Baker v. Farmers Elec. Co-op., Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
__________________
No. 92-1628
__________________
RICHARD BAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Cross-Appellee,
versus
FARMERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
and LAWSON WHITE,
Defendants-Appellees,
Cross-Appellants.
______________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
______________________________________________
(September 23, 1994)
Before REAVLEY and GARWOOD, Circuit Judges, and LAKE*, District
Judge.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Richard Baker (Baker) brought a state
court action in Hunt County, Texas, against his employer, Farmers
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Farmers), and Lawson White (White),
individually and as manager of Farmers, alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising from a job reassignment.
Defendants removed the suit to the United States District Court for
*
District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
the Northern District of Texas on the ground that federal labor law
preempted the state law claim because resolution of the action
required the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
(CBA). The district court denied Baker's motion to remand and
dismissed the action without prejudice for Baker's failure to
exhaust contractual grievance procedures. Baker appeals from this
order; defendants cross-appeal, asserting that the dismissal should
have been with prejudice.
Facts and Proceedings Below
Baker is an employee of Farmers and a member of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 59
(the Union). When the events underlying this lawsuit occurred,
Baker was a member of the Union and he was a Farmers' employee
covered by a CBA between Farmers and the Union; at Farmers, he was
a journeyman lineman and had held that position for fourteen years.
In early 1992, White, the general manager of Farmers, assigned to
Baker the duties of a custodian/yardman.1 Baker's duties as a
custodian/yardman include sweeping the warehouse and driveway,
mowing the yard, and cleaning the bathrooms and breakrooms. He
contends that these duties are demeaning and cause him physical and
emotional distress.
Baker alleges in his state court petition that he was
reclassified to the maintenance position in retaliation for
1
A collective bargaining agreement, which was negotiated
between Farmers and the Union for 1992 and 1993 and became
effective in May 1992, shortly after the state lawsuit was filed,
expressly reclassified Baker as a custodian/yardman at a salary
of $7.64 per hour. As a journeyman lineman, he had earned $16.35
per hour.
2
participating in an arbitration against Farmers; that arbitration
is unrelated to this matter. Following the completion of the
arbitration, defendants informed him that he could no longer drive
a company truck. According to Baker, driving a truck was not a
condition of employment as a journeyman lineman.2 He claims that
the defendants are intentionally trying to force him to resign by
making his work environment unpleasant. Baker has filed an unfair
labor practice charge against Farmers with the National Labor
Relations Board.
Defendants claim that Farmers acted within its legal rights in
reassigning Baker, under the terms of the CBA which was in effect
from 1990 to 1992.
On May 8, 1992, Baker filed this action in state court in Hunt
County, Texas, against Farmers and White, individually and as
manager of Farmers, claiming damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Defendants timely removed the action to the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
As grounds for removal, defendants claimed that resolution of
2
Defendants explain that in early 1992, Farmers' insurance
carrier notified them that Baker was uninsurable due to his poor
driving record. The 1990-1992 CBA assigned Baker, as a
journeyman lineman, various "on call" duties, such as responding
to electrical service disruptions, downed power lines, and other
emergencies; employees who were "on call" were permitted to use
Farmers' trucks. Farmers would not allow Baker to drive its
trucks after he became uninsured and asserts that therefore Baker
was no longer qualified to perform all of the duties of a
journeyman lineman.
The 1992-1993 CBA added a provision allowing the termination
of employees who failed to meet the requirements of Farmers'
fleet insurance policy. Because Baker was "grandfathered" out of
the termination provision, he was permanently reassigned to a
lower paying job rather than being terminated.
3
Baker's state tort claim required interpretation of the CBA and
thus the case involved a federal question arising under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 141, et seq., and
the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, et seq.
On June 11, 1992, Baker moved to remand the action to state
court. Defendants responded. On June 30, 1992, the district court
entered an order denying the motion to remand and dismissing the
action without prejudice. The court determined that resolution of
the dispute depended on Baker's ability to establish either that
his reassignment violated the terms of the CBA which governed
matters of his employment at Farmers or that the CBA was invalid.
