Sepulvado v. Louisiana Board of Pardons & Parole

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT March 21, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-70034
CHRISTOPHER SEPULVADO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LOUISIANA BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE; LARRY CLARK, Board Member
and Vice Chairman; RONALD D. COX, District Judge, (Retired) Board
Member and Chairman; CLEMENT LaFLEUR, Board Member; TED
MIGUES; JULIA BRUMFIELD SIMS; KATHLEEN BABINEAUX BLANCO,
Governor of Louisiana; RICHARD STALDER, Secretary of Louisiana,
Department of Public Safety and Corrections,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(3:04-cv-00820-SCR)
Before SMITH, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Death–sentenced Louisiana state prisoner Christopher Sepulvado
appeals this action’s being dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) (failure to state claim). Pursuant, inter alia,
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Sepulvado claims the State’s clemency
procedure violates the Eighth (cruel and unusual punishment) and
Fourteenth (due process denial) Amendments. AFFIRMED.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
I.
In 1993, Sepulvado was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death. Sepulvado v. La. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 114 F. App’x 620,
621 (5th Cir. 2004). He is incarcerated on death row in the state
penitentiary.
Sepulvado filed a similar action in 2003, claiming the
clemency system denied him due process. Id. Because Sepulvado had
not yet applied for clemency, the district court dismissed the
complaint for lack of standing, and we affirmed (lack of subject
matter jurisdiction), holding the dismissal was without prejudice.
Id. at 622.
After the district court had dismissed the complaint in the
first action, but before that dismissal was affirmed, Sepulvado
applied for clemency. In June 2004, his application was denied.
Id.
Sepulvado filed this action that November. It was dismissed
in May 2005.
II.
We review de novo a Rule 12(b)(6) motion’s being granted.
Ballard v. Wall, 413 F.3d 510, 514 (5th Cir. 2005). Each well-
pleaded allegation in the complaint “must be accepted as true, and
the dismissal will be affirmed ‘only if it appears that no relief
could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven
consistent with the allegations’”. Id. at 514-15 (quoting Moore v.
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Carwell, 168 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999)). For complaints, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief”. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Instead, Sepulvado’s two–claim
complaint is 36 pages, more closely resembling a brief.
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998),
held Ohio’s clemency procedures did not violate the Constitution;
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence (providing the fifth vote) stated
only “minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings”.
Id. at 289 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
Justice O’Connor suggested relief “might, for example, be warranted
in the face of a [clemency] scheme whereby a state official flipped
a coin to determine whether to grant clemency, or in a case where
the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to its clemency
process”. Id. (emphasis added).
Subsequently, in line with Justice O’Connor’s position, our
court stated minimal procedures are required. Faulder v. Tex. Bd.
of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343, 344 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
527 U.S. 1017 (1999) (stating clemency process requires minimal
procedural safeguards). Because clemency “decisions are not
traditionally the business of courts”, there is an extremely “low
threshold of judicial reviewability”. Id.
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A.
Sepulvado’s complaint seeks to distinguish Louisiana’s
clemency procedure from those in other States, claiming, inter
alia, because Louisiana law does not guarantee a clemency hearing,
its procedure falls below the minimum due–process threshold. Other
cases involving constitutional challenges to clemency procedures,
including Woodard and Faulder, however, do not establish specific
requirements States must follow.
Louisiana state law allows every inmate to apply for clemency
(which Sepulvado did). As shown infra, Sepulvado fails to state a
claim in asserting Louisiana’s clemency procedure falls below the
minimum constitutional threshold.
The Governor may commute a sentence only upon the Board’s
recommendation. LA. CONST. art. IV, § V; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.
When seeking clemency in Louisiana, the first step is filing an
application that includes, inter alia: (1) name and prison number;
(2) date of birth; (3) offense charged, convicted of or pled to;
(4) date and length of sentence; (5) time served; (6) reason for
requested clemency; (7) relief requested and narrative detailing
the events surrounding the offense; and (8) any institutional
disciplinary reports. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 22, § V.103(A). Except
in cases involving inmates who have served less than 15 years of a
life sentence and have evidence demonstrating actual innocence, no
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further information may be provided unless a clemency hearing is
granted. Id. § V.103(C).
After the application is filed, at least four Board members
review the application to determine whether a clemency hearing is
warranted. Id. § V.101(C). The Board has discretion to grant a
clemency hearing; Louisiana law lists eight reasons for which the
Board, in its discretion, may deny one. Id. § V.105. Sepulvado’s
application was denied, without a hearing, for two of § 105’s
listed reasons: (1) because his offense was serious in nature; and
(2) because he had not served sufficient time.
Sepulvado was allowed to apply for clemency, and the complaint
does not allege the Board failed to consider his application before
denying it. Instead, Sepulvado makes a facial challenge to the
procedure. His complaint alleges, for example, the Governor rarely
grants clemency to violent offenders; this, however, does not state
a claim for a due–process violation.
Sepulvado contends dismissal was inappropriate because,
without discovery, he cannot determine whether clemency was denied
arbitrarily, possibly even based on the coin–flip example in
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Woodard. Sepulvado’s
complaint, however, does not allege he was denied clemency in that
fashion; and, as discussed earlier, we are confined to reviewing
only the complaint when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
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In the light of the allegations in the complaint, Sepulvado
had full access to the clemency process, and the Board considered
his application before denying him a clemency hearing. Under the
highly deferential Faulder standard of review, Sepulvado does not
state a due–process–denial claim for which relief can be granted.
B.
Sepulvado’s complaint similarly claims the clemency procedure
violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. For the same reasons he failed to state a
due–process claim, he fails to state one under the Eighth
Amendment.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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