United States v. Westbrook

REVISED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________
No. 95-50890
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LARRY DARNELL WESTBROOK, WAYNE ALLEN BLEDSOE,
JR., MICHAEL LYNN PEOPLES, AND A.J. GREEN,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
August 5, 1997
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge:
Defendants Larry Darnell Westbrook, Wayne Allen Bledsoe, Jr.,
Michael Lynn Peoples, and A.J. Green appeal their convictions for
conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with intent to distribute and
to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
841(a)(1) (count 1) and Westbrook and Bledsoe appeal their
convictions for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (count 2). Westbrook also appeals the district
court’s calculation of his offense level under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, which resulted in a guideline range of life
imprisonment on count 1. We affirm.
I
After a federal grand jury returned a two-count superseding
indictment against the defendants, the district court selected a
jury to try them on these charges. On September 16, 1994, after a
few days of trial, the court learned that one of the jurors had
reported to various people))including another juror))that she had
been threatened that morning with injury if the jury rendered a
guilty verdict. The court immediately granted the defendants’
motions for a mistrial. On May 1, 1995, the court selected another
jury to try the defendants.
The government’s case against the defendants, who lived in
Temple, Texas, was based on (1) testimony of accomplices to the
defendants, (2) surveillance and seizures by Temple police, and (3)
information from third parties.
Because the defendants challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence, we summarize it here.
A
Crack Dealing
Jerry Reed, an accomplice of the defendants, testified that he
sold two ounces of crack to Westbrook in October 1988; that he
asked Westbrook, Bledsoe, and Green to buy two ounces of crack in
1991; that Green delivered crack to him; and that Peoples asked
Reed in 1991 to take Peoples and another to Dallas, Texas to buy
nine ounces of crack. Chuck Jones, another accomplice, testified
that between 1989 and 1990, he sold one to three ounces of crack to
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Westbrook five or six times, and sold quarter to half-ounce
quantities of crack to Green and Peoples several times; that after
August 1991, he sold five to nine ounces of crack to Westbrook four
times, and smaller quantities to Green and Peoples two or three
times; that Green was present once when Jones sold Westbrook nine
ounces of crack; that he operated a crack house in Temple, and was
told by Green and three others to get out of town because he was
making all the money.
A third accomplice, Edward Montgomery, Jr., testified that
Westbrook and Green had been partners in the drug business, and
that Bledsoe replaced Green after an arrest; that he drove
Westbrook to Houston four or five times to buy cocaine; that
Westbrook met with a source in Houston, Texas and usually bought
about nine ounces of crack from that source; that Peoples went on
a trip to Houston when Westbrook bought four or five ounces of
crack; that Bledsoe carried the money during a crack-buying
excursion to Houston with Montgomery and another; and that others,
including Green, gave Westbrook money to buy crack for them.
During 1991, the police began to investigate what appeared to
be the defendants’ crack operation. On August 11, 1991, police
raided a motel room after motel staff received complaints about
what seemed to be drug traffic. The police found Bledsoe, Peoples,
Green, and two others in the room. The police took a baggie from
Green containing thirty-seven rocks of crack. A couple of months
later, police stopped Westbrook driving a car belonging to Peoples
after a high-speed chase. Green was in the front passenger seat.
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Police seized crack from floor between door and front passenger
seat, and from the floor behind the front passenger seat.
B
The First Crack House
Roderick Reeders, an accomplice and convicted crack dealer,
testified that Westbrook and Bledsoe operated several crack houses
in Temple during 1991 and 1992. He stated that Westbrook and
Bledsoe approached him in late 1990 or early 1991 and asked him to
introduce them to his cocaine source in Houston. Reeders then took
them to Houston and bought two ounces of crack for them from his
source. Westbrook and Bledsoe paid Reeders in crack. According to
Reeders, the three returned to Houston the next day and bought
another four or five ounces of crack. Reeders saw Westbrook and
Bledsoe break the crack into rocks. Shortly thereafter, Reeders
and Bledsoe returned to Houston and bought nine to twelve ounces of
crack. Reeders testified that during the next six or seven months,
Reeders and Bledsoe went to Houston about twice a week, and Bledsoe
bought nine ounces of crack each time. Reeders noted that, once in
Temple, Bledsoe and Westbrook cut the crack into rocks and sold
them. After a time, Reeders and Bledsoe went to Houston less often
but bought half and whole kilograms of crack. In 1992, they began
buying powder cocaine and converting it to crack. Eventually,
Westbrook and Bledsoe went to Houston to buy cocaine without
Reeders. Westbrook and Bledsoe initially sold the crack at a city
park in Temple but then opened a crack house at 305 South 18th
Street. Reeders showed Westbrook and Bledsoe how to operate the
crack house and where to put lookouts. According to Reeders,
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Westbrook and Bledsoe paid workers $50 a day and small quantities
of crack, and crack house workers sold several thousand dollars of
crack daily and gave the money to Westbrook or Bledsoe.