The court concluded that the NLRA and the LMRA preempted Baker's
state tort claim and denied his motion to remand.
Upon finding that Baker had failed to exhaust the remedies set
forth in Article 29 of the CBA which required resolution of
disputes arising from the CBA through grievance or arbitration
proceedings, the district court dismissed the action without
prejudice to allow Baker to comply with this requirement.
Discussion
I. Denial of Motion to Remand
A. Claims against Farmers
Preemption is a question of law reviewed de novo. Galvez v.
Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 776 (9th Cir. 1991).
Where removal jurisdiction is predicated on the existence of
a federal question, the federal question generally must appear on
the face of the plaintiff's complaint. Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987). The removing defendant's
4
interjection of a federal defense is normally insufficient to
remove the case. Id. at 2430. One exception to this rule,
however, occurs where an area of state law has been completely
preempted by federal law. Id. Controversies involving collective
bargaining agreements, where section 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. §
185(a), provides the grounds for preemption, constitute such an
area of preemption.3 Id. at 2430-31; Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic
Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
Defendants removed this action to federal court on the grounds
that resolution of Baker's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim required interpretation of the CBA. This claim
implicates preemption under section 301 of the LMRA, which vests
jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear claims for violation of
labor contracts.4
3
It has been said that if issues involving section 301 arise
only as a defense, there is no preemption. "[A] defendant's
reliance on a CBA term purely as a defense to a state law claim
does not result in section 301 preemption." Fox v. Parker
Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 1990). Here,
defendants assert that, in order to meet his burden of proof on
the state intentional infliction of emotional distress claim,
Baker must rely on the CBA to establish that their actions in
reassigning him to the maintenance position were extreme and
outrageous; thus their dependence on the CBA for removal purposes
is not purely defensive.
4
Other grounds for preemption by federal labor laws exist.
In Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 97
S. Ct. 1056 (1977), the Supreme Court discussed the general rule
governing preemption in the labor law area. This rule removes
from state regulation activities which are protected by section 7
of the NLRA, or which constitute an unfair labor practice under
section 8. Farmer, 97 S. Ct. at 1061 (quoting San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 79 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1959)). One
exception to this rule, where preemption does not apply, occurs
where the activity at issue is peripheral to the labor concerns.
Id.
Baker argues that this case is governed by Farmer, which
5
"Section 301 not only gives federal courts jurisdiction
to hear employment cases covered by collective bargaining
agreements, but also directs them to fashion a body of
federal common law to resolve such disputes, and preempts
any state law claims which require the interpretation of
a collective bargaining agreement." Jackson v. Kimel,
992 F.2d 1318, 1325 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal citations
omitted).
The purpose behind section 301 preemption is to ensure that issues
raised in actions covered by section 301 are decided in accordance
with the precepts of federal labor policy. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Lueck, 105 S. Ct. 1904, 1910 (1985) (quoting Teamsters v. Lucas
Flour Co., 82 S. Ct. 571, 576 (1962)).
In Lueck, the Supreme Court recognized that the coverage of
section 301 extends beyond contract claims for breach of a labor
agreement to include state tort claims which require analysis of a
labor contract:
"If the policies that animate § 301 are to be given their
proper range, however, the pre-emptive effect of § 301
concerned a state law claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on allegations of discrimination in
employment referrals, personal abuse, and harassment. The Court
declined to preempt the state claim on the grounds that the tort
issue could be adjudicated without resolution of an underlying
labor dispute, and because the potential interference with
federal concerns was insufficient to counterbalance the
legitimate and substantial state interest in protecting its
citizens. 97 S. Ct. at 1065.
Although Farmer noted the existence of section 301
preemption, it did not address that preemption in the context of
the facts before it. Id. at 1062 n.8. We have interpreted
Farmer's stance on preemption of emotional distress claims
narrowly. Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250,
1256 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Farmer does not hold that claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress are never preempted
by the federal labor laws, but rather that such claims may escape
preemption when they relate only peripherally to federal
concerns."). Even assuming that Garmon preemption as discussed
in Farmer applies to section 301 cases, the case before us
differs substantially from Farmer in that Baker's state tort
claim cannot be adjudicated without reliance on the CBA.
