Cantu v. Collins

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 91-5512
_______________________
RUBEN MONTOYA CANTU,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
JAMES A. COLLINS, Director,
Texas Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
July 22, 1992
Before GARWOOD, JONES, and DUHÉ, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
Ruben Montoya Cantu challenges his murder conviction and
death sentence. His application for a writ of habeas corpus was
denied by the district court, but the court granted a certificate
of probable cause.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A Bexar County, Texas grand jury convicted petitioner for
the November 8, 1984 murder of Pedro Gomez during the commission of
a robbery, in violation of § 19.03(a)(2) of the Texas Penal Code
(Vernon Supp. 1984). The murder took place at the house of Eusebio
Moreno in San Antonio. The house was under construction, and
because Moreno had been experiencing numerous incidents of theft
from the building site, his brother, Juan Moreno, and brother-in-
law, Pedro Gomez, were sleeping in the house to prevent any further
loss. Some time after 10:30 p.m., Gomez and Juan Moreno were
awakened by two intruders: a man who was poking Moreno with a
rifle, whom he later identified as the petitioner, and an
accomplice.1 Cantu and his companion took wristwatches from Moreno
and Gomez, as well as Gomez's wallet. Cantu then told Gomez to
pull back the mattress on one of the beds, under which a pistol
owned by Eusebio Moreno was wrapped in a rag. According to Moreno,
as Gomez was handing the bundle to the petitioner, Cantu shot him
once in the head. Gomez fell to the ground, and Cantu shot him
eight more times. Petitioner next trained his rifle on Juan
Moreno, shooting him eight or nine times.
Gomez died from multiple gunshot wounds to the body and
head. Juan Moreno survived.
On November 14, two detectives from the San Antonio
Police Department visited Juan Moreno at the intensive care unit at
Wilford Hall Medical Center. The detectives showed him photographs
of possible suspects. Cantu's photograph was not in the photo
spread, and Moreno did not identify any of the photos.
1
The accomplice was later identified as David Garza, a
juvenile. According to evidence adduced at trial, the room in
which Juan Moreno and Gomez were sleeping was equipped with a 75-
watt bulb, which lighted the room well. The lamp had been turned
off when the two men went to sleep, but was on later that night
when Cantu awakened Moreno. Moreno testified that the lamp
illuminated the faces of Cantu and his accomplice, and that he
knew Cantu because he had seen him in the neighborhood before.
2
On December 16, detectives again visited Juan Moreno at
Wilford Hall and showed him a photo array, which this time included
a photo of Cantu. Moreno did not identify Cantu and did not look
at his photograph. The detectives later testified that Moreno
avoided looking at petitioner's picture, adding that it was their
opinion that he knew more than he was saying. According to one of
the detectives, when asked if he was afraid to identify the
assailant, Moreno replied, "Yeah." Both detectives who visited
Moreno at Wilford Hall on that day testified that he appeared to be
frightened as he looked through the photo spread.2 Detective Garza
2
One of the officers, Detective Garza, conversed with
Moreno in Spanish. Garza testified that when he asked Moreno,
"Are you afraid to identify the guy who did this?" Moreno
replied, "Yeah." Garza said he was prompted to ask the question
because Moreno "completely avoided the photograph, and you could
see it in his face that he was scared." The second officer,
Detective Herring, testified that when Moreno "reached Mr.
Cantu's picture, he completely didn't look at it. He just passed
it up twice." Herring added that out of the five photographs he
viewed, Cantu's was the only picture that Moreno avoided. As
Herring testified at trial:
Q. So [Moreno] did not treat any of the
other photographs the way he treated Mr.
Cantu's picture?
A. No, sir, he did not.
Q. Now, based on your experience, Detective
Herring, have you had experienced before
when people declined to pick out a
photograph when you have reason to
believe that they know who the person
is?
A. Many times.
Q. And is what you saw on December 16,
regarding Mr. Moreno's behavior,
consistent with that pattern that you
experienced before?
3
added that Moreno did recognize some of the other men in the photo
lineup, "but he advised me that these people were just from the
neighborhood and they were not any of the individuals involved in
the shooting of him or Pedro Gomez." Moreno also for the first
time offered a general description of his assailants: two Hispanic
males, one about 13 or 14 years old, the other about 19 and wearing
blue jeans.
