of her ribs and split her
liver into two pieces. The medical examiner concluded that Jayla
had died within five to fifteen minutes after receiving the injury
and also noted some thirty other bruises to her head, ear,
forehead, back, shoulder, elbow, chest, and the left side of her
torso. The examiner ruled Jayla’s death a homicide.
That same day, law-enforcement authorities removed all the
children from the Murray home. They placed LaCresha and one of her
sisters in Texas Baptist Children’s Home, a private shelter for
children which contracts with the State to provide foster care. At
3
the time that these children were removed from their adoptive
parents’ home, the authorities believed that they were in danger.
There is some dispute as to exactly when the police first began to
suspect that LaCresha had killed Jayla, but the focus of the
investigation had quickly shifted to LaCresha after law-enforcement
authorities spoke with other members of the household.
Three days after LaCresha had been removed from her adoptive
parents’ home, Detective Reveles directed Detectives Pedraza and
Eels, along with Angela McGown, the supervisor of the Travis County
Child Protective Services, to interview LaCresha. It is undisputed
that, by this time, the police no longer feared for LaCresha’s
safety but instead considered her a suspect in Jayla’s death.
Before the interview of LaCresha, Detectives Reveles and
Pedraza consulted with assistant district attorney Emmons on the
proper method of interrogating LaCresha. Emmons testified that,
even though LaCresha had been at the Texas Baptist Children’s Home
for three days, none of the officials believed that she was in the
custody of the State. In their minds, this obviated the need for
them to take her before a magistrate, as required by Texas law for
children who are in state custody. Pedraza and Eels gave LaCresha
a Miranda warning before beginning to interrogate her, but they did
not take her before a magistrate or notify her parents or attorney.
The detectives questioned LaCresha at the Baptist Children’s
Home for approximately two hours, eventually eliciting a confession
4
that she had dropped Jayla and kicked her. The State then charged
her with capital murder and injury to a child; the juvenile court
ruled her confession admissible; and the jury convicted her of
negligent homicide and injury to a child. Extensive publicity
followed, presumably influencing the juvenile court to order a new
trial on its own motion. At the second trial, the State charged
LaCresha with injury to a child; her confession was again admitted;
and the second jury convicted her. The juvenile court adjudicated
LaCresha delinquent and sentenced her to twenty-five years in the
custody of the Texas Youth Commission.
Three years later, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed
LaCresha’s conviction.2 The appellate court ruled that LaCresha
had been in the custody of the State, that law-enforcement
authorities had violated Texas law by not taking her before a
magistrate prior to interrogating her, and that her confession was
therefore inadmissible.3
LaCresha then brought suit in district court for damages
against numerous individuals, some of whom were only tangentially
related to the LaCresha’s judicial proceedings, asserting various
violations of her constitutional and state rights. On motions for
summary judgment, the district court dismissed all her claims
except those against the Defendants——Appellants (collectively, “the
2
In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, 291 (Tex. App. – Austin 1999,
pet. denied).
3
Id.
5
defendants”) for violations of her Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and for state law civil conspiracy. The
defendants now appeal the denial of their summary judgment motions
for qualified immunity on LaCresha’s Fifth Amendment claims and for
official immunity under state law on her civil conspiracy claims.
We have jurisdiction over both appeals. A defendant may
immediately appeal the denial of qualified immunity, even though it
is not a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4 The Texas law
of official immunity provides the same protection against both
suit and liability as does the federal doctrine, so we also have
jurisdiction to review denial of state law immunity claims on
interlocutory appeal.5
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review denials of grants of summary judgment de novo.6
Summary judgment may be granted if the moving party shows there is
no genuine issue of material fact, and it is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.7 We construe all facts and inferences in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing grants
4
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524-25 (1985).
5
Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299
F.3d 395, 413 (5th Cir. 2002).
6
Tex. Med. Ass’n v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 153, 156
(5th Cir. 1996).
7
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
6
of motions for summary judgment.8
B. Fifth Amendment Violation: Qualified Immunity
In undertaking a qualified immunity analysis, we must first
determine whether the plaintiff has suffered a violation of his
constitutional rights and, if so, whether a reasonable official
should have known that he was violating the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.9 The district court held that, under these
narrow circumstances —— an eleven-year-old child is removed from
her home, housed at a private shelter by the State for three days,
interrogated there for hours by two seasoned investigators to the
point of confession without an adult or advocate present to
represent her interests, and is convicted largely on the strength
of that confession —— the child may, after the conviction is
overturned on the grounds that the confession was inadmissible, sue
under § 1983 for damages she suffered as a result of the violation
of her constitutional rights.10 On appeal, the defendants insist
8
Hart v. O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 435 (5th Cir. 1997), cert
denied, 5525 U.S. 1103 (1999).