6
must extend beyond suits alleging contract violations.
These policies require that ``the relationships created by
[a collective-bargaining] agreement' be defined by
application of ``an evolving federal common law grounded
in national labor policy.' . . . Thus, questions
relating to what the parties to a labor agreement agreed,
and what legal consequences were intended to flow from
breaches of that agreement, must be resolved by reference
to uniform federal law, whether such questions arise in
the context of a suit for breach of contract or in a suit
alleging liability in tort." Lueck, 105 S. Ct. at 1911
(internal citations omitted).
A state tort claim is preempted by section 301 if "evaluation of
the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of
the terms of the labor contract." Id, at 1912.
The Court revisited the issue of preemption of state claims in
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877, 1885
(1988), holding that application of state law is preempted by
section 301 only if such application requires the interpretation of
a CBA. "[I]f the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon the
meaning of a collective-bargaining agreement, the application of
state law . . . is pre-empted and federal labor-law principles . .
. must be employed to resolve the dispute." Id. at 1881.
The Lingle Court found that preemption was not required on the
facts before it. The plaintiff's allegations concerned retaliatory
discharge, a claim requiring proof that (1) the plaintiff was
discharged or threatened with discharge and (2) the employer's
motive in discharging or threatening to discharge him was to deter
him from exercising his rights under the Act or to interfere with
his exercise of those rights. The Court decided that neither the
elements of the plaintiff's case nor the defense of proving a
nonretaliatory motive for discharge required the interpretation of
7
any term of a CBA, although some of the factual inquiries under the
state claim might be similar to those under section 301:
"[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective-
bargaining agreement, on the one hand, and state law, on
the other, would require addressing precisely the same
set of facts, as long as the state-law claim can be
resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the
claim is ``independent' of the agreement for § 301 pre-
emption purposes." Lingle, 108 S. Ct. at 1883.
Thus the critical inquiry concerns the necessity of looking to
the terms of a CBA to resolve the state law claim. "Section 301
governs claims founded directly on rights created by collective-
bargaining agreements, and also claims ``substantially dependent on
analysis of a collective-bargaining agreement.'" Caterpillar, Inc.
v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. at 2431 (quoting Electrical Works v.
Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 2161, 2166-2167, n.3 (1987)).
Baker claims that his claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress are purely state law claims which are not
preempted by federal labor law. He asserts that, as the CBA does
not expressly address intentional torts, resolution of his claims
does not require interpretation of the CBA.
For Baker to sustain his claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Texas law, he must prove that: (1) the
defendants acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendants'
conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendants' actions
caused Baker emotional distress; and (4) Baker's emotional distress
was severe. Tidelands Auto. Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 942
(Tex. App.SQBeaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965)).
Baker does not allege that any action on the part of the
8
defendants other than his reassignment to a maintenance position
has caused him mental distress. He alleges no instances of
harassment, discrimination, physical abuse, or other conduct which
would provide grounds for an emotional distress claim.
Baker must prove, as an element of his claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, that the defendants' actions in
reassigning him were extreme and outrageous. The terms of the CBA
are relevant to this issue, because the CBA expressly grants
management rights over the business of Farmers and its employees
which could be interpreted to include the right to reassign an
employee's duties.5 Article Five of the CBA provides:
"A. It is expressly agreed and understood that, except
as otherwise provided in this Agreement and by law, the
Cooperative [Farmers] retains the sole right to manage
the affairs of the business and to direct the working
forces thereof and shall have the exclusive right of
selection, direction and determination of size of the
work force . . . . The enumeration herein of
management's rights shall not be deemed to exclude other
functions not specifically set forth. The Cooperative,
therefore, retains all rights, powers, prerogatives, and
authorities not otherwise specifically abridged,
delegated or modified by this Agreement. The Cooperative
reserves the sole right to judge the skill and/or ability
of any employee."