Four months later, on March 1, 1985, petitioner was
involved in a bar shooting with an off-duty San Antonio police
officer, Joe De La Luz. At the time of the De La Luz shooting,
Cantu was already a suspect in the murder of Pedro Gomez. Because
Cantu was a suspect in both cases, San Antonio police renewed their
efforts to obtain a positive identification in the Gomez murder
investigation. Accordingly, the day after the De La Luz shooting,
an officer was assigned to interview Juan Moreno at his home. The
officer, Detective Ballesa, showed Moreno five photographs
different from those which he had viewed on December 16, except for
the photo of Cantu, which appeared in both arrays. Once again,
Moreno did not identify anyone in the photographs. Detective
Ballesa then engaged Moreno in a discussion, advising him that he
had to identify the assailants if he knew their identity. Moreno
A. Yes, sir, it is.
4
then provided the name of Ruben Cantu when viewing his picture but
did not identify him as Gomez's murderer.3
The next day, on March 3, 1985, a different officer,
Detective Quintanilla, went to the home of Eusebio Moreno for the
specific purpose of taking Juan Moreno to the police station to
3
As Detective Ballesa testified at trial:
Q. Had you mentioned Ruben Cantu's name to
[Moreno]?
A. No, sir.
Q. But he told you that Ruben Cantu had
shot him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he say when he got to Ruben
Cantu's photograph?
A. Well, he didn't say anything. He
mentioned the name after -- after the
array had been shown to him, you know,
and after there was some discussion on
the matter is when he came up with the
name.
Q. And what was this discussion?
A. Well, the discussion centered around I
was trying to make the man comfortable;
he was scared and visibly shaken; he
didn't want to identify the photograph,
and it became rather obvious that that
was the problem. So, you know, he was
trying to -- to get me to say that we'd
be able to protect him, things of this
nature, if he identified the picture.
He said, "Look, if I give you the name,
why isn't that good enough?" I said,
"Well, that isn't." I said, "You have
to identify the photograph," and he
wouldn't do it, but, you know, he
definitely gave me the name.
5
show him the photo spread once more. At the station, Detective
Quintanilla showed Juan Moreno the same photo spread containing the
picture of petitioner that had been shown to him the day before by
Detective Ballesa. This time, Moreno identified Cantu's photo as
representing the man who had shot him and Gomez. Quintanilla
testified that when he asked Juan Moreno why he had failed to
identify Cantu previously, Moreno replied that "he had recognized
the photo the day before; he just was afraid, scared."4 At trial,
Juan Moreno identified Cantu in court, adding that he had
recognized him in the photo line-ups he viewed on December 16,
1984, and March 2, 1985, but did not identify his photo on those
occasions because, "I didn't want to get into any problems."5
In addition to Juan Moreno's trial testimony, the state's
witnesses included Dr. Suzana Dana, a forensic pathologist and the
deputy chief medical examiner of Bexar County. Dr. Dana testified
4
Detective Ballesa explained that he understood Moreno's
fear because Cantu belonged to the "Grey Eagles," a youth gang
known for violent behavior.
5
As described by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals:
Juan testified that he had recognized
appellant in the photographs that were shown
to him on all the occasions. He did not tell
the police that it was appellant because he
did not want appellant to know where he and
his family lived. He was afraid for his life
and the lives of his family. He said the
police never told him they knew appellant was
the one who shot him. He also stated that he
knew appellant by sight because he had seen
him two or three times before the night of
the murder.
Cantu, 738 S.W.2d at 251.
6
that she performed the autopsy on Pedro Gomez, who had nine gunshot
wounds to the body, including a "defensive" wound to the left
forearm that was consistent with the victim attempting to shield
his face or body with his hands. Gomez was killed by shots from a
rifle, Dr. Dana continued, because there was no powder tattooing as
would typically have been present had the shots been fired by a
weapon with a shorter muzzle, such as a handgun. This and other
forensic evidence suggested that the victim was probably shot from
one and one-half to two feet away. Dr. Dana also analyzed
gunpowder traces on the palms of Gomez's hands, comparing them to
the relative absence of gunpowder particles on the backs of his
hands. She concluded that these findings were consistent with "a
gun being fired at the hands, or with the hands open simply because
the levels are higher on the palms than on the backs." In response
to questions from defense counsel, Dr. Dana opined that it was
unlikely that Gomez had fired a weapon at Cantu because that would
have left gunpowder residue on the backs of Gomez's hands;
clutching the gun would have shielded his palms from gunpowder.6
6
The detective who investigated the murder scene
recovered eleven .22 caliber shell casings and some slugs. The
detective testified that there were a number of bullet holes in
the walls of the house, adding that two of the slugs found at the
scene may have been larger than .22 caliber slugs. In his brief
to this court, the petitioner suggests that these two slugs were
fired from a .38 caliber handgun such as that hidden by Eusebio
Moreno under the mattress. Petitioner strongly implies that this
evidence supports his claim that he shot Moreno and Gomez in
self-defense. This assertion is tenuous at best, however, both
because the detective could not identify the slugs as .38
caliber, and because investigators recovered no .38 caliber shell
casings.