David Wright, an accomplice, testified that he worked as a
lookout in exchange for crack but began peddling that drug when
Westbrook and Bledsoe told him he could make more money as a
seller. Wright stated that he gave his drug proceeds to someone
else, who hid the money and then gave it to Westbrook and Bledsoe.
Westbrook and Bledsoe supplied the house with two or three ounces
of crack daily. Several times, Peoples and Green brought crack to
the house, which Wright sold for them with the approval of
Westbrook and Bledsoe
Montgomery worked around the house as a lookout in exchange
for crack. According to him, Westbrook and Bledsoe supplied the
workers at the house with crack and handled money from its sale.
He admitted that he stole crack that Westbrook had hidden in garage
next to Westbrook’s residence. In addition, Roderick Walker
testified that he saw Westbrook and Bledsoe possess 4 x 12 inch
packet of powder cocaine in Westbrook’s residence. Allen Robinson
said that Westbrook hassled him after Robinson found some crack in
the alley, sold some of it and smoked the rest. Reeders testified
that crack sold at the house was hidden outside, first next to a
garage and then in an alley across the street.
On February 5, 1992, Temple police raided the South 18th
Street crack house, finding drug paraphernalia. Reeders testified
that just as the police arrived, Westbrook flushed about $500 worth
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of crack down the toilet. Eleven months later, relying on a tip
from an informant, officers found $22,500 of crack buried in the
alley across from the crack house. The next month, after another
tip by an informant, police discovered two packages of crack worth
$900 buried in the alley.
The South 18th Street crack house closed after a year and few
months of operation.
C
The Second Crack House
After the South 18th Street crack house shut down, the
defendants purportedly opened a second crack house at 903 South
Henderson. Wright testified that he rented this house at Bledsoe’s
request and paid the rent with money from Westbrook and Bledsoe.
According to Reeders, as much as $10,000 worth of crack was sold
daily and crack supplies were hidden either outside the house or at
a residence at 902 South 18th Street which was connected to the
Henderson Street house by a trail. Moreover, Westbrook and Bledsoe
allowed Peoples and Green to sell crack at the South Henderson
house, and Reeders sold for both Peoples and Green there. Wright
testified that he sold crack at the South Henderson house, and that
Bledsoe and Westbrook used many of the same workers there. He also
averred that drugs were hidden near the alley at back of property,
and that he sold crack for Peoples and Green.
On June 22, 1993, police raided the South Henderson house.
Just before they searched the residence, they observed behavior
consistent with drug dealing. According to Walker, who was at the
house during the raid, Westbrook told a certain juvenile to get
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something and that juvenile returned with a small bag of what
Walker thought was crack. As the police entered, Walker heard
Westbrook tell the juvenile to get rid of the bag. The police then
found Westbrook with marijuana hidden in his mouth and $700 in
small bills and the juvenile with crack in his mouth and $610 in
small bills. In addition, officers discovered crack scattered on
the floor of the house as well as a car with some of Peoples’
belongings on the premises.
After the raid, the defendants allegedly ended operations at
the South Henderson crack house
D
The Third Crack House
Undaunted by the raid on the South Henderson house, Westbrook
and Bledsoe then supposedly rented a third crack house, at 705
South 20th Street. At Bledsoe’s request, the house was leased in
Reeders’ name. Wright testified that Green told him they had a
crack house on South 20th Street and asked Wright to sell crack for
him there. On August 12, 1993, the police raided this crack house.
In the house, officers found crack, containers with crack residue,
and crack paraphernalia. Moreover, on the property surrounding the
house, they discovered crack concealed in container.
Wright stated that Green left shortly before police arrived.