Because construction and understanding of the terms of the
CBA, particularly those governing Farmers' rights to reassign its
employees, are unavoidably and inextricably intertwined with
resolution of the question whether defendants' conduct in
reassigning Baker was extreme and outrageous, a necessary element
5
Indeed, counsel for Baker conceded at oral argument of this
matter that we must look to the CBA for resolution of the
"extreme and outrageous" element of the state tort claim. He
argued, however, that while relevant, the CBA was not
determinative and thus the tort claim was not preempted.
9
of Baker's state law claim, the district court properly held that
his state tort claim was preempted by section 301.
The propriety of the district court's action is revealed by
examination of other cases involving a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, where the question of preemption
turns on whether the conduct upon which the claim is grounded is
governed by the CBA. If the agreement would not condone the
activity, there is no preemption. If the conduct arises out of
activities covered in the agreement, however, courts generally hold
that the emotional distress claim is preempted.
In Brown v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 901 F.2d 1250 (5th
Cir. 1990), we upheld a finding of preemption and affirmed summary
judgment for Southwestern Bell (Bell) where the emotional distress
claim turned on the circumstances under which Bell could or could
not discharge an employee. The plaintiff, Brown, sued Bell, his
employer, in state court for denial of disability benefits and
subsequent discharge. Brown alleged, inter alia, that Bell
intentionally caused him emotional distress when it forced him to
choose between losing his job and returning to work, despite his
claimed inability to work for medical reasons.
Bell removed the action on basis of jurisdiction under ERISA
and the LMRA and moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied Brown's motion to remand and entered summary judgment for
Bell, concluding that the intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim arose out of the denial of disability benefits and
was therefore preempted by ERISA.
This Court, in addressing the intentional infliction of
10
emotional distress claim, did not reach the issue of ERISA
preemption because it concluded that the claim directly implicated
the concerns addressed by the LMRA. Brown, 901 F.2d at 1255. The
Court reasoned that because Brown was essentially claiming that
Bell could not fire him while he was absent from work for medical
reasons, resolution of his claim would require interpretation of
the CBA and was thus preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Id. at
1255-1256.
Although the facts underlying Baker's claims differ slightly
from those in Brown, at issue in each case is the authority of the
employer, as set forth in a CBA, to take certain actions affecting
the plaintiff's job. Because the terms of the CBA are relevant to
the resolution of the state tort claim, section 301 preempts those
state tort claims.
Similarly, in Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703 (5th
Cir. 1985), we affirmed the preemption of state tort claims arising
from the suspension and drug testing of two employees who were
later restored to full employment following negative testing
results. We found preemption proper because the employer had the
power under the CBA to require medical examinations when there was
concern regarding the physical condition of its employees. Id. at
705. See also Bagby v. General Motors Corp., 976 F.2d 919, 921-922
(5th Cir. 1992) (claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress allegedly caused by suspension and escort from factory
were preempted because acts which were claimed to be tortious were
"unquestionably taken in accordance with provisions of the CBA").
The Ninth Circuit has addressed preemption by section 301 of
11
claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress in a number
of cases. In each of these cases, where the allegedly tortious
conduct could not have been sanctioned by the CBA, for example in
cases concerning assault and battery or sexual harassment, no
preemption occurs. Where the conduct may reasonably be deemed
covered by the CBA, however, as in assignment of duties or
representation by a Union, section 301 does preempt state tort
claims.
The case of Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083
(9th Cir. 1991), provides a good example of the distinction between
conduct inside and conduct outside the scope of a CBA. In
Perugini, the court affirmed the trial court's finding of
preemption of emotional distress claims based on an employer's
refusal to honor a pregnant employee's request for light duty and
a union's failure to represent the employee, reasoning that the
claims required interpretation of the CBA. In contrast, the court
reversed the trial court's finding of preemption of the employee's
emotional distress claims which were based on alleged
discrimination and harassment of the employee by her employer and
union, on the ground that these claims did not implicate the CBA.
Other circuits have recognized this same dichotomy. Fox v.
Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795 (6th Cir. 1990), concerned a
wrongful discharge action. The plaintiff alleged harassment at
work and also outside the workplace. She claimed to have suffered
emotional distress, not as a result of her termination, but rather
as a result of the harassment from her co-workers. The Sixth
Circuit distinguished between conduct based on the CBA and conduct
12
outside the scope of the agreement.
