United States v. Samuels

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 7, 2004
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-50432
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GARRIE LAVERT SAMUELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. MO-02-CR-108-ALL
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Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DAVIS and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Garrie Lavert Samuels appeals his convictions for conspiracy
to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base, aiding and
abetting the possession of cocaine base with the intent to
distribute, and aiding and abetting the possession and
distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. He argues that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain his conspiracy conviction, that the
district court abused its discretion in dismissing his original
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-50432
-2-
indictment without prejudice, and that the district court abused
its discretion in admitting evidence of his prior drug
convictions.
Because Samuels did not renew his FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 motion
for a judgment of acquittal at the close of all of the evidence,
and his post-verdict motions were untimely, this court’s review
of the sufficiency of the evidence consequently “is limited to
determining whether there was a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 724 (5th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted). A conspiracy agreement can be established
through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. Here, the
circumstantial evidence showed that Samuels and Monroe were
involved in a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute the
crack found in Monroe’s apartment. Therefore, Samuels’
insufficiency-of-the-evidence claim fails. See id. at 724.
This court reviews a dismissal without prejudice under the
Speedy Trial Act for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Blevins, 142 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court
properly concluded that Samuels’ offenses were serious offenses
under the Speedy Trial Act. United States v. Melguizo, 824 F.2d
370, 371 (5th Cir. 1987). Contrary to Samuels’ contentions,
there was no evidence “that the delay was sought for ulterior
purposes or that the Government regularly or frequently failed to
meet deadlines in his case.” Blevins, 142 F.3d at 226. Finally,
the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of the Speedy
No. 03-50432
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Trial Act and on the administration of justice also weighed in
favor of dismissal without prejudice. Id. Therefore, the
district did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the first
indictment without prejudice and in permitting reindictment.
See id. at 224.
This court has consistently “held that evidence of a
defendant’s prior conviction for a similar crime is more
probative than prejudicial and that any prejudicial effect may be
minimized by a proper jury instruction.” United States v.
Taylor, 210 F.3d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 2000). Samuels does not
specifically dispute that his prior convictions were for a
similar crime, and the district court twice admonished the jury
that Samuels’ prior convictions were not to be considered as
evidence that he committed the offenses charged. Contrary to
Samuels’ contentions, our decision in United States v. Jackson,
339 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2003), is inapposite. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Samuels’
prior convictions. See Taylor, 210 F.3d at 318.
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.