Doe v. San Antonio Independent School District

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 17, 2006
)))))))))))))))))))))))))) Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-50653
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JANE DOE, Individually and as Next Friend of
SARAH DOE, a minor,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT—
BEXAR COUNTY; ET AL,
Defendants
ARTHUR AGUILAR, Individually and as Vice-Principal
of Thomas Edison High School, Division of San Antonio
Independent School District
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:03-CV-174
Before GARZA, PRADO and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
Edward C. Prado, Circuit Judge:*
Plaintiffs-Appellants Jane Doe and Sarah Doe (collectively
“Doe”) appeal the magistrate judge’s grant of summary judgment in
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT
RULE 47.5.4.
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favor of Defendant-Appellee Arthur Aguilar, who it determined was
immune from suit. Doe contends that the magistrate judge erred
in dismissing her federal substantive due process claims and
state law claims. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.
I. Facts
In December 2001, Sarah Doe was a fourteen-year-old special
education student1 at Thomas Edison High School. Arthur Aguilar
was the Assistant Principal of the school. On Friday, December
7, 2001, a teacher, Ashley Heyen, brought Sarah to Aguilar’s
office because Sarah had arrived late to class. Aguilar filled
out a permission slip for Sarah to return to class at 8:45 a.m.
At 9:15 a.m., Heyen again brought Sarah to Aguilar’s office.
Heyen stated that she found Sarah walking in the hallways. At
this second meeting, Aguilar spoke with Sarah. The parties
dispute whether Sarah correctly identified herself to Aguilar.
Doe claims Sarah correctly identified herself by name; Aguilar
states that she did not. Both parties agree that Sarah claimed
not to know her home address, her student identification number,
or her phone number. Sarah did, however, remember the phone
number of a man she told Aguilar was her uncle. Sarah told
Aguilar that her father was always drunk and that her mother was
never at home. At the time, Aguilar thought that Sarah was being
1
The record establishes that Sarah suffers from an
emotional disturbance and attention span problems but there is no
indication that she is learning disabled.
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“coy.”
Aguilar decided to suspend Sarah for truancy and
insubordination but was not able to find her in his electronic
database of students. So, Aguilar allowed Sarah to call her
“uncle” to arrange for him to pick her up from school. Aguilar
advised Sarah that he needed to meet with her uncle when he
arrived to pick her up. At that time, the school had a non-
discretionary release policy that provided that a student may
only be released to a parent or legal guardian, a police
authority, or a person who a parent had designated by written
request.
Aguilar told Sarah to wait in his office until her uncle
arrived. At about 9:45 a.m., Aguilar left his office to attend
to other duties. He left Sarah alone in the lobby of the main
office and did not assign any support personnel to supervise her.
Aguilar then forgot about Sarah.
Sarah left school at some later point with her “uncle.” At
around 5:00 p.m., Sarah’s grandmother and guardian contacted the
school after Sarah failed to arrive home. Sarah was then
discovered by San Antonio police at the home of the man who had
picked her up at school. Sarah alleges that he sexually abused
her.
II. Procedural History
Jane Doe, representing her then-minor daughter, Sarah, filed
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suit on March 6, 2003 against the San Antonio Independent School
District and several of its officials, including Arthur Aguilar.
All defendants except for Aguilar were voluntarily dismissed
after they filed motions for summary judgment. Doe and Aguilar
consented to a trial before a U.S. Magistrate Judge. Aguilar
moved for summary judgment on November 12, 2004. The magistrate
judge granted Aguilar’s motion on April 4, 2005, dismissing Doe’s
federal and state causes of action in their entirety on the
grounds that Aguilar was immune from suit. Plaintiff filed her
notice of appeal on May 2, 2005.
III. Discussion
“We review a grant of summary judgment under the same
standard applied by the [magistrate judge]. We examine questions
of law de novo and construe disputed material facts in favor of
the non-movant.” Bellum v. PCE Constructors, Inc., 407 F.3d 734,
738 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted).
