Holmes v. Atlantic Sounding Co

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED NOVEMBER 16, 2005
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 25, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
No. 04-30732
ADDIE HOLMES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ATLANTIC SOUNDING COMPANY INC;
WEEKS MARINE INC; ABC INSURANCE
CO; XYZ INSURANCE CO,
Defendants-Appellees;
-----------------------------------------------------
Cons. No. 04-30750
ADDIE HOLMES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ATLANTIC SOUNDING COMPANY INC;
ABC INSURANCE CO INC,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------------
Appeals from the United States District Courts
for the Western District of Louisiana
--------------------
Before WIENER, DEMOSS, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
WIENER, Circuit Judge:
In this consolidated appeal of two state actions that were
removed to different district courts, Plaintiff-Appellant Addie
Holmes appeals the denial of her motion to remand and the dismissal
of her Jones Act and general maritime law personal injury suit
against defendants-appellees, Atlantic Sounding Co., Inc.
(“Atlantic”), her nominal payroll employer, and Weeks Marine, Inc.
(“Weeks”), for which she was actually performing services at the
time in question. The dispositive issue —— whether an unpowered
floatable structure like Weeks’s quarterbarge BT-213 (“the BT-
213”), on which Holmes was working when injured, is a vessel for
Jones Act purposes —— is not one of first impression in this
circuit. We resolved this issue in Gremillion v. Gulf Coast
Catering Co.,1 answering the question in the negative; however, the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Stewart v. Dutra Construction
Co.2 calls into question the analysis underlying our holding in
Gremillion. We therefore must determine what effect, if any,
Stewart has on this aspect of our vessel jurisprudence. We affirm.
I. FACTS
Holmes sued defendants-appellees Atlantic and Weeks
(collectively, “appellees”) in Louisiana state court seeking
damages for injuries that she allegedly sustained on her first day
of work as a cook aboard the BT-213. Holmes is a Louisiana
1
904 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1990).
2
—— U.S. ——, 125 S. Ct. 1118 (2005).
2
domiciliary. Both Atlantic and Weeks are New Jersey corporations
with their principal place of business in Cranford, New Jersey.
The BT-213 is 140 feet long and 40 feet wide. It is, in
effect, a floating dormitory, a barge on the deck of which a two-
story, 50-bed “quarters package” is mounted. Weeks causes the BT-
213 to be moved from place to place to house and feed employees
during dredging projects at various locations. The BT-213 has
sleeping quarters on both stories, as well as toilet facilities, a
fully-equipped galley, locker rooms, freshwater deck tanks, diesel-
powered electrical generators, and a gangway with railings. The
BT-213’s entire “crew” consists of two cooks and two janitors.
There is no record evidence that they are transported on the BT-213
while it is moved from one site to another.
The BT-213 is towed by tugs between project locations. It is
sometimes towed by itself and, at times, together with other
barges. Weeks temporarily installs battery-operated running lights
on the BT-213 when it is to be towed by itself. When the BT-213 is
not in use, it is held in a boat slip at Weeks’s facility in Houma,
Louisiana. At the time of Holmes’s accident, the BT-213 was moored
in a private boat slip at Holly Beach in Cameron Parish while the
crew of Weeks’s dredge worked in the Gulf of Mexico. The BT-213
arrived at Holly Beach in August 2002 and had not moved before
Holmes’s accident the following month.
The BT-213 has never been inspected by or registered with the
Coast Guard. It is not intended to transport personnel, equipment,
3
passengers, or cargo, and no evidence in the record reflects that
it has ever done so or is capable of doing so. It is not fitted
out with winches, running lights, a radar, a compass, engines,
navigational aids, Global Positioning System, lifeboats, or
steering equipment such as rudders. It is incapable of self-
propulsion; has no captain, engineer, or deckhand; has no bilge
pumps or wing tanks; and has never been offshore.
On the other hand, the BT-213 has a raked bow on each end, and
“two end tanks where the rakes are . . . for flotation.” It has a
radio that is used primarily to communicate with the dredge. It is
equipped with bits or bollards that are used to tie it to the shore
or to other vessels or structures. It is sometimes moored by
anchors and is equipped with life rings and portable water pumps.
Holmes alleges that when she attempted to place her belongings
in her locker on the BT-213, both the locker and a television set
that was on top of it fell on her as she opened the locker door.
She alleges further that the accident caused injuries to her neck,
shoulder, ears, and nose and caused dizziness as well.
Holmes sued Atlantic and Weeks in Louisiana state court,
asserting claims under the Jones Act3 and general maritime law.
She later filed a second suit in Louisiana state court against only
Atlantic, seeking maintenance and cure.
3
46 U.S.C. § 688.
4
These cases were removed to different federal district courts.
In their respective removal notices, Atlantic and Weeks advanced
that Holmes fraudulently pleaded a Jones Act claim to prevent
removal to federal court and that diversity jurisdiction existed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Holmes responded with motions to remand
both suits. The magistrate judge ordered the parties to brief the
issue of Jones Act liability.
After discovery and briefing were complete, the magistrate
judge issued reports and recommendations in both suits, proposing
that the district courts deny Holmes’s motions to remand and enter
judgments in favor of Weeks and Atlantic. The magistrate judge
concluded that (1) the BT-213 is not a vessel for purposes of the
Jones Act, (2) Holmes could not establish any possibility of
recovery under the Jones Act, and (3) as diversity jurisdiction
existed, removal was proper. Holmes timely objected to the
magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.