7
Cantu did not testify at the guilt-innocence phase of the
trial. Other than recall Juan Moreno and the police officers who
conducted the photographic lineups in an attempt to discredit
Moreno's identification testimony, the only other witness offered
by the defense provided an alibi for Cantu. At the punishment
phase of the trial, the prosecution presented five witnesses who
testified to Cantu's bad reputation in the community. Officer De
La Luz also testified that he was in the Scabaroo Lounge in San
Antonio on the night of March 1, 1985, when Cantu shot him several
times without provocation. Cantu then offered the testimony of six
San Antonio police officers in an attempt to discredit De La Luz's
testimony. The defense also recalled De La Luz to the stand and
questioned him further about the shooting at the Scabaroo Lounge.
At this point, the defense sought to have Cantu testify for the
limited purpose of rebutting De La Luz's version of Cantu's assault
on him. The trial court sustained the government's objection to
this proposal, ruling that "when Ruben Cantu takes the stand, he is
subject to the same grounds, the same areas of cross-examination as
any other witness." In response to questions from defense counsel,
the trial court added:
THE COURT: The ruling is that you may offer
any and all evidence that you care to offer
through this witness. If you want to limit it
to exactly what he said on your direct, that's
fine; but when you pass him for cross-
examination, he will be subject to cross-
examination to the same [sic] as all other
witnesses, only exceptions are any and all
rules of evidence that apply to any and all
witnesses, regarding the admissibility of
evidence.
8
The defense declined to put Cantu on the stand under the conditions
set by the court but did perfect a bill of exception at which Cantu
testified outside the presence of the jury. Cantu essentially
claimed that De La Luz provoked the confrontation which led to the
Scabaroo Lounge shooting, adding that he shot De La Luz with a
pistol Cantu had purchased outside the bar earlier that evening.
Cantu was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
death on July 30, 1985. He appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, which on February 4, 1987 affirmed his conviction and
sentence. Cantu v. State, 738 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
That court later denied Cantu's motion for rehearing, and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. Cantu v. Texas, 484 U.S. 872, 108
S. Ct. 203, 98 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1987). Cantu was slated to be executed
on or before sunrise on January 8, 1988. He filed a post-
conviction habeas application, which the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied. Cantu then filed a federal habeas application and
motion for stay of execution, which was granted on January 7, 1988.
After an evidentiary hearing, a federal magistrate recommended that
habeas corpus relief be denied. The district court later accepted
the magistrate's report and denied the writ, prompting this appeal.
In his brief, petitioner raises seven challenges to his
conviction and death sentence, framing them as follows:
I. The Texas capital sentencing statutes precluded the jury from
giving full effect to Mr. Cantu's mitigating evidence of
youth, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
II. Petitioner was deprived of his constitutional rights under the
Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by the trial court's
refusal to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter.
9
III. The in-court identification of petitioner deprived him of due
process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as
the procedures employed by the San Antonio police departments
were so impermissibly suggestive as to lead to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
IV. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial
in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because
trial counsel failed to request the services of an expert
witness on the issue of eyewitness identification.
V. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to the effective assistance of counsel through the
punishment phase of his criminal trial.
VI. Petitioner was denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
VII. Petitioner's constitutionally protected right to present
evidence to the jury in mitigation of his sentence of death
was impermissibly chilled by the Texas state rule which
precludes a defendant, who testifies at the penalty phase of
his trial, from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in
support of his guilt or the admissibility of the
identification evidence.
We address each argument in turn.
II.
MITIGATING EVIDENCE
Petitioner first contends that the Texas capital
sentencing statute did not provide a vehicle by which the jury
could consider and give mitigating effect to his youth.7
7
Texas Code Crim. Pro. Ann. Art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp.