E
Other Links
During the trial, the government presented much testimony as
to the defendants’ presence at the various crack houses and similar
locations. A police officer, for instance, testified that he saw
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Bledsoe as well as Peoples’ car at the South 18th crack house, and
spotted Westbrook, Bledsoe, and Green at the house at 902 South
18th Street that later testimony revealed was a storage place for
crack sold at Henderson Street crack house. In addition, two
policemen noted that they saw Peoples and Bledsoe at the 902 South
18th Street house. One of these officers also observed Westbrook,
Peoples, Bledsoe, and Green at Westbrook’s residence, where the
police found several guns, currency, drug paraphernalia, drug
ledgers and other documents. Also at the residence, officers
discovered crack in a plastic bag hidden in an adjoining garage as
well as trace amounts of cocaine in the house, in Westbrook’s car,
and on his clothing.
Finally, an analysis of toll records for the cellular phones
and pagers leased by Westbrook, Bledsoe, and Peoples showed many
communications between them from mid-1992 to mid-1993.
F
Car Buying
In April 1992, Reeders, Westbrook, Bledsoe, Stevie Brown, and
Marty Trejo went to Teem Hem, a car dealer in Houston who goes by
the moniker Captain H. According to testimony by Reeders and Hem,
Reeders negotiated to buy two Mercedes-Benz cars for Westbrook and
Bledsoe for $19,500 in cash. Hem put title to Westbrook’s car in
Trejo’s name and title to Bledsoe’s car in Brown’s name. Reeders
testified that Westbrook and Bledsoe had the cars registered in the
names of Trejo and Brown because those individuals had jobs and
could explain the source of the money used to buy the cars. Trejo,
a relative of Westbrook, testified that he allowed his name to be
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used for Westbrook’s car because Westbrook claimed he had left his
driver’s license in Temple. Trejo stated that he was uncomfortable
knowing that his name was on the title for Westbrook’s car and,
over the next few months, repeatedly asked Westbrook to change the
title. Westbrook even had repairs done in Trejo’s name.
The police routinely saw Westbrook and Bledsoe driving the two
Mercedes. Officers even stopped Bledsoe a couple of times while he
was driving his Mercedes. Also, Walker testified that he saw
Westbrook and Bledsoe drive the cars to the crack house on South
18th Street.
G
Cracking Down
After hearing and seeing all the evidence, the jury found the
defendants guilty on both counts. The district court then
sentenced both Westbrook and Bledsoe to life imprisonment on count
1, a concurrent 240 months on count 2, five years supervised
release, a $3000 fine, and a $100 mandatory assessment. Peoples
received 235 months in jail, five years supervised release, a $3000
fine, and a $50 mandatory assessment. Green received 210 months in
jail, five years supervised release, a $3000 fine, and a $50
mandatory assessment.
On appeal, the defendants argue that their rights under the
Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., were violated and that
insufficient evidence exists supporting their convictions for
conspiracy. In addition, Westbrook and Bledsoe contend that there
was not enough evidence to convict them of money laundering.
Finally, Westbrook maintains that there was insufficient proof to
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establish that he possessed a dangerous weapon, and thus the
district court erred in adding two points to his offense level on
count 1. We examine each of these arguments in turn.
II
The district court granted the defendants’ motions for a
mistrial on September 16, 1994, after several days of trial. At
that time, the district court stated that it “expected” that the
defendants would order transcripts from the first trial to prepare
for the second one, but that these transcripts would be delayed
because the court reporter was in the midst of making transcripts
from a two-month criminal trial involving eleven members of the
Branch Davidian sect.1
1
The government claims that the defendants requested
transcripts from the first trial on September 16 and, as support,
cites to the transcript of the September 16 proceedings. The
September 16 transcript, though, was not in the record at the time
the government filed its brief. Thus, the government did not
follow Local Rule 28.2.3. See 5TH CIR. R. 28.2.3 (providing that
“[e]very assertion in briefs regarding matter in the record shall
be supported by a reference to the page number of the original
record where the matter relied upon is to be found”); FED. R. APP.
P. 10(a) (stating that the record on appeal includes “the
transcript of proceedings, if any . . .”). Moreover, there is no
evidence that the government made any attempt to use Rule 10(b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to ensure that the
defendants filed a copy of the September 16 transcript.
Ultimately, this court had to ask the parties to supplement the
record with the transcript after oral argument.
