Winston v. Baraka

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 95-10057
Summary Calendar
MARK ANTHONY WINSTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
LARRY W. BARAKA,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(3:94-CV-2629-H)
(April 7, 1995)
Before JONES, BARKSDALE and BENAVIDES, CIRCUIT JUDGES.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant, Mark Anthony Winston ("Winston"), a Texas state
prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his civil rights suit. The
district court dismissed his complaint with prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (d) because it found that the complaint lacked an
arguable basis in law or in fact. Because Winston's claim is based
*
Local Rule 47.5 provides: "The publication of opinions
that have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases
on the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession."
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, we affirm.
In the district court, Winston alleged that, although a jury
found him guilty of aggravated robbery, the trial judge, Judge Pat
McDowell, failed to make an affirmative finding that Winston used
and exhibited a deadly weapon. Defendant/Appellee, Larry W. Baraka
("Judge Baraka"), however, sitting for Judge McDowell, signed the
judgment and entered such a finding, even though no affirmative
finding had been made by Judge McDowell. Thus, Winston alleged,
Judge Baraka "entered a finding antagonistic to the punishment
verdict and the docket sheet." Winston requested monetary damages
for the alleged constitutional violation.
Texas law provides that a district court judge may hear and
determine a matter pending in any district court and authorizes
such district judge to sign a judgment or order in any such court.
Texas Government Code Ann. § 74.094(a) (West 1988). The judgment
or order is valid and binding as if the case were pending in the
court of the judge who acts in the matter. Id. Accordingly, there
was no clear absence of jurisdiction in Judge Baraka's signing of
the judgment containing the use of a deadly weapon finding. Thus,
even if Judge Baraka's complained of action was in error, done
maliciously or was in excess of authority, he would not be deprived
of his judicial immunity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-357
(1978). Because Judge Baraka is entitled to judicial immunity,
Winston's claim is based upon an indisputably meritless legal
theory. The district court properly dismissed the complaint with
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prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
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