In June 2004, the district court to which Holmes’s maintenance
and cure suit against Atlantic had been removed adopted the report
and recommendation and issued a partial final judgment in favor of
Atlantic. After Holmes conceded that no other viable claims
remained, the district court amended the partial final judgment to
reflect its finality.
One month later, the district court to which Holmes’s Jones
Act and general maritime law suit against Weeks and Atlantic had
been removed adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
5
recommendation, denied Holmes’s motion to remand, and dismissed her
Jones Act claim. The court certified the partial final judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Holmes timely filed
notices of appeal in both courts. We consolidated the appeals of
these two cases.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review the denial of a motion to remand de novo.4 We also
review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.5
Whether an unconventional craft is a vessel is an issue that is
generally resolved as a matter of law, although we have recognized
that “at the margin, fact issues may be presented.”6
B. Issues
1. Removal
Generally, Jones Act cases are not removable from state
court.7 A fraudulently pleaded Jones Act claim does not, however,
4
S.W.S. Erectors, Inc. v. Infax, Inc., 72 F.3d 489, 494 (5th
Cir. 1996) (citing Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1336
(5th Cir. 1995).
5
S.W.S. Erectors, Inc., 72 F.3d at 492 (citing Lee v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 34 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1994)).
6
Manuel v. P.A.W. Drilling & Well Serv., 135 F.3d 344, 347
(5th Cir. 1998) (citing Ducote v. Keeler & Co., Inc., 953 F.2d
1000, 1002 (5th Cir. 1992)).
7
See Burchett v. Cargill, Inc., 48 F.3d 173, 175 (5th Cir.
1995).
6
bar removal.8 A defendant may “‘pierce the pleadings to show that
the Jones Act claim has been fraudulently pleaded to prevent
removal.’”9 The district court may use a “summary judgment-like
procedure” to determine whether a plaintiff has fraudulently
pleaded a Jones Act claim.10 “The court may deny remand where, but
only where, resolving all disputed facts and ambiguities in current
substantive law in plaintiff’s favor, the court determines that the
plaintiff has no possibility of establishing a Jones Act claim on
the merits.”11
To qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act, an employee must
first demonstrate that his duties “‘contribute to the function of
the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.’”12 Second, “a
seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or an
identifiable group of vessels) that is substantial in terms of both
its duration and its nature.”13 Atlantic and Weeks contend only
that the BT-213 is not a vessel under the Jones Act. Accordingly,
if Atlantic and Weeks carry their burden and demonstrate that there
8
See id.
9
Id. (quoting Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202,
207 (5th Cir. 1993)).
10
Id. at 176.
11
Hufnagel v. Omega Serv. Indus., Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 345-46
(5th Cir. 1999) (citing Burchett, 48 F.3d at 176).
12
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 359 (1995) (quoting
McDermott Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 355 (1991)).
13
Id.
7
exists no genuine issue of material fact as to the BT-213’s vessel
status, removal was proper, as was dismissal. For the following
reasons, we find that the BT-213 is not a vessel for Jones Act
purposes. Accordingly, we uphold the district court’s denial of
Holmes’s motions to remand.
2. Our Pre-Stewart “Vessel” Jurisprudence
“The existence of a vessel is a ‘fundamental prerequisite to
Jones Act jurisdiction’ and is at the core of the test for seaman
status.”14 The term “vessel” has, however, escaped precise
definition. The exotic watercraft that have been deemed vessels
and the heavy inquiry that surrounds each analysis of an
unconventional craft’s status has led even this court to recognize
that the “three men in a tub would . . . fit within our definition
[of a Jones Act seaman], and one probably could make a convincing
case for Jonah inside the whale.”15
Historically, we have noted that the term “vessel” connotes a
structure designed or used for “transportation of passengers, cargo
or equipment from place to place across navigable waters.”16 “As
a general principle, where the vessel status of an unconventional
14
Daniel v. Ergon, Inc., 892 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 824, 828 (5th
Cir. 1984)).
15
Burks v. Am. River Transp. Co., 679 F.2d 69, 75 (5th Cir.
1982).
16
Cook v. Belden Concrete Prods., 472 F.2d 999, 1002 (5th Cir.
1973).
8
craft is unsettled, it is necessary to focus upon ‘the purpose for
which the craft is constructed and the business in which it is
engaged.’”17 “The greater the structure’s resemblance to
conventional seafaring craft, the greater the odds of securing
vessel status.”18
To evaluate the purpose for which a craft is constructed, we
have considered: (1) whether the owner assembled or constructed the
craft to transport passengers, cargo, or equipment across navigable
waters; (2) whether the craft is engaged in that service; (3)
whether the owner intended to move the craft on a regular basis;
(4) the length of time that the craft has remained stationary; and
(5) the existence of other “objective vessel features,” such as:
(a) navigational aids; (b) lifeboats and other life-saving
equipment; (c) a raked bow; (d) bilge pumps; (e) crew quarters; and
(f) registration with the coast Guard as a vessel.19
To determine the business in which the craft is engaged,
“evaluating the craft’s transportation function is the key to
determining the craft’s status.”20 When the transportation function
of the craft is merely incidental to the craft’s primary purpose,
17
Gremillion v. Gulf Coast Catering Co., 904 F.2d 290, 292
(5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Blanchard v. Engine & Gas Compressor
Servs., Inc., 575 F.2d 1140, 1142 (5th Cir. 1978)).
