Hoque v. Ashcroft

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT October 6, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-60024
Summary Calendar
MANIRUL HOQUE,
Petitioner,
versus
JOHN ASHCROFT, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
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Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A7 043 873
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Before JONES, BENAVIDES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Manirul Hoque, a citizen of Bangladesh, petitions this
court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision
denying his application for political asylum and his request for
withholding of removal. Hoque argues that the BIA is “churning
out” decisions, demonstrating that there has been a systematic
application of the affirmance-without-opinion (AWO) procedure that
has adversely prejudiced his statutory right to appeal.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
We have agreed with Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365 (1st
Cir. 2003), cited by Hoque, that the use of the AWO procedure does
not lead to the inference that the BIA did not conduct the required
review. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832 (5th Cir.
2003). Accordingly, Hoque’s argument that he did not receive
appropriate BIA review is without merit.
Hoque also argues that the BIA improperly used the AWO
procedure because the immigration judge (IJ) was required to, but
did not, make a credibility finding. However, the IJ implicitly
found Hoque credible. Hoque also argues that the BIA’s use of the
AWO procedure was inappropriate because the IJ’s decision was not
well-reasoned and because the BIA did not consider his appeal
arguments. Hoque’s argument fails because the BIA’s affirmance
without opinion could not include a discussion of the IJ’s reason-
ing or lack thereof or a discussion of Hoque’s arguments on appeal.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4)(ii).
Hoque argues that he has made a prima facie case that he
is a refugee and entitled to asylum based on past persecution and
his well-founded fear of persecution from the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) for his activities as a member of the
Jatiyo Party. Hoque did not establish past persecution. Hoque was
able to live and work openly as a garment-factory sales
representative and director in Bangladesh for a couple of years
after the BNP gained control of the government.
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Moreover, Hoque’s testimony does not establish a
particularized connection between his political activity and his
current fear of persecution. See Faddoul v. INS, 37 F.3d 185, 188
(5th Cir. 1994). The political climate has changed since Hoque
left Bangladesh, with Jatiyo Party members now serving in the
government. Hoque gave no specific reason as to why the BNP would
still be interested in persecuting him after a decade has passed,
in light of the changes in the government. Thus, Hoque has not
established by substantial evidence that he is entitled to asylum.
See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002).
Hoque also challenges the BIA’s determination that he was
not entitled to a withholding of deportation. Because Hoque is not
eligible for asylum, he does not meet the standard for withholding
of deportation. See id.
Finally, Hoque asserts that the IJ abused his discretion
in failing to grant 60 days for voluntary departure. Hoque has
offered no reason that this court can review the IJ’s grant of 30
days to voluntarily depart given the plain language of the
regulation extant at the time of the IJ’s decision. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 240.26(e)(1998); 8 C.F.R. § 240.26(g)(1998). Hoque’s petition
for review of the BIA decision is DENIED.
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