1985) provides in relevant part:
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the
evidence, the court shall submit the
following three issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the
defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and
with a reasonable expectation that the
death of the deceased or another would
result;
10
Petitioner admits that his trial counsel did "argue the issue of
Mr. Cantu's youth . . . as a basis for compassion." Indeed
references to Cantu's age surfaced repeatedly during the punishment
phase of his trial. At one point, for instance, Cantu's counsel
told the jury: "I think that when a man is on trial for his life,
and even more so when a boy is on trial for his life, that it
warrants a substantial investment of time." In support of its
request for an affirmative finding on the second special issue, the
state argued along the following lines: "He's been referred to as
a boy, a kid, a young man," the prosecutor noted at one point.
"Well, he was an 18 year old with 18 rounds of ammunition, and he
used them all."8
(2) whether there is a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence which would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether
the conduct of the defendant in killing
the deceased was unreasonable in
response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
In May 1991, the Texas legislature passed two bills amending art.
37.071(b). However, these changes, which were later enacted into
law, apply only to offenses committed on or after September 1,
1991. See Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1012 n.1 (5th Cir.
1992) (en banc), cert. granted, _____ U.S. _____, _____ S. Ct.
_____, 1992 WL 52201 (June 8, 1992).
8
While Cantu was 18 years old at the time of his state
criminal trial, he was 17 at the time of the murder. We reject
Cantu's assertion that the state's argument amounted to a claim
that the special issues, or any of them, should be answered in
the affirmative because of Cantu's youth. The most reasonable
characterization of the state's argument is that Cantu was
streetwise and hardened beyond his chronological age, and that in
this particular setting his chronological age was not a
reasonable basis on which to return a negative answer to any of
11
Notwithstanding the numerous references to the
petitioner's age, he insists that the jury's consideration of
mitigating evidence of his youth was unconstitutionally
circumscribed by Art. 37.071(b). Specifically, he maintains that
while the second special issue allowed the prosecution to use his
youth as a sword against him -- by drawing the jury's attention to
his potential for future dangerousness -- it effectively prevented
him from using his youth as a shield against a death sentence.
Thus, petitioner's brief continues, "the jury was left with no
vehicle through which it might express a 'reasoned moral response'
that, because of Mr. Cantu's youth, he should not be condemned to
die."9
Cantu grounds his theory that Art. 37.071 failed to
permit the jury to consider mitigating evidence of his youth on
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256
(1989). We have, however, in an en banc decision recently rejected
the theory that Penry calls into question the constitutionality of
the Texas death penalty statute as applied to the arguably
mitigating circumstance of youth. In Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d
1009, 1017 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. granted, _____ U.S.
the special issues.
9
The district court found that petitioner had
procedurally defaulted this claim for federal habeas review
because of his failure to raise it at trial. However, in light
of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in Selvage v.
Collins, 816 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc), which
called into question whether a procedural bar would apply in such
cases, the state briefed the merits of Cantu's claim on this
issue.
12
_____, _____ S. Ct. _____, 1992 WL 52201 (June 8, 1992), we
concluded "that Penry does not invalidate Texas's statutory scheme,
. . . in instances where no major mitigating thrust of the evidence
is substantially beyond the scope of all the special issues." Id.
at 1027.10 See also Black v. Collins, _____ F.2d. _____, 1992 WL
107848 (5th Cir. 1992); Holland v. Collins, _____ F.2d _____, 1992
WL 107830 (5th Cir. 1992); and Romero v. Collins, _____ F.2d ____,
1992 WL 105059 (5th Cir. 1992). Graham held: "At the very least,
Jurek must stand for the proposition that these mitigating factors
-- relative youth and evidence reflecting good character traits
such as steady employment and helping others -- are adequately
10
Like Cantu, Graham was 17 years old at the time the
offense was committed. Id. at 1015 n.9. The Court's grant of
certiorari in a capital case does not cause us to deviate from
circuit law, nor is it grounds for a stay of execution. See
Johnson v. McCotter, 804 F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, Johnson v. Lynaugh, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S. Ct. 1988, 95
L. Ed. 2d 827 (1987).
13
covered by the second special issue." Id. at 1029.11 In Cantu's
case, we agree with Graham that
[t]o the extent that [Cantu's] criminal
conduct was a product of his youth, he was for
that reason not only less culpable but, to the
same extent, also less likely to be dangerous
when no longer young. To the extent [Cantu's]
criminal conduct was not attributable to his
youth, his youth neither reduced his
culpability nor his future dangerousness.
Nothing in the present record suggests that
the jury here might have viewed the matter in
any other light.