More disturbing, though, is that, upon examining the
transcript (and the rest of the record), we can find absolutely no
basis for the government’s assertion that the defendants asked for
the transcripts on September 16. Rather, the district court merely
seemed to assume that the defendants (and presumably also the
government) would want the transcripts and, on that basis, informed
them that there might be a delay. As the district court averred,
“I don’t know when this case will be reset . . . . There’s going to
be a problem, though, in that it would be expected that you would
seek a copy of the transcript of the trial as it progressed this
far for use in a second trial. The problem is, as you know, [the
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On October 31, 1994, the district court sua sponte scheduled
the new trial for November 28, 1994. Shortly thereafter, Peoples
sought to continue the trial. On November 8, the court granted
Peoples’ motion, finding that the ends of justice outweighed the
interest of the defendant and the public in a speedy trial and that
the failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel for the
defendant reasonable time to prepare. The court also determined
that the time between November 28 and the “first available trial
date after completion of the transcript” would be excluded from
computation under the Speedy Trial Act, and that its order would
apply to all defendants.
On November 23, the defendants filed a joint motion requesting
transcripts from the first trial. On November 30, the district
court granted the motion as to certain witnesses. On December 9,
Green submitted the authorization form ordering the transcripts.
On February 10, the court reporter completed and filed the
transcripts. On February 13, the district court sua sponte set
trial for May 1, 1995. On April 4, 7, and 14, the government filed
petitions for writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum; the district
court decided these petitions on, respectively, April 5, 13, and
17.
On April 28, Green filed a motion to dismiss the indictment,
alleging that his Speedy Trial Act rights had been violated. Green
contended that he had not been tried within seventy days as
court reporter] is emersed [sic] in transcribing the Branch
Davidian trial.” None of the defendants replied to this statement.
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required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e), and asked that his indictment be
dismissed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e) (“If the defendant is to be
tried again following a declaration by the trial judge of a
mistrial or following an order of such judge for a new trial, the
trial shall commence within seventy days from the date the action
occasioning the retrial becomes final.”) No other defendant joined
the motion. In his motion, Green argued that time both before and
after the February 13 order had not been excluded, and that
unexcluded time from the date of the mistrial to the date of the
second trial was well in excess of seventy days.
The court considered Green’s motion on May 1, the day of
trial. During arguments on the motion, Green effectively conceded
that much of the delay in going to trial was due to the defendants’
desire for transcripts from the first trial. Thus, Green stated
that he was only “focusing” on the delay after the transcripts were
completed (i.e., after February 10), which amounts to about
seventy-nine days. The district court denied Green’s motion on the
basis that this period was “a reasonable exclusion time.” After
this ruling, the following exchange occurred between the district
court and counsel for Peoples:
THE COURT: . . . Any other matters we need to take up before
we bring in the jury?
MR. SWANTON: Judge, I want to say something on the record.
May I assume that your ruling with respect )) since we have
multiple Defendants, that one objection by one Defendant will
apply to all and we don’t need to join in those objections?
THE COURT: Yes. And you certainly don’t need to all stand up
and say you have no objection when something is offered. I’ll
just make eye contact, and if I don’t see anybody turning red
or standing up, then we’ll assume there are no objections.
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On appeal, all the defendants argue that the district court
erred in denying Green’s motion to dismiss the indictment for
violation of the Speedy Trial Act. While this court reviews facts
supporting a ruling under the Speedy Trial Act for clear error, we
review legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Ortega-Mena,
949 F.2d 156, 158 (5th Cir. 1991).
While all of the defendants contend that they were tried more
than seventy days from the date of the mistrial, they disagree on
how many days actually elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act. Peoples
argues that the relevant time period is from February 10, the date
the transcripts were completed, to May 1, the day of the trial
(about seventy-nine days). Westbrook seems to suggest that most of
the time from September 16 to May 1 is nonexcludable. Bledsoe
suggests that the period is from February 13, the date of the
district court order setting the May 1 trial date, and May 1 (about
seventy-six days). However, he also states, in a footnote, that
“[a]n argument can be made” that the relevant period is February 10
to May 1 and that there were an additional seven days of
nonexcludable time before February 10 (a total of about eighty-six
days). Green focuses on the time between the date the transcripts
were completed and May 1, but also considers the sixty-odd days
before the defendants requested the transcripts (a total of about
139 days).
