Jones v. American Council

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-30328
Summary Calendar
SCOTT RINEHART JONES
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(98-CV-592-C-M2)
September 21, 1999
Before JOLLY, JONES, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This appeal concerns the district court’s dismissal of
the plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Because the court relied improperly on factual
inferences, we reverse the order and remand for further
proceedings.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except for the limited circumstances
set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
BACKGROUND
Appellant Scott Rinehart Jones (“Jones”) filed suit
against the American Council on Education (“ACE”) alleging that ACE
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12102,
when ACE, the developer of and administrator in Louisiana of the
Tests of General Educational Development (the “GED”), denied
Jones’s request to modify questions on the GED to simple, direct
questions. Claiming to suffer from various learning disabilities,
Jones requested from ACE certain accommodations in taking the GED.
Specifically, he requested that ACE give him extra time, give him
a private examination room, allow him to use a calculator, and
modify the test so that it contained only simple, direct questions
without multiple parts. ACE allowed all the requested
accommodations except the last.
In the district court’s dismissal of Jones’s suit, the
court held that Jones’s request for accommodation was ureasonable
and thus not an accommodation permitted by the ADA. In finding
Jones’s request unreasonable, the court concluded that the request
imposed an unreasonable financial and administrative burden and
would alter the nature of the test.
DISCUSSION
“We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo.” Cinel v.
Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). A complaint should
not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his
claim which would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. Gibson, 355
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U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957); Lowrey v.
Texas A&M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997).
Although much of the district court’s reasoning makes
intuitive sense, the court based its decision on what are
essentially factual assumptions, such as the impact on norming of
test results created by changing the question format and even the
basic content of the GED exam. Factual inferences may be drawn
upon a motion for summary judgment after admissible evidence has
been introduced, but not upon a motion to dismiss on the pleadings
for failure to state a claim. While it may be doubtful that the
appellant will prevail on the merits, the pleadings adequately
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.
We therefore REVERSE the district court’s order and
REMAND the case for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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