Id. at 1031 (footnote omitted). Cantu's youth could adequately be
taken into account as a mitigating factor in answering the special
issues, particularly the second. Graham, 950 F.2d at 1033.12
11
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49
L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976) (sustaining the constitutionality of the Texas
capital sentencing scheme). Moreover, Graham noted that both
before and after Penry, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
continued to hold that the second special issue provides an
adequate vehicle for the jury to take into account the
defendant's youth. 950 F.2d at 1031. See Roney v. State, 632
S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Robinson v. State, 548
S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Earvin v. State, 582 S.W.2d
794, 798-99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), repudiated on other grounds,
Mercado v. State, 615 S.W.2d 225, 227 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981);
Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288, 293 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App.
1980), overruled on other grounds, Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d
813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, (61
Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Ex Parte McGee, 817 S.W.2d 77, 80 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991); Lackey v. State, 819 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Trevino v. State, 815 S.W.2d 592, 622 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991), reversed on other grounds, Trevino v. Texas, _____
U.S. _____, 112 S. Ct. 1547, 118 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1992). See also
DeLuna v. Lynaugh, 890 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1989) (habeas
corpus).
12
While petitioner focuses on the second special issue,
we also agree with the state's contention that the first special
issue permitted Cantu to present mitigating evidence of "a
youthful tendency to act rashly," and therefore not deliberately.
Unlike Penry, Cantu's ability to think about the consequences of
his actions was markably different from Penry's evidence of
mental retardation, which he contended made it uniquely difficult
14
III.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE
Petitioner next contends that the state trial court erred
when it refused to include in its jury charge petitioner's
requested instruction on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter. At the conclusion of the evidence, his counsel
requested that the jury be so instructed, but the trial court
sustained the state's objection. Subsequently, during the charge
conference at the penalty phase of the trial, petitioner's counsel
asked the court to submit Special Issue No. 3 as provided by Art.
37.071(b)(3). The prosecution did not object to this requested
submission, despite its earlier opposition to a voluntary
manslaughter instruction during the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial. Citing this asserted inconsistency, petitioner argues that
the third special issue would not have been submitted at the
penalty phase unless the evidence in the record suggested that the
killing occurred in response to provocation by the deceased.13 The
evidence presented at his trial, Cantu contends, could have
to control his impulses or to evaluate the consequences of his
conduct. Penry, 492 U.S. at 324, 109 S. Ct. at 2949.
13
Petitioner argues that in Texas, voluntary manslaughter
is considered a lesser included offense of murder. See Braudrick
v. State, 572 S.W.2d 709, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Braudrick
was later questioned by an en banc panel of that court. Bradley
v. State, 688 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc).
Bradley held that voluntary manslaughter may be properly
considered a lesser included offense of murder only if the
evidence raises the issue of sudden passion. Id. at 851.
Because Cantu argued the sudden passion issue at trial, we agree
that voluntary manslaughter was properly treated as a lesser
included offense in this case.
15
supported a verdict that he was guilty only of voluntary
manslaughter, and the trial court's refusal to give such
instruction therefore violated his constitutional rights.
Under the standard first announced in Beck v. Alabama,
447 U.S. 625, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 (1980), "the jury [in
a capital case] must be permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of
a noncapital offense 'in every case' in which 'the evidence would
have supported such a verdict.'" Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605,
610, 102 S. Ct. 2049, 2052, 72 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1982) (citing Beck, 447
U.S. at 627, 100 S. Ct. at 2384). Under Beck, a defendant is
entitled to instruction on a lesser included offense only "if the
evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the
lesser offense and to acquit him of the greater." Id. at 2388
(quoting Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S. Ct.
1993, 1995, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1973)). See also Lincecum v. Collins,
958 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1992); and Cordova v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 764
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 108 S. Ct. 2832, 100
L. Ed. 2d 932 (1988).14
The voluntary manslaughter statute, Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 19.04, provides in relevant part:
§ 19.04 Voluntary Manslaughter
(a) A person commits an offense if he causes
the death of an individual under circumstances
that would constitute murder under Section
14
"Although Beck itself spoke only to a statute under
which the judge could not give the requested instruction, [its]
rationale applies equally to cases in which a trial judge refuses
to give an instruction which is available under state law."
Lincecum, 958 F.2d at 1275.
16
19.02 of this code, except that he caused the
death under the immediate influence of sudden
passion arising from an adequate cause.
Sudden passion is defined as "passion directly caused by and
arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another
acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of
the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation."
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04(b). Adequate cause is defined as
"cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage,
resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to
render the mind incapable of cool reflection." Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 19.04(c).