9
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 739 (2002). Defendants
Emmons and Blazey are each prosecuting attorneys in Travis
County, however, they are entitled to claim only qualified
immunity rather than the absolute immunity normally enjoyed by
prosecutors. LaCresha is suing them for the legal advice which
they provided the police investigators, for which they are not
entitled to absolute immunity. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
496 (1992)(holding that absolute immunity does not protect the
prosecutorial function of giving advice to the police).
10
LaCresha spent three years in juvenile detention as a
result of her conviction.
7
that, even if LaCresha’s right against self-incrimination was
violated, § 1983 does not, or at least should not, provide her with
a remedy. We hold that, because LaCresha cannot demonstrate that
defendants acted unreasonably, in that their actions did not
proximately cause the damages that she suffered, she may not
maintain a Fifth Amendment cause of action against them under §
1983.
1. Constitutional Violation
It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant’s constitutional
rights have been violated “if his conviction is based, in whole or
in part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or
falsity.”11 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is a fundamental trial right which can be violated
only at trial, even though pre-trial conduct by law enforcement
officials may ultimately impair that right.12 The constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination adheres in juvenile court
proceedings just as it does in ordinary criminal court.13 In fact,
11
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 n.33 (1966). The
Supreme Court has held that § 1983 plaintiffs do not have a Fifth
Amendment claim against law-enforcement officials who have
elicited unlawful confessions if those confessions are not then
introduced against the plaintiffs in criminal proceedings. This
case is distinguishable, as LaCresha’s statement was admitted at
trial and did result in her conviction. See Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760 (2003).
12
Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767; United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)(internal citations omitted).
13
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 55 (1967).
8
states must take greater care to protect juveniles against coerced
confessions during police interrogations, because children are more
likely to be induced to confess, and their confessions are less
likely to be reliable.14
a. Custodial Interrogation
An individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination is implicated only during a “custodial”
interrogation.15 The Supreme Court defines “custodial
interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody.”16 A suspect
is “in custody” for these purposes either (1) when he is formally
arrested or (2) “when a reasonable person in the position of the
suspect would understand the situation to constitute a restraint on
freedom of movement to the degree that the law associates with
formal arrest.”17 We review de novo the question whether an
14
Id. at 55. “[A]uthoritative opinion has cast formidable
doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’
by children.” Id. at 52.
15
See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990)(citing
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444); United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d
928, 939 (5th Cir. 1997)(“It is axiomatic that ‘the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits
admitting statements given by a suspect during ‘custodial
interrogation’ without a prior warning.’”)(quoting Perkins, 496
U.S. at 296).
16
Gonzales, 121 F.3d at 939 (5th Cir. 1997)(citing Perkins,
496 U.S. at 296)(internal quotations omitted).
17
Gonzales, 121 F.3d at 940 n.6 (citing United States v.
Galberth, 846 F.2d 983, 986 n.1 (5th Cir. 1988) and United States
v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.)(en banc), cert
9
interrogation was custodial.18
The district court relied heavily on the reasoning of the
Texas Court of Appeals in determining whether LaCresha was in the
custody of the State during her interrogation. The Texas appellate
court’s initial determination whether LaCresha was in custody,
though addressing the federal constitutional standard for
“custodial interrogations,” was undertaken solely for the purposes
of the Texas law requiring that, if so, she should have been taken
before a magistrate before the police questioned her.19 This
inquiry is apposite but not determinative of our de novo federal
constitutional inquiry regarding “in custody,” i.e., whether a
reasonable person in LaCresha’s position would have understood that
his liberty was constrained to the extent associated with formal
arrest.
On the latter issue, the Texas appellate court held, in
contrast to the Texas trial court, that LaCresha’s interrogation
was custodial, adopting and applying a “reasonable child” standard.
The court asked whether, under these circumstances, a reasonable
child of eleven would have believed that her freedom of movement
denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988)).
18
United States v. Paul, 142 F.3d 836, 843 (5th Cir. 1998).
19
Texas law requires that a child be taken before a
magistrate before interrogation if the child is in a detention
facility or other place of confinement. Tex. Fam. Code. §
51.095(d)(1).
10
was constrained to the degree associated with formal arrest.20 The
appellate court emphasized that LaCresha was involuntarily removed
from her home by the State and placed in a children’s shelter
pursuant to emergency provisions of section 262 of the Texas Family
Code.21 The state appellate court agreed with the state trial court
that, for purposes of evaluating whether LaCresha was “in custody”
for purposes of Texas state law, the Texas Baptist Children’s home
was not a jail or detention facility.22 The appellate court
diverged from the trial court, however, in ruling that (1) because
the shelter assumed all duties of care and control over children
residing there, it was a place of confinement; and (2) practically
speaking, LaCresha was not free to leave, as she would have had to
“run away” from the shelter, and she had no means of returning to
her home.23 Although the determination that the shelter was a
“place of confinement” under Texas state law is not directly
relevant to the question whether LaCresha was in custody during the
ensuing interrogation, the state appellate court’s underlying
determinations regarding the degree of restriction over LaCresha’s
movement imposed by the state is relevant to whether she would have
20
In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, 289 (Tex. App. —— Austin,
1999, pet. denied).