18
Id.
19
Manuel, 135 F.3d at 350-51; Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 2936.
20
Manuel, 135 F.3d at 351 (emphasis added).
9
we have consistently held that the craft is not a vessel.21 On the
other hand, when the transportation function of the craft is “an
important part of the business in which the craft was engaged,” we
have generally found the craft to be a vessel, even if it has also
served as a work platform.22 We have attributed three common
attributes to nonvessels:
(1) The structure was constructed to be used primarily as
a work platform;
(2) the structure is moored or otherwise secured at the
time of the accident; and
(3) although the platform is capable of movement, and is
sometimes moved across navigable waters in the course of
normal operations, any transportation function is merely
incidental to the platform’s primary purpose.23
3. Stewart
With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the recent Supreme
Court opinion in Stewart v. Dutra Construction Co.24 to determine
any possible effect on our vessel jurisprudence. In Stewart, the
plaintiff sued Dutra Construction Co. (“Dutra”) under the Jones Act
and the Longshore Harbors Workers’ Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) after
he injured himself on Dutra’s dredge, the Super Scoop.25 The Court
described the Super Scoop as follows:
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
Pavone v. Miss. Riverboat Amusement Corp., 52 F.3d 560, 570
(5th Cir. 1995); Gremillion, 904 F,2d at 294.
24
—— U.S. ——, 125 S. Ct. 1118 (Feb. 22, 2005).
25
See id. at 1121-22.
10
The Super Scoop is a massive floating platform from which
a clamshell bucket is suspended beneath the water. The
bucket removes silt from the ocean floor and dumps the
sediment onto one of the two scows that float alongside
the dredge. The Super Scoop has certain characteristics
common to seagoing vessels, such as a captain and a crew,
navigational lights, ballast tanks, and a crew dining
area. But it lacks others. Most conspicuously, the
Super Scoop has only limited means of self-propulsion.
It is moved long distances by tugboat. . . . It navigates
short distances by manipulating its anchors and cables.26
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dutra
“because the Super Scoop’s primary purpose was dredging rather than
transportation and because it was stationary at the time of
Stewart’s injury.”27 The district court held, as a matter of law,
that (1) the Super Scoop was not a vessel, and (2) Stewart could
not establish seaman status. The court of appeals affirmed.28 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari “to resolve confusion
over how to determine whether a watercraft is a ‘vessel’ for
purposes of the LHWCA.”29 The Court stated that 1 U.S.C. § 3
provides the controlling definition of “vessel” for LHWCA
purposes:30 “every description of watercraft or other artificial
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
26
Id. at 1121.
27
Id. at 1122.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 1123.
30
See id. at 1129.
11
transportation on water.”31 Although the issue on which the Court
granted certiorari would appear at first to limit Stewart’s
precedential force to LHWCA cases only, we cannot read Stewart so
narrowly. Indeed, the Court’s opinion refers to the Jones Act and
the LHWCA interchangeably and nowhere limits § 3’s definition of
“vessel” to the LHWCA, either expressly or implicitly.
Other language in the opinion supports our conclusion that the
Court used Stewart to define “vessel” for purposes of both
statutes. After noting that the Jones Act does not define “seaman”
and that the LHWCA does not define “vessel,” the Court stated:
The Shipping Act of 1916 defines the term “vessel” for
purposes of the Jones Act. See 46 U.S.C. App. § 801.
However, the provisions of the Jones Act at issue here,
§ 688(a), speaks not of “vessels,” but of “seamen.” In
any event, because we have identified a Jones Act
“seaman” with reference to the LHWCA’s exclusion, see 33
U.S.C. § 902(3)G) (“a master or member of a crew of any
vessel”), it is the LHWCA’s use of the term “vessel” that
matters. And, as we explain, the context surrounding
Congress’ enactment of the LHWCA suggests that Rev. Stat.
§ 3, now 1 U.S.C. § 3, provides the controlling
definition of the term “vessel” in the LHWCA.32
Further, the Court observed that its earlier cases “show[ed] that
at the time Congress enacted the Jones Act and the LHWCA in the
1920’s, it was settled that § 3 defined the term ‘vessel’ for
purposes of those statutes.”33 The most telling indication that the
31
1 U.S.C. § 3 (emphasis added).
32
Id. at 1124 n. 1.
33
Id. at 1125.
12
Court considers Stewart’s holding applicable to the Jones Act is
found in the following language:
Applying § 3 brings within the purview of the Jones Act
the sorts of watercraft considered vessels at the time
Congress passed the Act. By including special-purpose
vessels like dredges, § 3 sweeps broadly, but the other
prerequisites to qualifying for seaman status under the
Jones Act provide some limit, notwithstanding § 3’s
breadth. A maritime worker seeking Jones Act seaman
status must also prove that his duties contributed to the
vessel’s function or mission, and that his connection to
the vessel was substantial both in nature and duration.