In response, the government contends that only Green moved to
dismiss the indictment on the basis of a violation of the Speedy
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Trial Act and that the May 1 trial began within seventy days under
the Speedy Trial Act.
A
The government claims that Westbrook, Bledsoe, and Peoples
cannot assert a Speedy Trial Act violation because they did not
join Green’s motion to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial
grounds. In reply, the three defendants argue that they did join
Green’s motion. Alternatively, they contend that, where the
government prosecutes two or more defendants together, if one
defendant moves to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act, the other
defendants need not explicitly join that motion in order to assert
a Speedy Trial Act violation on appeal.
The record is clear that Westbrook, Bledsoe, and Peoples did
not explicitly join Green’s motion. Westbrook, Bledsoe, and
Peoples suggest that the fact that the district court consented to
the suggestion of Peoples’ counsel that “one objection by one
Defendant will apply to all” means that they joined Green’s motion.
However, this is not persuasive. A fair reading of the transcript
indicates that the district court simply agreed to permit an
objection by one defendant at trial to cover all the defendants.
Moreover, the district court had earlier denied motions by Peoples
and Green to adopt motions filed by their codefendants. The court
noted that its “general practice . . . is to deny such motions due
to the confusion that results in a multi-defendant case.” Hence,
Westbrook, Bledsoe, and Peoples did not explicitly or implicitly
join Green’s motion.
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18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) states that “[f]ailure of the defendant
to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to
dismissal under this section.” This provision does not mention any
exception. In possible conflict with § 3162(a)(2), Rule 12(f) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[f]ailure by
a party to raise defenses or objections or to make requests which
must be made prior to trial, at the time set by the court . . ., or
prior to any extension thereof made by the court, shall constitute
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
the waiver” (emphasis added). Moreover, as the defendants point
out, a number of circuits, including this one, have permitted a
defendant to raise a district court error on appeal as long as one
of his codefendants objected below.
As a threshold issue, we determine that Rule 12(f) arguably
applies here. First, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply
in the federal courts of appeals. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (noting
that “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all criminal
proceedings in the courts of the United States”); FED. R. CRIM. P.
54(a) (stating that “[t]hese rules apply to all criminal
proceedings . . . in the United States Court of Appeals”); cf. FED.
R. CIV. P. 1 (noting that “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in
the United States district courts in all suits of a civil nature”).
Second, Rule 12(b) lists five categories of defenses, objections,
and requests which “must be raised prior to trial . . . .,” one of
which includes “defenses and objections based on defects in the
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institution of the prosecution . . . .” An allegation of a speedy
trial violation is such a defense and objection. Thus, we
determine that an allegation of a speedy trial violation is a
defense, objection, or request “which must be made prior to trial.”
Next, we note that Rule 12(f) and § 3162(a)(2) conflict over
whether courts can permit a defendant to make a Speedy Trial Act
objection if he failed to raise such an objection before trial (or
at least before a plea of guilty or nolo contendere); Rule 12(f)
explicitly allows courts to grant relief from any waiver, but
§ 3162(a)(2) does not. Although we have found no case recognizing
this conflict, it can be easily resolved under existing authority.
A statute that takes effect after the effective date of a federal
rule repeals the rule to the extent that it actually conflicts.
Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1996). Rule 12(f)
was added to the Federal Rules on April 22, 1974 and made effective
on December 1, 1975. Section 3162(a)(2) was enacted on January 3,
1975 and made effective “to all cases commenced by arrest or
summons and all informations or indictments filed, on or after July
1, 1980.” Thus, § 3162(a)(2) trumps Rule 12(f).
Even so, the three defendants contend that, under caselaw in
this circuit and elsewhere, they did not waive any violation of
their speedy trial rights. The defendants rely, for example, on
several cases not involving the Speedy Trial Act in which the court
of appeals permitted defendants to appeal points that were raised
below only by codefendants. See United States v. Cassity, 631 F.2d
461 (6th Cir. 1980) (search and seizure); United States v. Love,
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472 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1973) (search and seizure); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1960) (erroneous instruction).