A
The first issue is whether Aguilar has qualified immunity
from Doe’s federal claims. To determine whether qualified
immunity applies we use a two-pronged test. McClendon v. City of
Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 322 (5th Cir. 2002)(en banc). First, we
ask “whether a constitutional right would have been violated on
the facts alleged.” Id. at 322-23 (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533
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U.S. 194, 200 (2001))(internal quotation omitted). If so, “the
next sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly
established. Ultimately, a state actor is entitled to qualified
immunity if his or her conduct was objectively reasonable in
light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the
time of his or her actions. Id. at 323 (quoting Saucier, 533
U.S. at 201)(internal citation and quotation omitted).
Doe alleges a violation of Sarah’s right to substantive due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment. “To state a § 1983 claim
for violation of the Due Process Clause, [Doe] must show that
[s]he has asserted a recognized liberty or property interest
within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that [Sarah]
was intentionally or recklessly deprived of that interest, even
temporarily, under color of state law.” Walton v. Alexander, 44
F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (5th Cir. 1995)(en banc)(internal quotations
omitted). Encompassed in the liberty interest is the right to be
free from “unjustified intrusions on personal security.”
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977). In general, a
state is not liable for private violence. However, Doe argues
that Aguilar had a duty to protect Sarah from third party
violence due to a special relationship, and alternatively, that a
duty to protect arose under a “state-created danger” theory.
1. Special Relationship
“[I]n certain limited circumstances the Constitution imposes
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upon the State affirmative duties of care and protection with
respect to particular individuals.” McClendon, 305 F.3d at 324.
The affirmative duty arises when the State imposes limitations on
a person’s freedom to care for himself, such as when one is
incarcerated or institutionalized. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
The Supreme Court has stated that, “when the State takes a person
into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well-being.” Id. at
199-200. Under this theory, the Court has held that incarcerated
prisoners have a right to adequate medical care, that the state
must ensure reasonable safety to involuntarily committed mental
patients, and that suspects in police custody, who have been
injured during their apprehension by the police, have a right to
medical care. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Revere v. Massachusetts
Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239 (1983). In order to state a viable
claim under the special relationship theory, “the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the state official acted with culpability beyond
mere negligence,” McClendon, 305 F.3d at 325, which the Supreme
Court has termed “deliberate indifference.” See, e.g., DeShaney,
489 U.S. at 198 n.5.
We have already concluded that no special relationship
exists between a student at a state residential school for the
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deaf and school officials at that school, despite the “custodial
component present in the regimen of a residential school.”
Walton, 44 F.3d at 1304-06. Doe argues, however, that the State
was under a duty to protect Sarah because she was subjected to
heightened supervisory authority when Aguilar took her into his
“custody” to suspend her and was held against her will. We
disagree.
Sarah Doe’s liberty was not restrained in a manner that
would give rise to a constitutional obligation to protect. A
“‘special relationship’ only arises when a person is
involuntarily confined or otherwise restrained against his will
pursuant to a governmental order or by the affirmative exercise
of state power. This relationship does not arise solely because
the state exercises custodial control over an individual.” Id.
at 1299. As we stated in Doe v. Hillsboro Independent School
District, 113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997)(en banc):
The restrictions imposed by attendance laws upon students
and their parents are not analogous to the restraints of
prisons and mental institutions. . . . “Though attendance
may not always be voluntary, the public school remains an
open institution. Except perhaps when very young, the
child is not physically restrained from leaving school
during school hours . . . .”
Id. at 1415 (quoting Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670). Aguilar’s
instructions to Sarah to wait outside the assistant principal’s
office until a parent or guardian arrived to pick her up did not
rise to the level of incarceration, institutionalization, or
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police custody. Unlike a prisoner, criminal suspect, or person
in a mental institution, Sarah was able to leave the school
premises with relative ease. See id. (pointing out that a
student’s attendance at school is intermittent, the student
returns home each day, and that parents are the primary care
giver to a student who attends public school). Indeed, Sarah
left.
Furthermore, Aguilar’s behavior did not rise to the level of
deliberate indifference. The parties state that Aguilar forgot
about Sarah, not that he disregarded a known danger. See e.g.,
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198 n.5 (“[A] prisoner must show that the
state defendants exhibited ‘deliberate indifference’ to his
‘serious’ medical needs; the mere negligent or inadvertent
failure to provide adequate care is not enough.”).
The State was not under a duty to protect Sarah due to a
special relationship.
