Dale v. Chater

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-10375
(Summary Calendar)
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KAREN M DALE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHIRLEY S CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Northern District of Texas
(2:95-CV-127)
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December 5, 1996
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denied
Karen Dale disability benefits under the Social Security Act, and
Dale challenged the denial in federal district court. The court
granted summary judgment for the Commissioner, a decision that Dale
now appeals. We affirm.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Karen Dale filed applications with the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration for disability insurance benefits
and supplemental security income after being struck by a public
transit bus. The Commissioner denied both claims. Without
appealing the denial of these claims, Dale filed a second
application for disability insurance benefits for the same alleged
disability. The Commissioner denied this second application as
well. Dale next filed a request for reconsideration, which the
Commissioner also denied. Represented by counsel, Dale appeared
before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), who concluded that Dale
was not disabled and therefore not entitled to disability benefits
under the Social Security Act ("Act"). The Appeals Council denied
Dale's request for review of the ALJ's decision, which made the
ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Dale appealed to the federal district court for review of the
denial of disability insurance benefits. Both parties filed
motions for summary judgment. Based on the magistrate judge's
recommendation, and over Dale's objection, the district court
granted the Commissioner's motion and entered judgment for the
Commissioner. Dale appeals to this Court solely on the issue of
whether substantial evidence supported the Commissioner's finding
that Dale did not suffer from disabling pain.
Our inquiry is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and
whether the correct legal standards were applied. Ripley v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). If supported by
substantial evidence, the Commissioner's findings are conclusive.
Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion. Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357,
360 (5th Cir. 1993). Because the Commissioner alone resolves
evidentiary conflicts, we may not reweigh the evidence, try the
issues de novo, or substitute our judgment for that of the
Commissioner. Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174; Randall v. Sullivan, 956
F.2d 105, 109 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Commissioner's evaluation of a disability claim requires
a five-step inquiry. She must determine whether (1) the claimant
is currently employed; (2) the claimant has a severe impairment;
(3) the claimant's impairment meets or equals an impairment listed
in the appendix to the regulations; (4) the impairment prevents the
claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) the claimant
is capable of performing work in the national economy. Martinez,
64 F.3d at 173-74. The claimant bears the burden of proving the
first four elements; the Commissioner, the fifth. Greenspan v.
Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 115 S. Ct. 1984, 131 L. Ed. 2d 871 (1995). The inquiry
terminates if, at any step, the Commissioner deems the claimant
disabled or not disabled. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th
Cir. 1995).
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Here, the ALJ determined that Dale was not disabled under step
four of the test. The ALJ held that, although the medical evidence
establishes that Dale has degenerative disc disease and
degenerative joint disease, she is not disabled as defined by the
regulations. Dale's impairments do not prevent her from engaging
in light work. The ALJ also concluded that Dale's allegations of
pain were not substantiated by medical evidence to the extent
alleged and thus do not support a finding of disability. We agree.
There is uncontroverted medical evidence that Dale suffers
from degenerative disc and joint disease and chronic cervical and
lumbar myofascial syndrome. It is also uncontested that Dale has
bulging intervertebral discs with spurring in the lumbar region.
The magistrate judge held that "[c]learly, plaintiff has a physical
impairment resulting from anatomical and physiological
abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques."
However, there is no evidence suggesting a herniated disc or
surgical lesion. One examining doctor found Dale's examination to
be "entirely within normal limits." Another opined that Dale's
impairment did not appear to require surgical intervention. A
third doctor noted that Dale was in good general condition, with
intact reflexes, motor power and sensory examination. A myelogram
showed a normal cervical and thoracic spine with discogenic
syndrome without nerve root impingement in the lumbar spine. There
was no evidence of muscle spasms, and Dale experienced only a
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slightly diminished range of motion and slight tenderness.
The record lacks any mention that Dale has a specific
disability resulting from her impairments. There is also no
evidence that any physician restricted plaintiff's activities or
excused her from work. In various medical reports describing
Dale's condition, examining physicians used the terms "mild,"
"slight," "small," and "very small" in describing Dale's
impairments. Finally, the evidence also reveals that Dale's pain
subsides after taking medication. After considering this evidence,
the ALJ concluded that Dale's impairments allow her to perform
light work.
Dale contends that pain prevents her from working and, as
such, is the critical element upon which her claim of disability is
based. Under the Act, pain alone can be a disabling condition,
even if its existence is unsupported by objective evidence, Cook
v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1985), provided the
claimant establishes a medically determinable impairment capable of
producing disabling pain. Ripley, 67 F.3d at 556. Once the
claimant establishes such a medical impairment, the ALJ will
determine the claimant's work capacity by considering claimant's
subjective complaints of pain along with the medical evidence. Id.We accord considerable deference to the ALJ's determination. James
v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 1986).
After weighing the evidence regarding the nature, location,
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onset, duration, frequency, radiation and intensity of Dale's pain,
as well as Dale's treatment for pain and her functional limitations
due to the pain, the ALJ concluded that Dale's allegations of pain
were not medically substantiated to the extent alleged.
Subjective complaints of disability due to pain must be
corroborated by objective medical evidence. Wren v. Sullivan, 925
F.2d 123, 128-29 (5th Cir. 1991). Here, there appears to be no
medical evidence showing such disability. None of the treating
physicians restricted Dale's activities or issued her a medical
excuse from work. None of the physicians recorded anything showing
Dale was functionally limited or impaired. Although Dale was
prescribed three different pain medications (Dolobid, Anaprox and
Naprosyn), each is designed to treat only mild to moderate pain.
The medical records indicate that, although Dale has some
degenerative disc and joint disease, these ailments can be
effectively treated with "conservative treatment." After carefully
weighing this evidence, the ALJ properly concluded that the lack of
objective medical evidence did not corroborate Dale's complaints of
disabling pain.
The ALJ doubted the credibility of Dale's testimony regarding
the extent of her pain. The ALJ does not have to credit
plaintiff's subjective evidence of pain in the presence of
conflicting medical evidence. Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289,
295 (5th Cir. 1992). Because the medical evidence does not support
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Dale's subjective complaints of disability due to pain, the ALJ
properly discounted Dale's testimony regarding the extent of her
pain. Faced with this evidence, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment to the Commissioner.
The ALJ, the magistrate judge, and the district court all
carefully reviewed Dale’s claims and found them wanting. We
conclude that the Commissioner's decision to deny Dale's
application for disability benefits was supported by substantial
evidence, and we therefore AFFIRM the decision of the district
court.
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