Thus, even though the Super Scoop is a “vessel,” workers
injured aboard the Super Scoop are eligible for seaman
status only if they are “master[s] or member[s]” of its
crew.34
It is clear, then, that Stewart defines “vessel” for purposes of
both the Jones Act and the LHWCA. Given Stewart’s significant
broadening of the set of unconventional watercraft that must be
deemed vessels, however, we are convinced that the Court employed
the foregoing language to confirm that there still exist limits on
a potential plaintiff’s seaman status under the Jones Act.
As Stewart’s definition of “vessel” applies equally to the
Jones Act and the LHWCA, § 3 clearly controls the definition of
“vessel” for purposes of both acts. Thus, as long as a water-borne
structure is practically capable of being used for transportation
on navigable waters, it is a “vessel.”35 Convinced that our case
34
Id. at 1127.
35
See Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1129.
13
law was consistent with § 3’s definition of a vessel,36 we
confected a list of factors and requirements from § 3’s definition
to aid us in determining whether an unconventional watercraft
merits vessel status.37 We must therefore determine today the
effect, if any, that Stewart has on the continued efficacy of these
factors and requirements.
We hold that Stewart does not fundamentally alter our “vessel”
jurisprudence. One of the driving forces behind the Court’s grant
of certiorari in Stewart was to reject both the district court’s
and the court of appeals’ reliance on two particular factors: (1)
whether the primary purpose of the watercraft was navigation or
commerce; and (2) whether the watercraft was in transit at the time
of Stewart’s injury.38 The Court explicitly held that “[n]either
prong of the Court of Appeals’ test is consistent with the text of
§ 3 or the established meaning of the term ‘vessel’ in general
maritime law.”39
36
See Manuel, 135 F.3d at 347 (“A ‘vessel’ traditionally
refers to structures designed or utilized for transportation of
passengers, cargo or equipment from place to place across navigable
waters. This is consistent with the statutory definition which
defines the word ‘vessel’ as including ‘every description of
watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or capable of
being used, as a means of transportation on water.’” (citing 1
U.S.C. § 3) (other citations and quotations omitted)).
37
See text accompanying notes 17-24.
38
See id. at 1127-29.
39
Id. at 1127-28.
14
In rejecting the first prong, the Court quoted § 3’s
definition of vessel: “Section 3 requires only that a watercraft be
‘used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water’ to qualify as a vessel. It does not require that a
watercraft be used primarily for that purpose.”40 In rejecting the
second prong —— that the craft be in navigation at the time of
injury —— the Court noted that in Chandris it had rejected such a
“snapshot” test: “Just as a worker does not oscillate back and
forth between Jones Act coverage and other remedies depending on
the activity in which the worker was engaged while injured, neither
does a watercraft pass in and out of Jones Act coverage depending
on whether it was moving at the time of the accident.”41
We conclude that Stewart’s modification of our “vessel”
jurisprudence is narrow. Specifically, we may no longer rely on
whether (1) the transportation function of the watercraft is
primary or incidental to the its purpose and (2) the watercraft was
in motion at the time of the injury.42 Indeed, Stewart’s holding
40
Id. at 1128 (emphasis in original).
41
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
42
With regard to the second prong, the Court noted that a
vessel may still lose its status as such if it has been “withdrawn
from the water for extended periods of time.” Id. Thus, this
circuit’s jurisprudence holding that certain craft are not vessels
because they have been withdrawn from navigation for a considerable
amount of time is still good law. See id.; Pavone, 52 F.3d at 570
(holding that indefinitely-moored casino not a vessel for Jones Act
purposes).
15
appears to affect our definition of nonvessels more than that of
vessels.43
The Court’s language in Stewart demands this conclusion. In
rejecting the court of appeals’ reliance on the second prong, the
Court noted:
Granted, the Court has sometimes spoken of the
requirement that a vessel be “in navigation,” but never
to indicate that a structure’s locomotion at any given
moment mattered. Rather, the point was that structures
may lose their character as vessels if they have been
withdrawn from the water for extended periods of time.
. . .
Instead, the “in navigation” requirements is an element
of the vessel status of the watercraft. It is relevant
to whether the craft is “used, or capable of being used”
for maritime transportation.44
The emphasized language supports our conclusion that Stewart’s
holding stands for the proposition that § 3 is merely the starting
point for a determination whether an unconventional watercraft is
a vessel for Jones Act and LHWCA purposes. Indeed, the Stewart
Court recognized that it has always “construe[d] § 3’s definition
[of vessel] in light of the term’s established meaning in general
maritime law,” explicitly confirming that “§ 3 should be construed
consistently with the general maritime law.”45 The Stewart Court’s
use of the term “element” in describing the “in navigation”
requirement strongly suggests that, even though § 3’s definition of
43
See supra note 24 & accompanying text.
44
Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1128 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
45
Id. at 1126.
16
vessel is paramount, the general maritime law will continue to
dictate the discrete factors and requirements that emanate from §
3’s starting point. Nothing in Stewart rejects the majority of the
other factors and requirements; it rejects only those two on which
we and the First Circuit heretofore relied, as previously confected
from § 3 in our analyses underlying our determination of vessel
status in Jones Act or LHWCA cases. Accordingly, we hold that our
“vessel” jurisprudence rests relatively intact, modified only by
the Stewart Court’s rejection of the two prongs relied on by the
First Circuit in that case.