2. State-Created Danger
Many circuits have held that “state officials can have a
duty to protect an individual from injuries inflicted by a third
party if the state actor played an affirmative role in creating
or exacerbating a dangerous situation that led to the
individual’s injury.” McClendon, 305 F.3d at 324. “We have
never recognized state-created danger as a trigger of state
affirmative duties under the Due Process Clause.” Rivera v.
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Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 249 (5th Cir. 2003).
Even if we were to consider Doe’s claims under the state-created
danger theory, Doe would need to show that Aguilar acted with
deliberate indifference towards Sarah. Id. Deliberate
indifference is a stringent standard of fault, beyond mere
negligence and usually requires proof that a state actor
disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his actions. See,
e.g., Marasco, 318 F.3d at 509. Aguilar’s actions do not reach
the level of deliberate indifference. While Aguilar knew that
Sarah had been wandering the halls earlier that day and still
left her unattended, the danger that Sarah might be raped by her
“uncle” was not a known or obvious danger to Aguilar.
Doe has not alleged a violation of substantive due process,
and we need not address whether Aguilar’s conduct was objectively
reasonable in light of the clearly established legal rules at the
time of the alleged violation. Aguilar is entitled to qualified
immunity from Doe’s federal claims.
B
The next issue is whether Aguilar is immune from Doe’s state
law negligence claims. The Texas legislature has recognized a
public school principal’s immunity from suit. Johnson v. Calhoun
County Indep. Sch. Dist., 943 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex. App. 1997).
According to the Texas Education Code:
A professional employee of a school district is not
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personally liable for any act that is incident to or
within the scope of the duties of the employee’s position
of employment and that involves the exercise of judgment
or discretion on the part of the employee, except in
circumstances in which a professional employee uses
excessive force in the discipline of students or
negligence resulting in bodily injury to students.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 22.051(a)(Vernon 1996)(amended 2003).2
The issue is whether Aguilar is not immune because he falls
within the exception that may be applied when a principal’s
negligence results in bodily injury to a student. The Texas
Supreme Court has limited section 22.051’s negligence exception
to immunity to situations involving “negligent discipline.”
Hopkins v. Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex.
1987). Negligent discipline is “punishment which involves no
force, but rather requires some action on the part of the student
as a result of which the student suffers bodily injury.” Id.(emphasis added). A typical example of “negligent discipline” is
when a teacher forces a student to run laps around an athletic
field, and the student suffers physical injury from running the
laps. See Diggs v. Bales, 667 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. App. 1984).
Texas case law imposes four requirements for conduct to
constitute negligent discipline: (1) the school district employee
must be negligent; (2) the circumstances must involve student
punishment, (3) the punishment must require some action on the
2
This version of the statute was effective until August 31,
2003.
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part of the student, and (4) the student must suffer bodily
injury as a result of the punishment. See Hopkins, 736, S.W.2d
at 619 (“‘Discipline’ in the school context ordinarily describes
some form of punishment. The opinion in Diggs v. Bales describes
‘negligent discipline’ as ‘punishment [which] involves no force,
but rather requires some action on the part of the student as a
result of which the student suffers bodily injury,’ as in
ordering a student to run laps.”). Here, we cannot say that
Sarah suffered bodily injury as a result of her punishment.
Aguilar’s disciplinary actions did not result in Sarah’s
injury. There must be a nexus between a state actor’s negligent
conduct, the punishment, and the student’s ultimate injury. See
Diggs, 667 S.W.2d at 918 (limiting the liability of professional
school employees to acts incident to the disciplining of
students); see generally, Estate of Garza v. McAllen Indep. Sch.
Dist., 613 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App. 1981). Aguilar disciplined
Sarah by ordering her to stay in the office until he could meet
the person she identified as her uncle. One could argue that
leaving Sarah unattended when she had a history of “wandering”
constituted negligence on Aguilar’s part. However, Aguilar never
released Sarah to her “uncle.” Instead, Sarah left the school
premises against Aguilar’s instructions. Sarah’s departure with
her “uncle” was not part of her punishment. Her subsequent
injury was inflicted by a third-party private actor, off of the
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school premises. Sarah’s injury was not a foreseeable result of
Aguilar’s actions, and her injury did not result from Aguilar’s
disciplinary actions.
Aguilar enjoys professional immunity from Doe’s state law
claims.
AFFIRMED.
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