United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT April 3, 2007
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30516
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MIGUEL RAMOS-GONZALEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
USDC No. 2:04-CR-161-1
Before JONES, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Miguel Ramos-Gonzalez (Ramos) entered an Alford1 plea of
guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine hydrochloride and one count of
possession with intent to distribute five hundred grams or more of
a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine. Ramos appeals his conviction and sentence,
raising several grounds of error.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Ramos argues that the district court erroneously denied
his motion to suppress drug evidence found in his truck and a
motion to suppress statements given to police. He asserts that,
due to his lack of proficiency in the English language, his consent
to search his truck was unknowing and involuntary. He similarly
argues that he did not understand his Miranda2 rights and could not
validly waive them.
A Louisiana State Police Trooper and a DEA agent
testified that they were able to communicate with Ramos in English
without difficulty and that he indicated that he understood two
separate Miranda warnings. Additionally, the Trooper testified
that he explained the consent to search form to Ramos. Ramos
signed the Spanish-language side of the consent form. The
Government produced evidence that Ramos had completed a citizenship
test in English, and the district court found that a videotape of
the stop showed Ramos communicating with the officer. Further, the
district court observed during Ramos’s testimony at the suppression
hearing that he nodded in apparent understanding of counsel’s
questions before they were translated. Ramos does not argue that
the police coerced either his consent to the search or his
subsequent statements. Based on a totality of the circumstances,
we conclude that the district court did not erroneously find that
Ramos had sufficient understanding of the English language to
2
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
validly consent to the search and knowingly waive his Miranda
rights. See United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 460-61 (5th Cir.
2004); United States v. Andrews, 22 F.3d 1328, 1340 (5th Cir.
1994); United States v. Alvarado, 898 F.2d 987, 991 (5th Cir.
1990).
Ramos next argues that the district court erroneously
denied a motion to continue filed on the day of trial because he
needed time to investigate the credibility of a witness disclosed
by the Government. Ramos’s argument is conclusional, and he fails
to show specific and compelling or serious prejudice as a result of
the denial. See United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138, 144 (5th
Cir. 1999); United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 912 (5th Cir.
1992).
Ramos argues that he was denied due process because the
drug quantity used to calculate his offense level was not submitted
to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Ramos was
sentenced after the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, the
district court was permitted to find all facts relevant to
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States
v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 793, 798 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2884 (2006).
Ramos also argues that his sentence was unreasonable
under Booker. Ramos has failed to show that his sentence, which
was at the bottom of the guidelines range, was unreasonable. See
United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006).
3
Finally, we decline to address in this direct appeal
Ramos’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See United
States v. Navejar, 963 F.2d 732, 735 (5th Cir. 1992).
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
4