United States v. Conrod

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT May 13, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-40955
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM CONROD,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 6:03-CR-47-ALL-LED
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Before GARZA, DeMOSS, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
William Conrod entered a guilty plea to a violation of
18 U.S.C. § 472, admitting that he possessed approximately
$21,500 in counterfeit U.S. $100 bills. Conrod waived the right
to appeal error concerning the substance, procedure, or form of
his conviction and sentence. Conrod reserved the right to appeal
Sentencing Guideline determinations and the ruling that denied
his motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his
car. The district court sentenced Conrod to five months of
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 04-40955
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imprisonment, five months of home detention, and three years of
supervised release.
Conrod asserts that the initial stop of his vehicle, his
subsequent detention, and the search of his vehicle violated his
rights under the Fourth Amendment. We review the district
court’s findings, including credibility determinations, for clear
error; we review the district court’s ultimate conclusions on
Fourth Amendment issues de novo. United States v. Brigham,
382 F.3d 500, 506 n.2 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v.
Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 435-36 (5th Cir. 2002). The evidence is
construed “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.”
Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506 n.2 (citation omitted).
Conrod contends that the State Trooper lacked the mechanical
ability to determine his car’s speed. He challenges the State
Trooper’s subjective intent for the stop.
The legality of a traffic stop is examined in accordance
with the analysis described in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968). Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506. Under Texas law, 70 mph is
the maximum speed that a passenger car may travel on a U.S.
Interstate. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.352(b)(2) (Vernon 2005).
Evidence presented at the suppression hearing established that
Conrod’s vehicle was traveling at 76 mph. Conrod has not shown
that the district court’s finding that the traffic stop was
justified is clearly erroneous. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506
& n.2; United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 208 (5th Cir.
No. 04-40955
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2002). The subjective motivation for the stop is irrelevant
because there was an objective legal justification for the stop.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13 (1996).
Conrod contends that his detention was unlawfully prolonged
and that the continued detention was not reasonably related in
scope to the initial justification for the stop. Conrod asserts
that the State Trooper unreasonably delayed the initiation of the
warrant check and detained him unlawfully after the warrant check
revealed that there were no outstanding warrants.
The evidence established that during the six to seven
minutes that elapsed after Conrod was pulled over and before a
warrant check was initiated, the State Trooper asked Conrod to
exit the vehicle and walk over to him, advised Conrod that he had
been stopped for speeding, and asked Conrod to produce his
driver’s license or some identification. When Conrod revealed
that he did not have any identification, the Trooper obtained
Conrod’s name, his date of birth, the name of the State in which
he was licensed to drive, and the reason why Conrod had no form
of identification with him. The State Trooper also asked Conrod
and his companion questions concerning their trip.
A police officer may lawfully request to examine a driver’s
license and may make inquiries concerning the purpose and
itinerary of a driver’s trip. Brigham, 382 F.3d at 507-08.
The district court did not err in determining that the detention
prior to the warrant check was reasonably related to the
No. 04-40955
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circumstances that justified the stop or constituted a graduated
response to emerging facts. See id. at 508-09.
The computer check revealed that Conrod was licensed to
drive in another state but that his driver’s license had been
suspended. Under state law, the Trooper could not issue an out-
of-state driver with a suspended license a citation for speeding;
he was required to either arrest Conrod or let him go. Conrod
has not shown that the district court erred in determining that
the detention following the warrant check was not unrelated to
the justification for the traffic stop. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at
509 (when officer learned that identification was likely false,
he acted reasonably by engaging in further questioning).
Conrod asserts that he did not provide voluntary consent to
the search of his car. He asserts that his answers to the State
Trooper’s requests for consent were misconstrued and that the
audio portion of the tape of the incident was unintelligible.
Conrod admitted that he knew he could refuse to give consent
to the search and that he did not object during the search.
The district court found that Conrod provided valid consent to
the search of his car based on its evaluation of the testimony
presented at the suppression hearing, its review of the videotape
of the incident, and its determination of the credibility of the
witnesses. Conrod has not shown that the district court’s
finding that he validly consented to the search of the car was
No. 04-40955
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clearly erroneous. See United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez,
318 F.3d 663, 666 (5th Cir. 2003); Duffaut, 314 F.3d at 208.
Conrod has not challenged the search of his briefcase and
the validity of his arrest; accordingly, he has abandoned these
issues. See United States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553, 563 (5th
Cir. 1992).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.