21
Id.
22
See Tex. Fam. Code. § 51.095(d)(1).
23
In re L.M. 993 S.W.2d 276, 289 (Tex. App. —— Austin,
1999, pet. denied).
11
felt her liberty to be constrained.
The defendants protest that we ought not consider a suspect’s
age in evaluating whether he was “in custody” for purposes of a
Fifth Amendment violation. Rather, they assert, we must use an
objective test, asking only whether a reasonable person, not a
reasonable child, would have concluded that his liberty was
constrained.24 The Supreme Court has endorsed this approach when
confronted with an interrogation of a seventeen-year-old suspect,
but the Court’s conclusion rested on the assertion that the
“custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear
guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect’s
individual characteristics —— including his age —— could be viewed
as creating a subjective inquiry.”25 Justice O’Connor wrote
separately to emphasize that “[t]here may be cases in which a
suspect’s age will be relevant to the Miranda ‘custody’ inquiry”
but that in Yarborough, the defendant was almost eighteen years old
and it would be difficult “to expect police to recognize that a
suspect is a juvenile when he is so close to the age of majority.”26
The case of an eleven-year-old is different. The police
should have no difficulty recognizing that their suspect is a
juvenile and adjusting their determination whether the suspect
24
See United States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 940 n.6 (5th
Cir. 1997)(citations omitted).
25
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2151-52 (2004).
26
Yarborough, 124 S. Ct. at 2152 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
12
would understand his freedom of movement to be constrained
accordingly. In any event, even if we were to ignore LaCresha’s
age at the time of her interrogation, we would still conclude that
a reasonable individual of any age who is removed involuntarily
from his home, housed by the State for three days, not informed
that he is free to leave, and questioned by two police detectives
in a closed interrogation room, would believe that his liberty was
constrained to the degree associated with formal arrest.27 We hold
that LaCresha was “in custody” for purposes of evaluating her
interrogation.
b. Involuntary Confession
Next, we must determine whether the statement that LaCresha
gave while in custody was involuntary, making its introduction at
her criminal trial violative of her Fifth Amendment rights.
Although LaCresha’s statement was taken in violation of Texas law,
this alone did not automatically produce a violation of her Fifth
27
See United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1405 (5th
Cir. 1992)(“[T]he most obvious and effective means of
demonstrating that a suspect has not been taken into custody ‘is
for the police to inform the suspect that an arrest is not being
made and that the suspect may terminate the interview at
will.’”)(citing United States. v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349
(8th Cir. 1990)); United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 124
n.1 (5th Cir. 1990)(“We agree with the defendant that a detention
of approximately an hour raises considerable suspicion,” though
declining to establish a bright-line rule for when a suspect’s
interrogation becomes custodial); United States v. Bengivenga,
845 F.2d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 1988)(holding that 90-second, routine
citizenship check at Mexican border did not constitute custodial
interrogation). Here, the act of the police in administering a
Miranda warning should confirm their own belief that LaCresha was
in custody.
13
Amendment rights.28 Once we have concluded that a juvenile’s
interrogation was custodial, we determine whether such a suspect’s
confession is coerced or involuntary by examining the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the child’s interrogation.29 In
addition to the fact that the interrogation was conducted in
violation of state law, our examination includes consideration of
the juvenile’s “age, experience, education, background, and
intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to understand
the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights,
and the consequences of waiving those rights.”30 The Supreme Court
has admonished that the police are required to take special care to
ensure the voluntariness of a minor suspect’s confession:
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason
when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must
be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary,
in the sense not only that it was not coerced or
suggested, but also that it was not the product of
ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright
or despair.31
28
See Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilderness, 160 F.3d 1173, 1175
(7th Cir. 1998)(“Indiana would not have permitted [the juvenile
plaintiff’s] confession to be used in a state prosecution. . .
But . . .the voluntariness of a confession depends on public
officials’ compliance with constitutional norms, not on any rule
of state law.”).
29
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); Gachot v.
Stadler, 298 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2002).
30
Fare, 442 U.S. at 725; Gachot, 298 F.3d at 418-19
(quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 725).