The dissent reads Stewart as stripping the vessel/non-vessel
analysis of all these requirements and factors that we previously
confected from § 3's definition of “vessel.”46 Thus stripped, the
46
The dissent points to the Second Circuit’s recent decision
in Uzdavines v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 418 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2005),
which “undertook the analysis that is required of us to correct
prior precedent no longer vital after Stewart.” Slip op. at ___
(DeMoss, J., dissenting). True, the Uzdavines court did modify the
Second Circuit’s vessel/non-vessel jurisprudence in light of
Stewart (as do we here), but it did so in a manner that fails to
provide support for the dissent. The Second Circuit’s discussion
of Stewart’s impact on its vessel/non-vessel jurisprudence is pure
dicta, as the Uzdavines petitioner had conceded that in light of
Stewart the bucket dredge at issue qualified as a vessel. See
Uzdavines, 418 F.3d at 144. It was therefore unnecessary for that
court to address the effect of Stewart on its vessel/non-vessel
jurisprudence.
Furthermore, even if the Second Circuit’s modification of its
pre-Stewart vessel/non-vessel jurisprudence was not dicta,
Uzdavines’ support for the dissent’s position would at best be
tenuous. The Uzdavines court purported to hold that
Stewart “supersedes the three-part test” used by the Second Circuit
to define a non-vessel. Id. That three-part test was almost
identical to the three common attributes that this circuit
attributed to non-vessels. See Tonnesen v. Yonkers Contracting
17
dissent’s vessel/non-vessel analysis reduces to just two parts: (1)
a rule (if a craft is used or is practically capable of being used
as a means of maritime transportation, then that craft is a
vessel); and (2) an exception to that rule (if a craft is
permanently moored or otherwise rendered incapable of
transportation or movement, then that craft is not a vessel).47 The
dissent’s rule properly focuses the vessel/non-vessel analysis on
a craft’s practical capability of engaging in maritime
transportation.48 The dissent’s exception to the rule strays off
course, however, by overemphasizing the significance of a craft’s
being permanently moored or otherwise rendered incapable of
movement.
Co., 82 F.3d 30, 36 (2d Cir. 1996) (adopting, with slight
modification, this circuit’s description of the three common
attributes of non-vessels); see also supra text accompanying note
23 (describing the three common attributes of a non-vessel). And,
as we readily acknowledge today, Stewart’s greatest impact is on
our non-vessel definition. See supra text accompanying note 43.
Our opinion is thus in accord with Uzdavines.
47
See slip op. at ___ (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
48
Our disagreement on this point just goes to how that rule
should be applied, i.e., whether the determination of a craft’s
practical capability of engaging in maritime transportation should
be determined with reference to our pre-Stewart factors and
requirements. We hold that it should; the dissent disagrees. The
dissent contends that the only relevant question with regards to
this rule is whether the craft at issue is, in fact, practically
capable of engaging in maritime transportation. But that question
alone cannot control the outcome of this case, as Holmes, whose
burden it was, failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show the BT-
213's practical capability of engaging in maritime transportation.
18
To be sure, the frequency and duration of the mooring and
moving of a putative vessel is one of the several pre-Stewart
elements for testing vessel status that remains valid in the post-
Stewart world.49 But, contrary to the dissent’s reasoning, the
Stewart Court’s discussion of the effect of a craft’s permanently
static condition on its vessel/non-vessel status does not signal
that a craft must be permanently moored or otherwise rendered
incapable of movement to qualify as a non-vessel. Rather, the
Court’s discussion is a didactic reminder to all inferior federal
courts that, even after Stewart broadened the test for vessel
status, limits as to what constitutes a vessel still exist. In
other words, crafts that are permanently affixed to the shore and
are theoretically —— but not practically —— capable of
transportation, are not “vessels” within the meaning of the Jones
Act and the LHWCA. The obverse, though, does not follow: The Court
neither says nor implies a per se rule that either the absence of
permanent mooring or the frequency of movement (or the absence of
both) automatically bars non-vessel status.
4. The Quarterbarge BT-213
When the undisputed facts of this case are plugged into our
“vessel” jurisprudence, we find inescapable the conclusion that the
BT-213 is not a “vessel,” even in light of the modifications
announced in Stewart. The principal dispute here turns on whether
49
See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
19
this appeal is controlled by Manuel —— as Holmes contends —— or by
Gremillion —— as appellees contend.
At first blush, it would appear that Gremillion is
dispositive. In Gremillion, we held that the quarterbarge MINDY
was not a vessel for purposes of the Jones Act and general maritime
law. We reached this conclusion because:
A. the significance of Q/B MINDY’s transportation
function was purely incidental to its primary
mission of providing living facilities;
B. it did not transport cargo;
C. it was not designed for navigation;
D. it was not engaged in navigation at the time
of the injury;
E. there was no evidence that suggested that the
barge provided housing on the open sea;
F. the barge’s motive power was provided
externally through towboats as it had no
engine, rudders, or navigational equipment;
and
G. it was not registered with the Coast Guard as
a vessel.50
We conceded, however, that other factors weighed in favor of vessel
status: (1) The barge had a raked bow, was equipped with navigation
lights, and had life-saving equipment and crew quarters; (2) the
owner intended to move it on a recurring basis; (3) the barge
possessed the ability to be refloated after years of deterioration;
and (4) the barge remained static only for a relatively short
time.51 In our analysis, we recognized that even though the MINDY
possessed several attributes of a vessel, our objective factors
50
904 F.2d at 294 (emphasis added).
51
See id. at 294 n. 9.
