Truitt v. Barnhart

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
February 21, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 06-50876
Summary Calendar
TRACI TRUITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER
OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Western District of Texas
(USDC No. 1:05-CV-731)
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Reviewing under the same standard as the district court, we affirm the ALJ’s final
decision denying Truitt’s claim for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
security benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., for the following
reasons:
1. This court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining
whether the Commissioner used proper legal standards to evaluate the
evidence and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See
Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000). We find that the
ALJ’s decision comports with the legal standards for disability
determination set forth by this Court under the Act and relevant regulations.
The ALJ’s decision reflects that he properly considered all of the evidence
of record concerning Truitt’s condition, including the objective findings in
her treatment records, her treatment history, the findings of consultative
examiners Dr. Tadlock, Dr. Hirsch, Dr. Dubin, and Dr. Harrell, the
assessments of the non-examining state agency physicians, testimony of a
vocational expert, Truitt’s testimony, and her activity level.
The ALJ’s decision further indicates that he recognized and applied
the relevant legal standards in assessing Truitt’s residual functional capacity
and the credibility of her subjective allegations. The record also reflects
that the ALJ properly considered all of Truitt’s symptoms, including pain,
and the extent to which those symptoms could reasonably be accepted as
consistent with the objective medical and other evidence.
2. We find there is substantial evidence of record supporting the ALJ’s
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determination that Truitt is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. See
Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). The medical evidence
does not indicate that Truitt was unable to ambulate effectively due to her
ankle injury or that she had the requisite number of depressive symptoms or
marked functional limitations as required to establish a listed or equivalent
joint dysfunction or mental health impairment.
The medical records indicate that Truitt sought very little treatment
for her ankle after the fracture healed and stabilizing hardware was
removed. Although subsequent x-ray and physician examinations reflect
some deformity of her ankle resulting in some pain and limitation, the
medical evidence does not indicate that Truitt’s ankle pain was so
debilitating that she could not perform any work.
Truitt’s mental health records reveal that, although she was
diagnosed with certain mental impairments, her symptoms were controlled,
stable, and generally mild. These treatment records also indicate that Truitt
was “somewhat dramatic,” was not consistently compliant with her
medication, and, in the opinion of one examiner, exaggerated her
psychological symptoms and problems in an attempt to create the
impression of severe psychopathology.
Finally, testimony from a vocational expert provides substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s decision that Truitt was able to perform her
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past relevant work as an electronics assembler, given the specific
limitations of her residual functional capacity.
AFFIRMED.
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