Ali v. Johnson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 00-10777
Summary Calendar
Civil Docket # 3:00-CV-555
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AHMAD YUSUF ALI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
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July 11, 2001
Before DAVIS, JONES, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:
This appeal leads us to reiterate that inmates sentenced
to incarceration cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment claim
if the prison system requires them to work. The district court’s
decision denying relief to appellant Ali is thus affirmed.
Ali’s § 1983 claim arises from a hiatus in Texas law,
whose statutes did not specifically require inmates to work between
1989 and 1995,1 and from some inartful language in one of this
court’s opinions. Ali began serving a 13-year sentence after his
1994 conviction for robbery. He alleges that because of the
statutory gap, he was not sentenced to “hard labor.” He then cites
the following statement from this court: “We agree that a prisoner
who is not sentenced to hard labor retains his Thirteenth Amendment
rights . . .” Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir.
1990).
Even if Watson correctly implied that a prisoner not
sentenced to hard labor may make a Thirteenth Amendment claim, Ali
conveniently overlooks the fact that this statement was dicta,
because the court found that in any event the inmates’ factual
allegations did not comport with an involuntary servitude claim.
Id. at 1552-1553.
Watson‘s statement about involuntary servitude is an
anomaly in federal jurisprudence. Two years before Watson, this
court rejected a Thirteenth Amendment claim made by a Texas
prisoner, citing a half dozen previous federal decisions and the
text of the Thirteenth Amendment:
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
1
Both before 1989 and after 1995, the statutes have clearly authorized
that inmates may be ordered to labor as part of their punishment. See Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. art. 6166x (repealed 1989); Tex. Gov’t. Code § 497.090 (1995, repealed
in 1999 and replaced by Tex. Gov’t. Code § 497.099(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
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duly convicted shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.
U.S. Constitution, Thirteenth Amendment, § 1 (emphasis added).
Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1988). Wendt
quoted a Ninth Circuit case articulating the literal intent of the
Thirteenth Amendment: “When a person is duly tried, convicted and
sentenced in accordance with the law, no issue of peonage or
involuntary servitude arises.” Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). In the same year in
which Watson was decided, this court held in two separate cases
that forcing inmates to work without pay, and compelling them to
work on private property without pay, do not violate the Thirteenth
Amendment. See Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir.
1990); Murray v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 911 F.2d
1167 (5th Cir. 1990). Other decisions of this court have rejected
similar claims. Craine v. Alexander, 756 F.2d 1070, 1075 (5th Cir.
1985); Plaisance v. Phelps, 845 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1988).
This court is always bound by earlier controlling precedents, if
two of our decisions conflict. To the extent Watson conflicts with
these earlier decisions, it lacks authority.2
2
Ali would distinguish Wendt from his case on the grounds that at the
time of Wendt’s conviction, Texas law clearly required inmates to work as part
of their punishment. Watson also appears to classify Wendt as applicable when
inmates have been sentenced to hard labor. For Thirteenth Amendment purposes,
however, the precise terms of state law are irrelevant. The Constitution does
not forbid an inmate’s being required to work. Whether that requirement violates
state law is a separate, non-constitutional issue not here raised by Ali.
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Ali’s final contention, that he was denied equal
protection under a state law provision that grants release credit
for days of work performed, is meritless. Tex. Crim. Proc. Code
Ann. art. 43.10, rule 6 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (a person convicted of
a misdemeanor, or confined in jail for a felony, is entitled to one
day of sentence credit for each day he works). The rule does not
apply to Ali, as he is serving a felony sentence in a TDCJ unit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
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