These courts have recognized that little reason may exist to refuse
to permit codefendants to appeal such points because (1) at least
one defendant properly raised the issue now on appeal and ensured
that the district court would consider it (at least with regard to
the defendant who raised it), (2) identical challenges mounted by
similarly situated codefendants would not have changed the district
court’s ruling, and (3) if one defendant succeeded in convincing
the district court to grant his motion, his codefendants would then
simply have filed the same motion. Westbrook, Bledsoe, and Peoples
also note that the Speedy Trial Act provides that, if one
codefendant seeks an adjournment excludable under the act, the
request is imputed to all codefendants. Similarly, they argue, if
one defendant moves for dismissal of the indictment for violation
of the act, all the defendants should implicitly be regarded as
joining in the motion.
We have sometimes allowed a defendant to preserve a district
court error as long as one of his codefendants objected below. See
United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283, 1290 (5th Cir. 1979)
(holding that objection to instructions by codefendant’s counsel is
sufficient to preserve any error); Love, 472 F.2d at 496 (holding
that the failure of one codefendant’s counsel “to move to suppress
the evidence or to object to its introduction should be excused
because such a motion or objection would have been a useless
formality” given fact that other codefendant’s counsel had made
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motion to suppress); see also United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535,
541 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“We recognize that in certain situations, it
may be redundant and inefficient to require each defendant in a
joint trial to stand up individually and make every objection to
preserve each error for appeal.”); Cassity, 631 F.2d at 466 (“Under
these circumstances, we hold the remaining appellants did not waive
their fourth amendment objections by neglecting to perform the
useless and purely formal act of joining Cassity in moving to
suppress.”); United States v. Bagby, 451 F.2d 920, 927 (9th Cir.
1971) (ruling that objection to instructions by codefendant’s
counsel preserves any error); cf. United States v. Alvarez, 584
F.2d 694, 697 (5th Cir. 1978) (ruling that since “[t]he trial court
had already ruled adversely to defendant’s contention . . . there
was no need for the defense to make the assuredly futile gesture of
repeating its objection”); Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d at 313 n.1 (ruling
that “[w]e do not regard the failure of Dryja’s counsel to except
as barring Dryja from seeking reversal for error in the charge;
Lefkowitz’s exception called the matter to the judge’s attention
and further exception would have been fruitless”).2 Only one
2
In United States v. Harris, 104 F.3d 1465 (5th Cir.
1997), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 21, 1997) (No. 96-9169),
the defendant argued on appeal that the district court’s jury
instructions were erroneous. In district court, a codefendant had
objected to the instructions but the defendant declined to
challenge them, telling the district court “I don’t have any
objections to the charge.” We then held that the defendant had not
preserved the issue for appeal and thus only examined the
instruction for plain error.
If the defendant states that he will not object to something
and then, on appeal, reverses course and raises such an objection,
this court should generally apply a plain error standard. Id. at
1472. There may be times, however, as recognized by this court in
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appellate case, United States v. Cassity, appears even indirectly
to rely on the “for cause shown” exception of Rule 12(f) in
permitting a defendant to preserve an error that a codefendant
raised below; the rest simply cite existing caselaw as authority.
However, we have found no case allowing a defendant to make such an
argument in the speedy trial context))and rightly so. Section
3162(a)(2) not only preempts Rule 12(f), but the plain language of
§ 3162(a)(2) provides that failure to move for dismissal for a
speedy trial violation “shall constitute a waiver of the right to
dismissal under this section” (emphasis added). The Speedy Trial
Act provides no exception to this waiver provision, and we may not
read one in. In sum, Westbrook, Bledsoe, and Peoples waived their
Speedy Trial Act claims by failing to join Green’s motion to
dismiss the indictment.
B
The remaining question is whether Green’s May 1, 1995 trial
date was within seventy days of the date “the action occasioning
the retrial becomes final,” which in this case is September 16,
1994, the date the district court declared a mistrial.3 The
Love
and White where the failure to join a codefendant’s objection may
nevertheless preserve the issue for appeal.