20
“are not to be applied mathematically but [only] as useful guides
in determining vessel status.”52
Apart from the above emphasized factors on which the
Gremillion panel relied and that the Stewart Court rejected, the
other factors are present here and weigh against vessel status.
The BT-213 does not transport cargo, equipment, or personnel.
Indeed, although she relies heavily on the fact that the BT-213 was
moved 14 times between January 4, 2001, and September 12, 2002,
Holmes points to no record evidence that transportation occurred in
any of these 14 moves. Holmes mistakenly conflates
“transportation” with “movement.” If the sole test for vessel
status were “capable of being moved,” then anything that floats ——
even an inner tube or a canoe, perhaps (which, in the broadest
sense, are also capable of § 3 transportation) —— would constitute
a vessel for Jones Act or LHWCA purposes.
Neither was the BT-213 designed for navigational or
transportation purposes. There is no record evidence that the BT-
213 ever provided housing on the open sea. Further, the BT-213,
like the MINDY, relies exclusively on tugs to move it. Unlike the
Super Scoop in Stewart, which could navigate short distances by
manipulating its anchors and cables, the record is devoid of
evidence that the BT-213 is capable of any self-propulsion
whatsoever. The BT-213 has never been registered with or inspected
52
Id.
21
by the Coast Guard. The purpose for which the BT-213 was
constructed and the business in which it has engaged exclusively is
housing. As noted earlier, the record contains no evidence that
the BT-213 ever transported —— or was even capable of transporting
—— anything; not passengers, not cargo, not equipment.53 Indeed,
unlike the dredge in Stewart, the BT-213 does not “serve[] a
waterborne transportation function,” as it does not perform its
work by carrying machinery, equipment, and crew “over water.”54
Holmes insists that it is Manuel, not Gremillion, that
controls this case. Holmes argues that our vessel jurisprudence
was previously modified by Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni55 and
53
In Gremillion, we observed a common theme that exists in our
jurisprudence granting vessel status to “special purpose vessels,”
such as the BT-213: “Despite the outward appearance of the
structure at issue, if a primary purpose of the craft is to
transport passengers, cargo, or equipment from place to place
across navigable waters, then that structure is a vessel.” 135
F.3d at 348. Although the use of the term “primary” has been
modified by Stewart, any possible transportation function of the
watercraft is still a factor to be taken into consideration when
determining vessel status. See also Brunet v. Boh Bros. Constr.
Co., Inc., 715 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that barge
consisting of several interlocking flexi-float platforms and
designed to transport crane across navigable waters was vessel);
Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1966)
(holding submersible drilling barge designed to transport drilling
equipment to drill site qualified as vessel as a matter of law);
Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959) (holding that
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether drilling barge
on which a drilling rig was mounted and transported qualified as
vessel).
54
125 S. Ct. at 1126; see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
55
502 U.S. 81 (1991).
22
that we recognized this modification in Manuel. Holmes’s reliance
on Gizoni and Manuel is misplaced.
In Manuel, we held that the Rig 3, a workover rig, was a
vessel for purposes of the Jones Act and general maritime law.56
Using our two-prong test set out above, we determined that (1) the
business in which Rig 3 engaged —— transporting across navigable
waters all of the equipment necessary to plug and abandon oil wells
—— weighed in favor of vessel status; and (2) the purpose for which
the floatable structure of the rig was built —— to transport the
workover rig and its attendant equipment from place to place ——
also weighed in favor of vessel status.57 That is not the case
here. The BT-213 has never transported —— nor was it designed or
built to transport —— anything between project locations.58
56
135 F.3d at 351.
57
See id.
58
Indeed, the BT-213 more closely resembles other floating
structures that this circuit has held are not vessels. See, e.g.,
Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 294 (holding that shoreside quarterboat
barge serving as floating hotel did not merit vessel status);
Daniel v. Ergon, Inc., 892 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that
floating barge moored to shore, remaining in place for seven years,
and used as work platform to clean and strip cargo and gas from
barges, and that possessed no propulsion, crew quarters, or
navigation lights did not qualify as vessel); Ducrepont v. Baton
Rouge Marine Enters., Inc., 877 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that barge moored to shore and used as stationary work platform not
a vessel); Bernard v. Binnings Constr. Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 824 (5th
Cir. 1984) (holding that work punt —— a floating iron platform ——
not a vessel because it was not designed for navigation nor did it
have any significant transportation function).
One caveat: Most of these cases relied —— at least in part ——
on the incidental (as opposed to primary) transportation function
of the floating platform, a factor rejected by Stewart.
23
At oral argument, Holmes advanced that the BT-213 does
transport equipment from place to place; specifically, that the
room-and-board modules —— presumably attached to the hull —— is
moved from dredge job to dredge job, implying that this
superstructure is “equipment.” We reject this specious argument.