31
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
14
Every factor weighed in our analysis militates against the
conclusion that LaCresha’s statement was voluntary. At eleven
years of age, she was far younger than the fifteen-year-old
juvenile suspect whom we held to have voluntarily confessed in
Gachot v. Stadler.32 She had no experience with the criminal
justice system, had been held in the custody of the State for three
days, was unaccompanied by any parent, guardian, attorney, or other
friendly adult, and was found to have below-normal intelligence by
the court-appointed psychiatrist prior to her criminal trial, also
in contrast to the Gachot defendant.33
LaCresha cannot be held to have knowingly and voluntarily
waived her rights to be represented by counsel and to remain
silent.34 Other than having LaCresha sign a Miranda card, and
32
298 F.3d at 416, 421.
33
Id. (noting that the defendant was accompanied by his
brother during the interrogation, voluntarily went to the police
station for questioning, and was there for approximately four
hours). Compare Fare, 442 U.S. at 726-27 (holding 16 1/2 year-
old juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment
rights during an interrogation as he had considerable experience
with the police, having a record of several arrests, sufficient
intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving, and was not
worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy
questioning by trickery or deceit) with Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948) (holding that a 15-year-old who had been arrested at
midnight, taken to a police station and subjected to continuous
interrogation by a rotation of several police officers, without
counsel or friend, until he confessed to participating in a
robbery and shooting, had not voluntarily confessed).
34
See E.A.W. v. State, 547 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. Civ. App. ——
Waco 1977, no writ)(holding that an eleven-year-old child cannot
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive her
15
briefly explaining her rights to her at the outset of the
interrogation, the police took no precautions to ensure the
voluntariness of her statement, let alone “special care.” The
police made no effort to contact LaCresha’s adoptive parents, and
the shelter, which had assumed responsibility for her care, sent no
representative with her to the interrogation. LaCresha was never
told that she was free to leave or that she could call her adoptive
parents or any other friendly adult. In addition, the police
officers represented to LaCresha that they had already talked to
everyone in her family, that everyone “knew” what happened, and
that she could help her family only by telling the truth. We hold
that LaCresha’s statement was involuntary, and that its admission
at trial violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.
2. Clearly Established Law
To overcome a claim of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must
establish that the right an official is alleged to have violated
was “clearly established,” i.e., sufficiently clearly defined that
“a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.”35 Although there need not be prior case law
directly on point for a constitutional right to be clearly
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination after
spending nine hours, from midnight to nine a.m., in a detention
facility, and without the guidance of a parent, guardian or
attorney).
35
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
16
established, the state of the law must be such that a reasonable
officer would be on notice that his actions could violate a
constitutional right.36 Defendants argue that, even assuming
arguendo that clearly established law should have put them on
notice that their interrogation of LaCresha was custodial and that
her statement was not made voluntarily, no clearly established law
put them on notice that their actions could violate her Fifth
Amendment rights.
Defendants assert that a reasonable officer would not have
understood that his actions could have violated LaCresha’s Fifth
Amendment rights because, as we discussed above, such a violation
requires that (1) officials coerce an involuntary statement from a
suspect and (2) this statement later be introduced against her at
trial.37 Therefore, because an officer cannot contemporaneously
interrogate a suspect unlawfully and violate a suspect’s Fifth
Amendment rights, we must determine whether clearly established law
should have alerted a reasonable official that his pre-trial
conduct, although perhaps a but-for cause of the violation of the
plaintiff’s trial rights, could proximately cause a violation of
her Fifth Amendment rights.
In a perfect world, trial courts protect defendants’ Fifth
Amendment rights by excluding improperly obtained confessions or
36
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
37
See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003).
17
statements.38 In this real-world case, however, the trial court
failed to protect LaCresha’s rights. It is true that the officers
wrongfully elicited LaCresha’s confession during her interrogation
and that this confession was later wrongfully admitted at trial and
used against her, and ultimately resulted in her conviction; yet a
trial judge twice heard all the evidence concerning the
circumstances surrounding LaCresha’s confession and twice admitted
it into evidence. The defendants thus insist that, inasmuch as the
decision whether to admit a criminal defendant’s statement lies
within the discretion of the presiding judge at trial, that judge’s
decision to admit LaCresha’s confession was an independent,
superseding cause of the violation of her Fifth Amendment rights.39
38
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985)(ruling
that failure to Mirandize a witness before his confession
automatically results in exclusion of the statement’s use in the
prosecution’s case in chief); United States v. Blue, 384 U.S.
251, 255 (1966) (“Even if we assume that the Government did
acquire incriminating evidence in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, Blue would at most be entitled to suppress the
evidence and its fruits if they were sought to be used against
him at trial”).