3
When the district court declares a mistrial and one of
the parties files a certain kind of appeal, the court of appeals’
disposition of the appeal, rather than the declaration of the
mistrial itself, is “the action occasioning the retrial.” United
States v. Kington, 875 F.2d 1091, 1108-09 (5th Cir. 1989)
(discussing situations where disposition of appeal of declaration
of mistrial is “the action occasioning the retrial”). However,
there was no appeal here))interlocutory or otherwise))relating to
the district court’s declaration of mistrial. Therefore, “the
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starting point for computing this seventy-day period is September
17. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Duberry, 923 F.2d 317, 320
n.8 (3d Cir. 1991) (excluding days on which triggering events occur
for purposes of calculating time under Speedy Trial Act); Kington,
875 F.2d at 1109 (not counting the day that action occasioning
retrial became final when computing time under Speedy Trial Act);
cf. Ortega-Mena, 949 F.2d at 158 (stating, in case not involving
mistrial, that the first day of seventy-day period was the day
following defendants’ indictments). The period of delay “resulting
from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the
conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such
motion” is not used in computing the seventy-day limit. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(1)(F). The day that a pretrial motion is filed and the
day on which the motion is decided by the court are likewise
excluded. Kington, 875 F.2d at 1106. All defendants who are
joined for trial generally fall within the speedy trial computation
of the latest codefendant and the excludable delay of one
codefendant may be attributed to all defendants. United States v.
Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1567 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, __ U.S.
__, 115 S. Ct. 1113, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1995). We exclude from
computation any delay resulting from a continuance if the district
court granted the continuance on the basis of the “ends of
action occasioning retrial” must be the declaration of mistrial
itself. See United States v. Menzer, 29 F.3d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir.)
(noting that, where no party appealed declaration of mistrial,
“there is no dispute that following the mistrial . . ., the
government had seventy days in which to retry the defendant”),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1002, 115 S. Ct. 515, 130 L. Ed. 2d 422
(1994).
-20-
justice,” and the court sets forth its reasons for so finding. 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).
The government argues that all the time from September 16 to
February 10, 1995 (the date the court reporter completed and filed
the transcripts) is excludable because the defendants’ caused this
delay by asking for these transcripts on September 16. However, as
discussed above, there is no evidence in the record that the
defendants requested the transcripts until they filed a motion for
those documents on November 23. Within the September 16-February
10 period, Peoples sought a continuance on November 4, which the
district court granted on November 8 as to all defendants. While
the time that had elapsed before Peoples’ motion (from September 17
to November 3) is not excludable, the five days from November 4 to
November 8 are excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(F). In addition, the
defendants (including Green) filed a joint motion on November 23
requesting transcripts, which the district court granted in part on
November 30. These eight days are also excludable under
§ 3161(h)(1)(F). However, the period from November 9 to November
22 is nonexcludable.
In his motion for a continuance, Peoples’ counsel stated that
he needed more time for trial preparation and also noted that he
“anticipates that all defense counsel of record will file a joint
motion for the transcript of the preceding trial of this cause
which would in all likelihood necessitate a further delay in the
present trial setting.” The district court accepted this argument,
and determined that a continuance would be necessary to ensure that
-21-
Peoples’ counsel had sufficient time to prepare for trial. In its
order, after making the required ends-of-justice finding under 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A), the district court excluded the time
between November 28 (which was then the scheduled trial date) and
the new trial date, which the court stated would be “the first
available trial date after completion of the transcript.” The
transcript was completed and filed February 10. On February 13,
the district court sua sponte set the trial for May 1, and the
trial began on that date.
The district court’s November 8 continuance was an open-ended
one in the sense that it lacked a specific ending date. While the
circuits have split over whether a district court may grant an
open-ended continuance under § 3161(h)(8)(A),4 this circuit has
4
Compare United States v. Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 358 (2d
Cir. 1995) (stating that “[t]he length of an exclusion for
complexity must be . . . limited in time”), cert. denied, __ U.S.
__, 116 S. Ct. 1671, 134 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1996), and United States v.
Jordan, 915 F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Speedy
Trial Act “requires that an ‘ends of justice’ continuance be
specifically limited in time”) with United States v. Twitty, 107
F.3d 1482, 1489 (11th Cir. 1997) (ruling that “[a]n open-ended
continuance may be granted to serve the ends of justice”); United
States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1458 (10th Cir.) (ruling that in
“rare cases” it will not be possible to set a specific ending date
for a continuance and “an open-ended continuance for a reasonable
period is permissible”), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 385,
136 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1996); United States v. Jones, 56 F.3d 581, 586
(5th Cir. 1995) (holding that district courts may grant open-ended
continuances except that continuances for any substantial length of
time are extraordinary and must be adequately justified by the
circumstances); United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866, 868 (3d
Cir. 1992) (holding that “open-ended continuances to serve the ends
of justice are not prohibited if they are reasonable in length”),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829, 114 S. Ct. 97, 126 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1993);
and United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 508 (1st Cir. 1984)
(noting that “it is inevitable that in some cases, like the present
one, a court is forced to order an (h)(8) continuance without
knowing exactly how long the reasons supporting the continuance
-22-
held that a district court may sometimes grant such continuances.