We agree with the district court and with the state
courts that no rational jury could conclude that Cantu shot Gomez
under the influence of sudden passion, thereby warranting an
instruction of voluntary manslaughter. Juan Moreno, the only
witness who testified at trial as to what happened at the time of
the shooting, stated that Pedro Gomez did not fire the .38 caliber
handgun he was attempting to hand over to Cantu. Petitioner's
attempt to characterize police testimony as supporting his claim
that some of the bullet holes in the wall were caused by a .38
caliber gun, instead of the .22 caliber murder weapon, does not
accurately reflect what the investigating officer said. In fact,
the officer stated that he was unsure whether the bullet holes, or
slugs found at the scene, were .38 caliber. Nor has Cantu offered
a plausible explanation linking this physical evidence to his claim
that he acted in self-defense. His unsupported conjecture is
17
hardly probative on the issue of whether he acted under the
immediate influence of sudden passion. See, e.g., Hobson v. State,
644 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
Yet even assuming for the sake of argument that Cantu
acted upon sudden passion within the meaning of § 19.04(b), that
passion did not arise from an adequate cause as required by §
19.04(c). See Hobson, id. It is undisputed that Cantu initiated
the criminal episode in question when he and an accomplice entered
Eusebio Moreno's house, awakened Gomez and Juan Moreno at gunpoint,
robbed them, and repeatedly shot them with a rifle at point-blank
range, killing one man and seriously wounding the other. We have
recently noted that "Texas law plainly does not consider adequate
cause to arise under these circumstances." Lincecum, 958 F.2d at
1277.15 See also Penry v. State, 691 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1073, 106 S. Ct. 834, 88 L. Ed. 2d 805
(1986); and Goff v. State, 681 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. App. -- Houston
[14th Dist.] 1983), aff'd, 720 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
Because state law prevented the jury from finding that Cantu
15
In Lincecum, the petitioner invoked Beck to support his
claim that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury
on voluntary manslaughter. Lincecum was convicted of capital
murder for killing Kathy Ann Coppedge during the course of a
kidnapping, robbery and attempted sexual assault. Evidence
adduced at trial indicated that after robbing Coppedge and
ordering her to take off her clothes, Coppedge managed to grab
Lincecum's knife and stab him in the side. On collateral appeal,
Lincecum insisted that in light of this evidence, a voluntary
manslaughter instruction was constitutionally required. In
rejecting this claim, this court noted that even assuming
Lincecum acted under sudden passion, he lacked adequate cause
because he initiated the criminal episode in which the stabbing
occurred. 958 F.2d at 1277.
18
committed voluntary manslaughter, the trial court's failure to
instruct the jury on this offense was not constitutional error.
IV.
IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION
Petitioner next takes issue with the identification
procedures used by the San Antonio Police Department.
Specifically, he contends that the repeated showing of his
photograph to Juan Moreno was so impermissibly suggestive as to
create a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.
Ct. 967, 971, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968). Even unnecessarily
suggestive procedures do not automatically require suppression,
however, if the witness's identification is reliable under the
totality of the circumstances. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98,
114, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2254 (1977).
During the state court proceedings, Cantu moved to
suppress the in-court identification, arguing that Moreno had been
unfairly influenced by police officers. The trial court disagreed,
finding that the photo array containing Cantu's picture was not
unduly suggestive, nor was Moreno's identification in any way
tainted.16 In denying the suppression motion, the court ruled that
Moreno's testimony "established that he knew who the defendant was,
16
Among other things, the court noted that Moreno had
initially made a sign of recognition when first shown Cantu's
photograph. Moreno's obvious unease when shown the photo
adequately accounted for his initial uncertainty in identifying
him. Additionally, the trial court found that the in-court
identification was separate from the photo line-up and was based
on Moreno's recollection of the shooting.
19
what the defendant looked like, and was able to identify him
without the aid of any photograph to assist him in his recollection
of who the person was who shot him. . . ." On direct appeal, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the repeated
showing of Cantu's picture during the photo arrays was suggestive.
Cantu v. State, 738 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). However,
that court rejected the petitioner's contention that the suggestive
procedures tainted Moreno's in-court identification so as to create
a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. Id. at
252.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), state court factfindings are
entitled to a presumption of correctness absent one of eight
statutory exceptions. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S. Ct.