"Although state law claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress strictly based upon a defendant's
exercise of CBA rights do not escape the preemptive force
of section 301, such claims premised upon abusive
behavior above and beyond the routine exercise of CBA
rights are not preempted." Id., 914 F.2d at 802
(internal citations omitted).
The court held that the emotional distress claim was not preempted
because the allegations arose from abuse endured while the
plaintiff was employed, and from conduct which was not authorized
or even contemplated by the CBA, rather than from her termination.6
That the defendants' action may have been taken in retaliation
for Baker's participation in the prior arbitration does not defeat
6
See also Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F.2d at 1325-1327
(intentional infliction of emotional distress claim arising from
sexual harassment by co-worker not preempted because CBA could
not lawfully authorize alleged behavior); McCormick v. AT & T
Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 537 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992) (intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim stemming from employer's disposal of contents of
his locker preempted because resolution of claim would be
substantially dependent on analysis of CBA); Knafel v. Pepsi Cola
Bottlers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir. 1988) (affirming
summary judgment for employer on claim that conditions of
employment were calculated to intentionally cause employee
emotional distress because claim required analysis of CBA;
plaintiff claimed actions taken by employer were in retaliation
for participation in prior civil rights action); Douglas v.
American Information Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 571-573
(7th Cir. 1989) (intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim stemming from work assignments and denials of excused work
preempted because claim required determination of whether
employer's conduct was authorized by CBA); Galvez v. Kuhn, 933
F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1991) (claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress based on assault and battery and racial slurs
were not preempted by section 301); Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 251 (1987)
(claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on
circulating to other employees letters concerning suspension of
employee for allegedly purchasing drugs on the job were not
preempted where CBA was silent on work conditions and vague on
disciplinary formalities and did not regulate suspension
letters).
13
section 301 preemption. Cases in which intentional infliction of
emotional distress claims are found to be preempted imply that the
intent with which the alleged tort is performed is not a
determinative factor in preemption analysis. See, e.g., Knafel v.
Pepsi Cola Bottlers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1155, 1160-1162 (6th Cir. 1988)
(finding preemption of emotional distress claim without discussing
alleged retaliatory motive).
Indeed, the fact that Baker alleges retaliatory action as the
motivation for his reassignment supports a finding of section 301
preemption. The purpose of preempting claims based on a violation
of a labor contract is to secure the development of a uniform body
of federal labor policy. This purpose is furthered when state
torts alleged to have been committed in retaliation for exercising
rights granted under a CBA, such as arbitration, are heard by a
federal court applying federal labor law. While such retaliation
as Baker alleges is not itself a wrong under state tort law, it may
constitute an unfair labor practice actionable under federal labor
law. Thus, even the question of the intent behind Baker's
reassignment implicates questions of federal labor law and is
related to the CBA and Baker's rights under CBA.
Because Baker's claim requires analysis of the CBA to
determine whether the defendants' actions in reassigning him to the
maintenance position were extreme and outrageous, a necessary
element of his state law claim, his claims against Farmers are
preempted by section 301. The district court did not err in
denying his motion to remand.
14
B. Claims against White
Baker claims on appeal that the district court abused its
discretion in not remanding the claims asserted against White
individually and as manager of Farmers. Because these claims arise
out of the same facts and circumstances as those asserted against
Farmers, however, removal of Baker's claims against White was
appropriate under the district court's exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.
The recently enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which in many respects
codifies the case law doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, provides
that the district courts
"shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within
[the original jurisdiction of the district court] that
they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III of the United States Constitution."
This pendent jurisdiction may continue even after the federal
claims upon which jurisdiction is based have been dismissed or
rendered moot. Hefner v. Alexander, 779 F.2d 277, 281 (5th Cir.
1985). Removal jurisdiction may properly be exercised over pendent
state claims in the context of federal labor law. See Jackson v.
Southern California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 641-642 (9th Cir. 1989)
(district court had jurisdiction on removal to address state claims
which could have been brought originally in the district court as
pendent to claim for breach of collective bargaining agreement
governed by section 301).