39
See Crowe v. County of San Diego, 303 F. Supp. 2d 1050,
1091-92 (S.D. Cal. 2004). The Crowe court also observed that it
would be unfair to subject to civil liability under § 1983 only
those police officers whose improper questioning produced
statements admitted at trial but exonerate those officers whose
questioning violated defendants’ civil rights more egregiously,
resulting in statements excluded by the trial court. 303 F.
Supp. 2d at 1092. We find this logic unpersuasive, as defendants
abused by the police during their interrogations may bring suit
for violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Chavez,
538 U.S. at 773-74; Rex v. Teeples, 753 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir.
1985)(“Extracting an involuntary confession by coercion is a due
process violation.”)(citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503,
513-15) (1963) and Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-23
18
Therefore, contend the defendants, because their improper
questioning could not have caused the violation of LaCresha’s Fifth
Amendment rights, they should not be held liable for the
violation.40
Section 1983 does require a showing of proximate causation,
which is evaluated under the common law standard.41 In cases like
this one, we read § 1983 against the background of tort liability
that makes a person liable for the natural consequences of his
actions.42 A corollary of these background tenets of tort law
(1959)); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 944-45 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 894 (1972).
40
The defendants argue that the presiding judge or
prosecutor is responsible and therefore liable for the
constitutional violation; but, of course, judges and prosecutors
enjoy absolute immunity for their judicial decisions and
prosecutorial functions, respectively. Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420
(1976). Whether an objectively reasonable officer could be
aware, as he was improperly obtaining a suspect’s statement, that
he could be violating that individual’s Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights is a separate question that we do
not address, as LaCresha did not allege a violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 773
(2003)(“Our views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s
Self-Incrimination Clause do not mean that police torture or
other abuse that results in a confession is constitutionally
permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial; it
simply means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,
rather than the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause,
would govern the inquiry in those cases and provide relief in
appropriate circumstances.”)(emphasis in original).
41
Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976).
42
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), over-ruled on
other grounds, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)(holding that plaintiffs may sue
municipalities for civil rights violations using § 1983).
19
relieves tortfeasors from liability if there exists a superseding
cause, or “an act of a third person or other force which by its
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to
another which his antecedent wrongful act was a substantial factor
in bringing about.”43 Defendants advance that the trial judge’s
decision to admit LaCresha’s statement into evidence constitutes
such a superseding cause, and that, absent any allegation or proof
that they endeavored to mislead the judge into admitting an
involuntary statement at trial, they cannot have acted
“unreasonably” according to clearly established law for purposes of
§ 1983 liability.
Albeit in dicta, the Supreme Court has intimated that this
argument should not hold sway, at least with respect to false
arrest claims. Although the Court in Malley v. Briggs conceded
that the appellant police officer’s argument that he could not have
proximately caused a defendant’s unlawful arrest by filing an
affidavit unsupported by probable cause was not before it on
appeal, the Court stated that it would not have been receptive to
this contention.44 Malley states that § 1983 should be read against
background tort law, which recognizes the liability of individuals
for the consequences of their acts:
Petitioner has not pressed the argument that in
a case like this the officer should not be liable
43
Restatement 2d of Torts § 440-41 (1965).
44
475 U.S. 335, 345 n.7 (1986).
20
because the judge’s decision to issue the warrant
breaks the causal chain between the application for
the warrant and the improvident arrest. It should be
clear, however, that the District Court’s “no
causation” rationale in this case is inconsistent with
our interpretation of § 1983. As we stated in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), § 1983 “should be
read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions.45
One year after Malley, we implicitly endorsed this approach in
United States v. Burzynski Cancer Research Institute, holding that
Malley required us to reject a police officer’s “superseding cause”
arguments and examine only whether a reasonably well-trained
officer would have known that his warrant application was
unsupported by probable cause.46 The following year, however, we
decided Gary v. Hand, a false arrest case in which we held that,
when a neutral intermediary, such as a justice of the peace,
reviews the facts and allows a case to go forward, such an act
“breaks the chain of causation.”47 We qualified our holding by
stating that “the chain of causation is broken only where all the
facts are presented to the grand jury, or other independent
intermediary where the malicious motive of the law enforcement
officials does not lead them to withhold any relevant information
from the independent intermediary.”48 This holding in Gary was
45
Malley, 475 U.S. at 345 n.7.
46
819 F.2d 1301, 1309 (5th Cir. 1987).
47
Gary v. Hand, 838 F.2d 1420, 1428 (5th Cir. 1988).
48
Id. at 1427-28.
21
consistent with other circuit precedent,49 yet we made no mention
of Burzynski or of the Supreme Court’s “proximate cause” footnote
in Malley.