764, 66 L. Ed. 2d 722 (1981). Petitioner insists that the
presumption of correctness should not be afforded here because the
state factfinding was insufficient. According to Cantu, the
presumption does not apply because "the trial court made no factual
findings regarding the identification process, or the procedures
employed, but merely arrived at a legal conclusion." He
specifically faults the trial court for failing to make explicit
factfindings on several issues, such as the brightness of the
lighting in the room at the time of the murder, which he insists
should bear on whether Moreno correctly identified Cantu as his and
Gomez's assailant.
Petitioner's argument is totally without merit. That the
trial court did not make explicit fact findings on every issue does
20
not mean the court "merely arrived at a legal conclusion" unworthy
of the presumption of correctness. Both implied and explicit
factfindings fall within the ambit of § 2254(d). Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 433-34, 103 S. Ct. 843, 850-51, 74 L. Ed. 2d
646 (1983); McCoy v. Cabana, 794 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1986);
Armstead v. Maggio, 720 F.2d 894, 896 (5th Cir. 1983). Thus, for
instance, the state court, after weighing the evidence, found that
Juan Moreno had sufficient opportunity to view Cantu on the night
of the shooting. Cantu, 738 S.W.2d at 253. As the state correctly
observes, petitioner cannot avoid the binding effect of the state
court findings merely by referring to snippets of testimony from a
voluminous record. "One of the purposes of § 2254(d) was to
prevent precisely this kind of parsing of trial court transcripts
to create problems on collateral review where none were seen at
trial." Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 435, 105 S. Ct. 844, 858
(1984). Because § 2254(d) is controlling here, the district court
properly relied on the presumption of correctness to reject Cantu's
challenge to the state court factual findings on the identification
issue.17
17
Petitioner emphasizes that unlike its factual findings,
the state court's legal conclusions are not entitled to the
presumption of correctness. This is undoubtedly true, and indeed
the state concedes as much. But it yields nothing more than a
hollow victory for petitioner given that the district court
applied the presumption of correctness only to the state court's
factfindings and not to its legal conclusions.
21
V.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
Petitioner asserts that his state trial and appellate
counsel were constitutionally ineffective on several grounds. We
review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at a capital
sentencing trial under the familiar standards of Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
As this court has recently noted:
First, a defendant must show that "counsel's
representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness," with reasonable-
ness judged under professional norms prevail-
ing at the time counsel rendered assistance.
Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. This is a
standard which requires us to be "highly
deferential," as it is extremely difficult for
reviewing courts to place themselves in
counsel's position and evaluate the choices he
or she should have made. . . .
Second, "[t]he defendant must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. A
court evaluating a claim of ineffective
assistance need not address the reasonableness
component first, and if a defendant fails on
one part, it need not address the other. Id.
at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.
Black, 1992 WL 107848 at *5.
First, Cantu insists that his trial counsel erred during
the guilt-innocence phase of the trial by failing to secure the
services of an expert witness to contest the testimony of
eyewitness Juan Moreno. According to Cantu, because no expert
witness testified, "the jury was deprived of a way to intelligently
22
evaluate the testimony of Juan Moreno." This argument is specious.
While petitioner is correct that the admission of expert testimony
regarding eyewitness identifications is proper, see, e.g., United
States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (5th Cir. 1986), he cites
no authority to support the theory that his trial counsel was
required to call an expert witness to challenge Moreno's testimony.
Indeed, Cantu's trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing
that he considered seeking the services of an expert witness on the
issue of eye-witness identification but decided against it based on
his belief that his cross-examination of Moreno would be sufficient
to refute the accuracy of the identification.18
Petitioner next contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective during the punishment phase. Counsel, he maintains,
acted unprofessionally by failing to present evidence of Cantu's
"low IQ, emotional immaturity, troubled youth, trauma as a result
of his parents' divorce, and appearance of neglect." While counsel
did not seek a psychiatric examination, nothing at the time of
trial indicated that Cantu was insane when the offense occurred.19
18
Moreover, even had Cantu's counsel proffered an expert
witness to testify on this issue, the trial court would have had
discretion whether to admit such testimony. Pierce v. State, 777
S.W.2d 399, 414-16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), cert. denied, Pierce
v. Texas, 496 U.S. 912, 110 S. Ct. 2603, 110 L. Ed. 2d 283 (1990).
The Texas rule is also consistent with federal practice. In
Moore, we held that the decision whether to admit expert
testimony "is squarely within the discretion of the trial judge,"
adding that "there is no federal authority for the proposition
that such testimony must be admitted." 706 F.2d at 1312-13
(emphasis added).