Baker has not asserted any claim against White or Farmers
other than the emotional distress claim arising from his change in
job assignment. The only conduct at issue is White's reassignment
15
of Baker from journeyman lineman to custodian/yardman; Baker does
not claim that White harassed, assaulted, or discriminated against
him, nor does he argue that White's actions in reassigning him were
outside the scope of White's authority as manager of Farmers.
Baker's claims against White are essentially identical to his claim
against Farmers and form part of the same case or controversy. The
district court properly exercised its pendent jurisdiction in
removing the claims against White.
In addition, we hold that removal of the claims asserted
against White, individually and as manager of Farmers, was
appropriate on the facts before us under the doctrine of section
301 preemption.
Baker sued White in both his individual and official
capacities, but it is evident that Baker does not claim any
personal motivation on the part of White in reassigning him to the
maintenance position. The motivation alleged, that of retaliation
for participating in the arbitration, is related to White's
employment with Farmers. Likewise, the action claimed to be
tortious, the actual reassignment, also stems from White's position
as manager of Farmers. In sum, White's reassignment of Baker, the
sole ground for Baker's tort claim, was a company action.
If a plaintiff were allowed to bypass preemption of his state
claim against his employing company by asserting an identical claim
against the company's chief executive, section 301's policy of
developing a consistent body of federal labor law would be
16
eviscerated.7
In cases involving claims against fellow employees where the
question of section 301 preemption has arisen, courts have governed
their determinations on the preemption by the necessity of
referring to a CBA for resolution of the claim rather than by the
individual status of the defendant. In Brown v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., we held that intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims asserted against two supervisors were preempted because the
claims were "'inextricably intertwined with the terms of . . . [a]
labor contract.'" 901 F.2d at 1256 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp.
v. Lueck, 105 S. Ct. at 1912). The fact that two of the defendants
were individuals employed by Southwestern Bell was not a factor in
our decision. See also Knafel v. Pepsi Cola Bottlers, Inc. 850
F.2d at 1160-1162 (affirming preemption of claims against
defendants, including individual employees, on basis of CBA,
without discussion of individual status); Perugini v. Safeway
Stores, Inc. 935 F.2d at 1088-1089 (preemption discussion revolving
around reference to CBA rather than status of defendants). But see
Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F.2d at 1328-1329 (Phillips, J., concurring)
(suggesting that claim against supervisor should not be preempted
7
By this we do not intend that all claims raised against a
fellow employee or supervisor should be preempted; for example,
claims arising out of conduct which is unrelated to the work
environment or which involve actions not within the scope of
employment or not in furtherance of the employer's business may
still escape the reaches of section 301 preemption whether
asserted against an employer or a fellow employee. See Jackson
v. Kimel, 992 F.2d at 1325-1327 (emotional distress claim, based
on alleged sexual harassment, asserted against fellow employee
not preempted by section 301 on ground that interpretation of CBA
not required to resolve tort claim).
17
because of his individual status).
Preemption of Baker's emotional distress claims against both
Farmers and White leaves him with the alternative of pursuing the
remedies available through the grievance procedures set forth in
the CBA; Baker has already filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the National Labor Relations Board.8 In these procedures, his
potential remedies are against Farmers, not White. As Baker does
not allege that White did anything but act for the company,
however, this result is not inappropriate. A company can act only
through the individuals it employs. In situations where, as here,
state tort claims against a fellow employee allege nothing but
company action, allowing a plaintiff to pursue those claims in
state court would destroy the protections provided by section 301.9
II. Dismissal Without Prejudice
This Court reviews the district court's order of dismissal de
novo. Hickey v. Irving Indep. School Dist., 976 F.2d 980, 982 (5th
Cir. 1992).
The district court recognized that Baker had failed to comply
8
This remedy was found adequate in Int'l Union, United Mine
Workers v. Covenant Coal Corp., 977 F.2d 895, 897-899 (4th Cir.
1992), where the Fourth Circuit held that section 301 barred a
federal cause of action for tortious interference with contract
against an entity not a party to the contract, but at the same
time held that section 301 preempted an identical state law
claim. Id. at 899.