The rule of Gary v. Hand has since prevailed in this circuit
for almost two decades.50 Even though Burzynski appears to
contradict Hand’s holding on the issue of superseding cause, the
earlier decision did not address the issue in depth, and we are
unwilling to disregard firmly ensconced circuit precedent in favor
of such a cursory analysis of Malley’s dicta. A review of other
circuits’ case law addressing proximate cause when a plaintiff’s
49
See Thomas v. Sams, 734 F.2d 185, 191 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding a mayor who had falsely sworn an arrest warrant, then
submitted the warrant to himself, as a magistrate, for issuance,
did not break the chain of causation because he did not submit
the warrant to a neutral party); Smith v. Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522,
526 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that an officer who acted with
malice in procuring a warrant or a indictment will not be liable
if the facts supporting the warrant or indictment are put before
an impartial intermediary such as a magistrate or a grand jury,
for that intermediary’s ‘independent’ decision ‘breaks the causal
chain’ and insulates the initiating party); Rodriguez v. Ritchey,
556 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1977)(en banc), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1047 (1978).
50
See Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150 (5th Cir.
2004)(“[O]nce facts supporting an arrest are placed before an
independent intermediary such as a . . . grand jury, the
intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation”. . .unless
“the deliberations of that intermediary were in some way tainted
by the actions of the defendants”)(internal citations omitted);
Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d 722, 728 (5th Cir. 2002)(reaffirming
Hand); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994)(“It is
well settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before
an independent intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury,
the intermediary’s decision breaks the chain of causation for
false arrest, insulating the initiating party.”)(citations
omitted).
22
injury results from an independent decision-maker’s ruling also
reveals a fundamental tension between these primary tenets of tort
law: (1) An individual is liable for the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of his actions, and (2) an intervening decision of an
informed, neutral decision-maker “breaks” the chain of causation.51
51
Compare Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 126 (2d
Cir. 2004)(holding that police officer could be held liable for
plaintiff’s loss of liberty after police officer wrongly sent
plaintiff to a mental hospital, even though the plaintiff’s
subsequent detention in the hospital resulted from the
independent judgment of the physicians. “Tort defendants,
including those sued under § 1983, are responsible for the
natural consequences of their actions.”)(citing, inter alia,
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986)); Herzog v. Village of
Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2002)(“[T]he ordinary
rules of tort causation apply to constitutional tort suits” after
a suspect was illegally forced to give blood and urinate as a
result of an illegal arrest)(internal citation omitted); Zahrey
v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 352 (2d Cir. 2000)(“[I]t is not readily
apparent why the chain of causation should be considered broken
where the initial wrongdoer can reasonably foresee that his
misconduct will contribute to an ‘independent’ decision that
results in a deprivation of liberty.”); Warner v. Orange County
Dep’t of Probation, 115 F.3d 1068, 1072-73 (2d Cir.
1996)(concluding that, as a sentencing judge’s adoption of
probation officers’ recommendation was entirely foreseeable, the
judge’s decision did not break the chain of causation with
respect to the probation officers’ liability under § 1983); and
Buenrostro v. Collazo, 973 F.2d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 1992)(holding
that, as “the Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that
principles of causation borrowed from tort law” apply to
constitutional torts, a jury “could conceivably find a causal
nexus between [an] unlawful arrest and [a] consequent
imprisonment,” even after an independent magistrate determined
that there was probable cause to detain the plaintiff)(citing
Malley, 475 U.S. at 345 n.7) with Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d
238, 248 (3d Cir. 2004)(“To the extent that the common law
recognized the causal link between a complaint and the ensuing
arrest, it was in the situation where “misdirection” by omission
or commission perpetuated the original wrongful
behavior.”)(citing Hand, 838 F.2d at 1428); Townes v. City of New
York, 176 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 1999)(holding chain of causation
broken between police officers’ illegal search and seizure and
23
In this circuit, it was not well-established at the time of
LaCresha’s interrogation that an official’s pre-trial interrogation
of a suspect could subsequently expose that official to liability
for violation of a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights at trial. We
hold that, as in the analogous context of Fourth Amendment
violations, an official who provides accurate information to a
neutral intermediary, such as a trial judge, cannot “cause” a
subsequent Fifth Amendment violation arising out of the neutral
intermediary’s decision, even if a defendant can later demonstrate
that his or her statement was made involuntarily while in custody.52
LaCresha has not identified, and we have not found, any
evidence in the record to indicate that the state judge who
plaintiff’s subsequent conviction and imprisonment); Smiddy v.
Varney, 665 F.2d 261, 266-68 (9th Cir. 1981)(holding police
officers not liable for damages once prosecutor made independent
decision to charge plaintiff); Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939,
943 (7th Cir. 1972)(holding that no § 1983 cause of action exists
for violation of Fifth Amendment rights resulting from admission
into evidence of a coerced confession as officers did not
proximately cause the violation); Crowe v. County of San Diego,
303 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1092 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (“Given the roles and
obligations of prosecutors and judges and the independent nature
of these positions, a police officer could not reasonably know
that by obtaining a coerced confession he will cause a prosecutor
and/or a trial judge to violate a defendant’s Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.”). See also Hector v.