First, neither party briefed exactly what constitutes “equipment”
for purposes of the Jones Act’s transportation requirement. In
fact, if we were to hold that such housing —— if not permanently
then at least indefinitely attached to a bare hull or work platform
—— constitutes “equipment” for purposes of vessel transportation,
we would be greatly expanding the concept of equipment in this
context. Indeed, we would be hard-pressed to conclude that any
other appurtenance attached to the watercraft would not fall within
that rubric. Our traditional understanding of “equipment,” as that
term is used in our Jones Act and LHWCA cases, is an item or items
loaded onto a vessel at one location and moved —— “transported” ——
to another location to perform a specific function, such as
machines and equipment loaded onto a vessel onshore and delivered,
for example, to an offshore drilling station or production
platform. As we understand the case law, “equipment” does not
include the appurtenances that contribute exclusively to the
mission or function of the putative vessel itself. Here, the
living module is no more transported equipment than are the BT-
213’s gangway, life rings, and water pumps.
24
Although Holmes is correct that Gizoni modified our case law,
making suspect any holding, such as Gremillion’s, that was handed
down before Gizoni, her reliance on this modification is inapposite
to the case before us. In Gizoni, the Court treated the issue
whether “a maritime worker whose occupation is one of those
enumerated in the [LHWCA] may yet be a ‘seaman’ within the meaning
of the Jones Act and thus be entitled to bring suit under that
statute.”59 Affirming the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether (1) the
plaintiff was entitled to recover under both statutes, (2) the
floating platform on which Gizoni worked was a vessel in
navigation, and (3) the employee was a member of the crew.60
The Manuel panel recognized Gizoni’s effect on our
jurisprudence:
We must also note that many of our work platform cases
were decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in
Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, where the Court
concluded that genuine issues of material fact existed
“regarding whether the floating platforms [upon which
plaintiff worked] were vessels in navigation” and whether
the plaintiff had a sufficient connection to these
platforms to qualify as a seaman. The floating platforms
consisted of a pontoon barge, tow float barges, a rail
barge, a diver’s barge, and a crane barge. None of the
barges had means of steering, navigation lights or aids,
living facilities, or motor power. The barges were moved
around the shipyard by tugboat and were used to transport
equipment, materials, supplies, and vessel components
59
502 U.S. at 83.
60
See id. at 92.
25
around the shipyard and on to and off of the vessels
under repair.61
Thus, not only were the barges in Gizoni used to transport
equipment, material, and supplies to other vessels, but the Court
upheld only the Ninth Circuit’s determination that a genuine issue
of material fact existed as to the barges’ status, and that the
parties disputed those facts. There are no disputed facts here, so
dismissal was proper. Neither, as noted above, was the BT-213 ever
used to transport anything within the intendment of § 3 or the
Jones Act. Gizoni and Manuel are thus distinguishable. All this
leads us to conclude that the majority of factors that remain
relevant post-Stewart weigh heavily in favor of the BT-213’s
nonvessel status.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district courts’
denials of Holmes’s motions to remand and their dismissals of her
Jones Act and general maritime claims.
AFFIRMED.
61
135 F.3d at 350 n. 8 (citations omitted) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
26
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
With respect for the majority’s careful analysis on a close
question of law, I dissent. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Stewart requires our Circuit to reevaluate precedent that defines
“vessel” and the tests by which we mark the contours of the term.
On the rare occasion of a unanimous, on-point opinion from the
Supreme Court, we must be careful to apply its demands on our
Circuit’s canon, even if those demands require the broadening of
our jurisprudence. The Supreme Court need not explicitly overrule
our case law in order to require that we tailor it. Stewart so
requires.
Stewart requires that we enlarge Gremillion, and our Circuit’s
factors and requirements “confected” from § 3's vessel definition.
See Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1129. It necessarily follows from the
broad language and broad “practically capable of being used for
transportation” analysis of Stewart that more types of water crafts
are now and will be vessels, as a matter of law, than would have
been so defined in this Circuit previously. See id. The majority
implies that this is so, see Manuel, 135 F.3d at 347, but we do not
satisfy Stewart’s broad vessel landscape merely by concluding that
our pre-Stewart vessel jurisprudence is consistent with § 3, as a
starting point for the vessel determination. It must not only be
consistent with § 3 but also eliminate the additional factors and
requirements eschewed by Stewart, not just the “purpose” and
“transit at the moment of injury” factors explicitly rejected
there.
The majority ably explains why Stewart must apply to the Jones
Act as well as to the LHWCA. See Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1124; see
also Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co. Inc., No. 02-1713, 2005 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16612 (1st Cir. Aug. 9, 2005) (applying the reasoning of
Stewart to define vessel under the Jones Act in the same manner as
under the LHWCA); Uzdavines v. Weeks Marine, Inc., No. 03-40084,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15946, at *14 (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2005) (making
the extension, that Stewart requires, of § 3's definition for
vessel to the Jones Act).
I also agree with the majority that Stewart primarily
corrected two errors of the lower courts in that case: (1) their
reliance on the primary purpose of the craft and (2) their reliance
on whether the craft was in transit at the time of injury. The
conclusion is inescapable that our pre-Stewart jurisprudence
countenancing these two rejected factors is necessarily erroneous
as well. See, e.g., Manuel, 135 F.3d at 350-51 (providing factors
for determining the purpose of the craft’s construction);
Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 293 (citing Blanchard, 575 F.2d at 1142)
(concluding that the purpose of the craft’s construction is
28
necessary to determination of vessel status).62 In Uzdavines, the
Second Circuit undertook the analysis that is required of us here
to correct prior precedent no longer vital after Stewart, and in
which I believe the majority has too broadly determined how much of
our vessel precedents survives. 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15946, at *
15 (concluding the Second Circuit’s former test that included an
element of “primary purpose” does not survive Stewart).