19
Compare Bouchillon v. Collins, 907 F.2d 589, 597-98
(5th Cir. 1990) (Where defendant apprised his counsel of mental
problems prior to plea hearing, counsel's failure to perform any
23
Moreover, Cantu's assertion that he was denied effective assistance
of counsel by his attorney's failure to introduce evidence that he
appeared to be a child who was either neglected or abandoned is
specious. The evidence does not indicate that the petitioner was
neglected or abandoned. At best, it shows he might have felt
rejected and abandoned, which was assertedly manifested by the fact
that he sometimes watched television until the early hours of the
morning and engaged in fantasy. There is likewise no merit to
petitioner's claim to have been traumatized by his parents' divorce
or by his family's socio-economic background. Cantu's counsel
thoroughly investigated these claims, consulting with his client as
well as Cantu's father and brother for possible mitigating
evidence. Counsel ultimately decided not to introduce this
information because of his concern that the state would use it
against his client. Introducing the testimony of family members
would have allowed the state to cross-examine them about Cantu's
reputation in the community, including both his membership in the
Grey Eagles and his personal notoriety for theft, violence and drug
use. Counsel was not incompetent in his approach to mitigating
evidence.
Cantu also challenges his appellate counsel's
representation as constitutionally deficient. Both the issues he
investigation whatsoever for a possible insanity defense violated
Strickland); and Profitt v. Waldron, 831 F.2d 1245, 1248-49 (5th
Cir. 1987) (counsel's failure to present an insanity defense,
despite his knowledge that defendant had been previously
adjudicated insane and had escaped from a mental institution at
the time he committed the crime, held unreasonable).
24
faults appellate counsel for failing to raise -- a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Texas Sentencing Statute and the trial
court's refusal to charge the jury on the lesser included offense
of voluntary manslaughter -- were raised and considered both on
state habeas and in the present federal proceedings and were
determined to be meritless. Because appellate counsel's
effectiveness is judged by the same standard as that of trial
counsel, see Sharp v. Puckett, 930 F.2d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 1991),
petitioner's assertion, which fails even to allege that he was
prejudiced by appellate counsel's performance, is frivolous.
VI.
LIMITATIONS ON PETITIONER'S TESTIMONY
DURING THE PUNISHMENT PHASE
Petitioner did not testify at the guilt-innocence phase
of his trial. However, his counsel attempted to call him as a
witness during the punishment phase so that Cantu could testify on
the limited issue of whether he shot Officer De La Luz in self-
defense. The trial court refused to allow petitioner to testify on
such a limited basis, ruling that if Cantu took the stand, he would
be subject to cross-examination the same as any other witness.
Petitioner then chose not to testify and offered a bill of
exception, out of the presence of the jury, in which he testified
that he shot Officer De La Luz in self-defense.
Petitioner now contends that the trial court's decision
impermissibly chilled his right to present mitigating evidence.
Specifically, petitioner challenges the Texas requirement that a
defendant who testifies only at the punishment phase of the trial,
25
and who admits guilt during such testimony,20 waives the right to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to guilt and waives
any evidentiary objections made during the guilt-innocence phase.
See, e.g., Brown v. State, 617 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981) (en banc). According to petitioner,
Mr. Cantu was faced with a Hobson's choice at
the punishment phase of his trial. Mr. Cantu
could, on the one hand, testify at the
punishment phase and risk waiving his
substantial appellate issues as to the
sufficiency of the evidence and the legality
of the in-court identification; or, as he
chose to do, allow the jury to impose sentence
without the benefit of his version of the De
La Luz shooting. . . .
Because of Texas' peculiar procedural rule,
Mr. Cantu's constitutionally protected right
to present mitigating evidence in favor of a
sentence less than death was unconstitution-
ally chilled.
The state argues that Cantu has waived this argument because it is
raised for the first time on appeal, and we agree. See Buxton v.
Collins, 879 F.2d 140, 148 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, ____ U.S.
____, 110 S. Ct. 3295, 111 L. Ed. 2d 803 (1990) (Penry claim may not
be considered for the first time on appeal). In the alternative,
petitioner is asking this court to announce and apply retroactively
on collateral review what amounts to a new rule of constitutional
law, a request foreclosed by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.
20
Cantu has never suggested that his testimony in the
punishment phase would have admitted guilt.
26
Ct. 1060d, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989).21 We decline to review this
issue.
VII.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court denying habeas relief is AFFIRMED.
21
While petitioner has not briefed the Teague issue, we
agree with the state that none of the Teague exceptions apply
here.
27