Watt, 235 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2000)(declining to reach the
question of whether proximate cause prevented a § 1983 plaintiff
from suing police officers for fabricating evidence as “there is
a great deal of tension in the caselaw about when official
conduct counts as an intervening cause.”).
52
We emphasize again that our analysis does not apply to
Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by plaintiffs against
officials that attack the lawfulness of the interrogation itself.
See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 773-74 (2003).
24
presided over her juvenile trial failed to hear (or was prevented
from hearing) all of the relevant facts surrounding her
interrogation before deciding to admit her confession into
evidence. Armed with all those facts, that judge nevertheless
concluded that LaCresha was not “in custody” for purposes of
Miranda or Texas law governing the interrogation of minors, and
ruled that her statement to the police was voluntary and
admissible.53 Like the state appellate court, we disagree with the
trial court’s ruling, yet we are constrained to hold that it
constituted a superseding cause of LaCresha’s injury, relieving the
defendants of liability under § 1983. This holding pretermits our
consideration whether she suffered a violation of a constitutional
right that was clearly established at the time, and whether a
reasonable official should have known that he was violating that
right. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s denial of
qualified immunity for the defendants on LaCresha’s Fifth Amendment
claim.
C. State Law Civil Conspiracy Claim
LaCresha has also asserted a claim under state law, contending
that the defendants conspired to deprive her of her Fifth Amendment
rights. The elements of a civil conspiracy claim in Texas are:
“(1) two or more persons; (2) an object to be accomplished; (3) a
meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one or more
53
In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276, (Tex. App.– Austin,
1999)(pet. denied).
25
unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result.”54
A plaintiff asserting such a claim must prove that the defendants
conspired to accomplish an unlawful purpose or used unlawful means
to accomplish a lawful purpose.55
The defendants counter that, under Texas law, they are
officially immune from suit for civil conspiracy.56 In this
interlocutory appeal, we have jurisdiction to hear the defendants’
claim of official immunity because Texas law, like the federal
doctrine, “provides a true immunity from suit and not a simple
defense to liability.”57 As official immunity is thus an
affirmative defense, a state official seeking summary judgment on
such grounds “must conclusively prove each element of the
defense.”58
54
Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex.
1983).
55
Juhl v. Airington, 936 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1996).
56
As the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive the State’s
immunity for civil conspiracy suits or other intentional torts
committed by officials in their official capacity, the district
court correctly dismissed claims brought against the defendants
in their official capacities. TRST Corpus, Inc. v. Financial
Ctr., Inc., 9 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.]
1999, writ denied)(citing Tex. Civ. Prac & Rem. Code § 101.021
(2004), which enumerates the causes of action for which the state
has waived immunity, but not including civil conspiracy).
Accordingly, we address only state conspiracy claims brought
against the defendants in their individual capacities.
57
Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299
F.3d 395, 413 (5th Cir. 2002).
58
Univ. of Houston v. Clark, 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex.
2000).
26
Government officials in Texas are officially immune from
liability for the performance of their (1) discretionary duties (2)
in good faith (3) as long as they are acting within the scope of
their authority.59 A discretionary function —— as distinguished
from a ministerial duty, which requires rote obedience to orders or
performance of a function to which the actor has no choice ——
involves personal deliberation, decision and judgment.60 An officer
acts in good faith if a reasonably prudent officer, under the same
circumstances, could have believed that his actions were correct.61
An officer acts within the scope of his authority when he
discharges the duties generally assigned to him.62
The district court ruled, and LaCresha does not dispute, that
the remaining defendants were performing discretionary functions
and acting within the scope of their authority vis-à-vis her
interrogation. That leaves only the question whether they acted in
good faith.
To obtain official immunity on summary judgment, an official
must prove that a reasonably prudent official might have believed
that his action was appropriate under the circumstances.63 Even if
59
City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.
1994).
60
Id. at 654 (citation omitted).
61
Id. at 656.
62
Id. at 658.
63
Id.