9
We note that Baker's claims against White, in his official
capacity as manager of Farmers, may also be preempted for the
same reasons as his claims against Farmers. As defined in both
the NLRA and the LMRA, an employer includes "any person acting as
an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly . . . ." 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1993 Supplement). White, as manager for
Farmers, was thus an employer for purposes of determining whether
the claims against him were preempted by section 301.
18
with the grievance/arbitration procedures required by the CBA and
dismissed the action without prejudice for failure to exhaust his
available remedies. Defendants cross-appeal from this dismissal,
claiming that it should have been with prejudice. Baker claims
that, because an arbitrator has no authority to address matters not
addressed by the CBA, and because the CBA does not address
intentional torts, arbitration pursuant to Article 29 of the CBA
could not provide redress for his emotional distress claims.
It is clear that Baker's claims were properly dismissed for
failure to exhaust the grievance procedures in the CBA. Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 85 S. Ct. 614, 616 (1965) ("As a general rule
in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy
requires that individual employees wishing to assert contract
grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure
agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress.")
(original emphasis); Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703, 704
(5th Cir. 1985) ("The law is completely clear that employees may
not resort to state tort or contract claims in substitution for
their rights under the grievance procedure in a collective
bargaining agreement."). Therefore the only question is whether
this dismissal should have been with or without prejudice.
Defendants argue that the dismissal should have been with
prejudice because Baker did not file a grievance within the time
allowed by the CBA and has thus "waived" his rights to his
administrative remedies. Article 29 of the CBA directs that
grievances "shall be initiated under . . . within five (5) working
days after the date of the occurrence on which they are based and
19
not thereafter."
In Seniority Research Group v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 976 F.2d
1185 (8th Cir. 1992), the Eighth Circuit faced but did not reach an
argument almost identical to the one in the instant case. There
the United Auto Workers Union argued that dismissal for failure to
exhaust intra-union remedies should have been with prejudice,
because the plaintiffs were time barred from pursuing an inter-
union appeal. Although the court declined to address that
contention, because it had not been briefed, it stated: "The
normal consequence of a holding that a plaintiff has failed to
exhaust intra-union remedies is a dismissal without prejudice. The
plaintiff, once these remedies are exhausted, if complete relief
has not been obtained, can return to court." Id., 976 F.2d at
1189.10
While we agree that the district court's dismissal of Baker's
state tort claim does not preclude him from pursuing any remedies
10
Other courts have allowed dismissal without prejudice,
without much discussion of the propriety of such a dismissal and
without any indication that the plaintiff would be time-barred
from pursuing his administrative remedies. See Wagner v. General
Dynamics, 905 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming, without
discussion of prejudice issue, dismissal without prejudice for
failure to exhaust internal union appeals procedures); Ritza v.
Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368
n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The court's order does not say that the
dismissal of the section 301 claims is without prejudice, but
specifically states that dismissal of the Title VII claims is
with prejudice. From this we assume that the court intended, as
it should have, to dismiss the section 301 claim without
prejudice.") (original emphasis); Chube v. Exxon Chemical
Americas, 760 F. Supp. 557, 562 (M.D. La. 1991) ("Because there is
an arbitration proceeding currently pending between the parties,
the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Consequently, the plaintiff's action
for wrongful termination is premature and must be dismissed
without prejudice.").
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provided him by the CBA, we determine that the district court's
conclusion that those tort claims are preempted by section 301 is
final and should not be relitigated.11 Baker may not refile his
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in state court,
nor may he bring it in federal court under the federal labor laws,
as he has not exhausted grievance procedures.
Accordingly, we modify the district court's dismissal of
Baker's claims of intentional infliction of emotion distress to
dismissal with prejudice, except that the judgment shall not
prejudice what rights Baker may have to pursue any remedies
provided by the CBA or other contract.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the order of the district court
denying Baker's motion to remand this action to state court is
AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the action is MODIFIED to be a
dismissal with prejudice, except that the judgment shall not
prejudice whatever rights Baker may have to pursue contractual
remedies.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
11
In allowing Baker to pursue contractual remedies, we make no
determination whether those remedies are still available to him
after this lapse in time.
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