Stewart does more than reject the “primary purpose” and
“moment of injury snapshot” tests. See Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at
1129. While § 3 remains the fundamental definition for determining
a craft’s status as a vessel, the additional factor to be
considered beyond § 3's plain text is the one now emphasized by
Stewart — any craft’s practical use or capability of being used as
a means of maritime transportation — and not all of the factors
previously considered in our Circuit that create a more narrow set
of vessels than is now contemplated by the Supreme Court.
The quarters barge is practically, not just theoretically, “used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water.”
Undisputed facts confirm the BT-213 quarters barge is
practically capable of transporting equipment, including supplies
for crew members of the barge and for the crew of the dredges, from
place to place to accommodate the different location of dredging
62
I note that Gremillion’s language of bias for the
“traditional craft” cannot co-exist with Stewart’s broad “capable
of being used for transportation” definition. Compare Gremillion,
904 F.2d at 293, with Stewart, 125 S. Ct. at 1128-29.
29
activities. Fourteen such movements appear in the record, creating
a pattern of actual use that far exceeds the much lower threshold
of capability of use that Stewart would permit for vessel status.
See id.
The BT-213 is also undeniably capable of transporting
personnel and cargo. That she was constructed for the purpose of
floating and providing movable housing is no longer of moment in
our vessel analysis; and the analysis of Stewart does not require
that the quarters barge perform a transportation function, but
rather that it be practically capable of such use. While the
majority relies upon our two-prong test, including specifically
that the BT-213 was not designed nor built to transport, Stewart
requires us to apply a different set of questions. The majority’s
reliance on a lack of equipment transportation, while compelling in
its rejection of Holmes’s argument that the housing superstructure
is not traditional equipment under maritime law, fails to account
for the much broader conception of vessel transportation
countenanced in Stewart. Moreover, the majority’s analysis on the
point of equipment transportation implies that practical
transportation requires “delivery,” when no such requirement
exists. Instead, Stewart’s reliance on The Alabama, 19 F. 544, 546
(S.D. Ala. 1884), recognizes that capacity for navigation is the
key to understanding capacity for transportation. Stewart, 125 S.
Ct. at 1125.
30
Here, the combination of the quarters barge’s repeated
movement — albeit not by self-propulsion — and the quarters barge’s
equipment with the housing supplies, the “quarters package,” as
well as navigational instruments, a railed gangway, and land lines,
used only for temporary mooring, all weigh in favor of determining
that the craft is practically capable of being used as maritime
transportation. The BT-213 is capable of “travers[ing] waters,
carrying with it workers like [Holmes].” Id. at 1128.
The quarters barge is not “permanently moored” or rendered
“practically incapable of transportation or movement.”
The broad language of Stewart’s vessel definition is not
entirely unchecked. A limit to the “capable of being used as a
vessel” standard exists if the craft is, again in terms of
practicality, rendered “incapable of transportation or movement.”
Id. at 1127 (emphasis added). The BT-213 does not cross this drawn
line. “A ship [does] not move in and out of Jones Act coverage
depending on whether the ship is at anchor, docked for loading or
unloading, or berthed for minor repairs, in the same way that ships
taken permanently out of the water as a practical matter do not
remain vessels merely because of the remote possibility that they
may one day sail again.” 125 S. Ct. 1127.
The BT-213 is not sufficiently similar to other permanently
fixed, grounded, or converted crafts that fall within Stewart’s
exception and have traditionally, because of that permanent
disability, in this Circuit avoided classification as a vessel.
31
See Gremillion, 904 F.2d at 291 (finding the quarters barge there
was not a vessel where the barge had been “partially sunk into a
shoreside mudbank” and was “used exclusively as a stationary
housing facility in shallow coastal and inland waters”) (emphasis
added); See also Pavone, 52 F.3d at 570 (concluding “indefinitely
moored, shore-side, floating casinos” must be added to grouping of
crafts that are not vessels because of practical incapability of
movement or navigation).
Instead, the BT-213 more closely parallels the unique category
of craft, such as a jack-up drilling rig, that has dual elements of
navigation capacity and work platform function. See Manuel, 135
F.3d at 351 (citing, as examples, Colomb v. Texaco, Inc., 736 F.2d
218, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1984), and Brunet v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co.,
715 F.2d 196, 198 (5th Cir. 1983)). The BT-213 falls between the
clear categories of traditional self-propelled vessel and of
permanently moored craft or craft rendered practically incapable of
transportation; and as such, it remains within Stewart’s broad
scope of vessel status.
I cannot say I would have drafted as broad a framework for
analysis as has the Supreme Court, but in light of Stewart, I
cannot agree that our prior vessel jurisprudence is as unaffected
as the majority resolves. I would vacate the district courts’
denials of Holmes’s motions to remand and remand to the state court
32
for further proceedings consistent with the legal determination
that the BT-213 is a vessel under the Jones Act.
33