27
an official’s actions were taken negligently, that would not be
sufficient to defeat a showing of good faith.64 The test for good
faith is objective and is substantially derived from the test for
good faith in a qualified immunity claim for federal constitutional
violations.65
In light of our holding that the defendants are immune from
prosecution for LaCresha’s Fifth Amendment constitutional claim
because they did not act unreasonably according to clearly
established law, we also determine, by conducting the analogous
state law inquiry under Texas state law,66 that immunity bars
LaCresha’s civil conspiracy claim. As we have now determined, for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment inquiry, that the officers did not
conceal from the Texas trial court any of the circumstances
surrounding LaCresha’s interrogation and, therefore, that they did
not cause the violation of her rights, we are constrained to hold
that they acted “in good faith” for purposes of Texas official
immunity. A reasonable officer, under the circumstances, could
have believed that what he was doing would not violate a suspect’s
Fifth Amendment rights —— certainly, if none of the officials could
cause a violation of those rights, none could conspire to cause
such a violation, particularly in view of our determination that
64
Id. at 655.
65
Roe v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 299
F.3d 395, 413 (5th Cir. 2002).
66
See Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656.
28
the officials properly presented evidence of their interrogation of
LaCresha to the Texas trial court. Therefore, the defendants are
entitled to immunity from LaCresha’s state law conspiracy claim.
Further, our determination that the defendants did not commit
an actionable violation with respect to LaCresha’s Fifth Amendment
violation bars a claim of civil conspiracy based on that violation,
as “[g]enerally, if an act by one person cannot give rise to a
cause of action, then the same act cannot give rise to a cause of
action if done pursuant to an agreement between several persons.”67
Although LaCresha did suffer a violation of her constitutional
rights, our determination that none of the state officials could
have proximately caused this violation means that none have
committed a tortious act. As we conclude that LaCresha’s claims
against these defendants are unavailing, we reverse the district
court, and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
The importance of deterring the improper obtaining of
confessions, however, cannot be gainsaid. “A deliberate, voluntary
confession of guilt is among the most effectual proofs in the law,
and constitutes the strongest evidence against the party making it
that can be given of the facts stated in such confession.”68
Justice White called a voluntary confession the most damaging form
67
Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88, 95
(Tex. App. —— Corpus Christi 1992, writ dism’d w.o.j.).
68
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1884).
29
of evidence and noted that “[e]ven the testimony of an eyewitness
may be less reliable than the defendant’s own confession.”69
“Confession evidence (regardless of how it was obtained) is so
biasing that juries will convict on the basis of confession alone,
even when no significant or credible evidence confirms the disputed
confession and considerable significant and credible evidence
disconfirms it.”70
A voluntary confession merits credence “because it is presumed
to flow from the strongest sense of guilt.”71 In diametric
opposition, an involuntary confession constitutes evidence entitled
to little weight, as it is likely to be unreliable.72
69
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 140 (1968) (White,
J., dissenting).
70
Stephen A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-D.N.A. World, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 891, 923
(2004). “Regardless of how often police elicit confessions from
the innocent, the social science literature strongly suggests
that interrogation-induced false confessions are highly likely to
lead to the wrongful conviction of the innocent, perhaps more so
than any other type of erroneous evidence. This is due to the
strong effect that confession evidence exerts on the perceptions
and decision-making of criminal justice officials and lay jurors.
With the exception of being captured during the commission of a
crime (whether by physical apprehension or electronically on
videotape), a confession is the most incriminating and persuasive
evidence of guilt that the State can bring against a defendant.
It therefore stands to reason that with the exception of being
falsely captured during the commission of a crime, a false
confession is the most incriminating and persuasive false
evidence of guilt that the State can bring against a defendant.”
Id. at 921.
71
Hopt, 110 U.S. at 584.
72
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86 (1964); In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (“The principle, then, upon which a
30
The privilege against self-incrimination is,
of course, related to the question of the
safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or
confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they
are not the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but
are reliable expressions of the truth. . .coercion
is thought to carry with it the danger of
unreliability.73
Involuntary confessions also affront society’s “deep-rooted feeling
that . . in the end, life and liberty can be as much endangered
from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals
as from the actual criminals themselves.”74 These principles are
doubly true in cases such as this one, in which the suspect is a
young child whose statements are more likely to be the product of
“fear, ignorance, fantasy, or despair.”75
Nonetheless, the independent roles of police officers,
prosecutors, and judges operate in this context to prevent
individuals who have suffered violations of their Fifth Amendment
rights from recovering for their damages, absent a showing that a
neutral intermediary, such as a judge, did not have all pertinent
information surrounding an interrogation before him when deciding
a confession’s admissibility. Therefore summary judgment in favor
of the defendants is appropriate.
confession may be excluded is that it is, under certain
conditions, testimonially untrustworthy. . .”)(emphasis in
original)(quoting 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 822 (3d ed. 1940)).
73
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
74
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
75
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 55.
31
III. CONCLUSION
As LaCresha cannot demonstrate that the acts of the defendants
in obtaining her confession proximately caused the violation of her
Fifth Amendment rights, we hold that she may not maintain against
the defendants either a claim under § 1983 for a constitutional
violation or civil conspiracy claim under Texas law.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
32