Jones, 56 F.3d at 585-86. In Jones, we noted that situations may
exist “in which it is impossible, or at least quite difficult, for
the parties or the court to gauge the length of an otherwise
justified continuance.” Id. at 586. “In such circumstances, the
district court may decide to continue the trial indefinitely, at
least until the defendant or the government is able to propose a
more specific trial date or until there exists enough additional
information for the district court to set one.” Id. However, if
the continuance is “for any substantial length of time [it must be]
extraordinary and . . . adequately justified by the circumstances
of the particular case.” Id.
In this case, the district court had been expecting the
defendants to request transcripts from the first trial from the
date it granted a mistrial on September 16. Moreover, the district
court had formal notice that the defendants would ask for the
transcripts as early as November 4, the date on which Peoples filed
his request for a continuance. Given the uncertainty over when the
transcripts would finally be ready (and, more generally, over
Peoples’ need for additional time to prepare for trial), the
district court lacked sufficient information on November 8 to set
a specific trial date. Thus, it was perfectly reasonable for the
district court to grant an open-ended continuance that extended
will remain valid”), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1004, 105 S. Ct. 1355,
84 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1985).
-23-
until the first available trial date after the transcripts were
ready.
In addition, the continuance only lasted about five months,
and the trial itself occurred just two-and-a-half months after the
court reporter completed and filed the transcripts the defendants
had requested. Such a relatively short period of time is not
unreasonable. See, e.g., Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (holding that
five-month open-ended continuance based on ends of justice did not
violate Speedy Trial Act); Lattany, 982 F.2d at 874-76 (ruling that
one-year delay resulting from district court’s grant and then
extension of open-ended ends-of-justice continuance was not
unreasonable where defendant changed counsel several times and
various counsel requested continuances to permit them to prepare
for trial); United States v. Davenport, 935 F.2d 1223, 1236 (11th
Cir. 1991) (determining that seven-month ends-of-justice
continuance giving two defendants additional time to prepare for
trial was reasonable delay that could be attributed to co-
defendant); cf. Jones, 56 F.3d at 584-85 (noting that where
district court “memorialized” its previous “silent grant” of
defendant’s motion for a continuance more than a year after he
filed the motion, defendant’s motion only requested a two-month
continuance, and continuance reflected the district court’s
“oversight rather than deliberation,” defendant’s speedy trial
rights were violated).
We also emphasize that Green requested, accepted, and
benefitted from the five-month delay occasioned by the continuance.
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Peoples’ motion for the continuance specifically asked that “the
trial proceedings be continued and be reset for the first available
date following preparation of the transcript[s].” The district
court then gave Peoples exactly the relief he sought; the court
continued proceedings until further notice and “reset [the trial]
for the first available trial date after completion of the
transcript.” Peoples’ motion is imputed to Green for purposes of
computation of time under the Speedy Trial Act, so Green
effectively joined the motion. Moreover, Green did not object to
the continuance at the time the district court granted it, and he
did not even allege a violation of his speedy trial rights until
the day of trial. See Twitty, 107 F.3d at 1489 (suggesting that
defendant’s failure to object to open-ended continuance cuts
against defendant’s argument that the delay occasioned by
continuance was not excludable under the Speedy Trial Act). The
district court also made the findings and statement of reasons
required by § 3161(h)(8);5 it simply declined to set a specific
ending date for the continuance because it was unclear when the
transcripts would be available. Under these circumstances, Green
may not seek “to turn the benefit he accepted into an error that
would undo his conviction . . . .” United States v. Eakes, 783
5
At oral argument, Green contended that the district court
did not make a finding under § 3161(h)(8)(A) why the seventy-nine
days between the completion of the transcripts and the trial date
should be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act. The court, though,
specifically found that the ends of justice would be served by
“allowing the Defendant additional time to prepare this case” and
that “the Defendant [should not be denied] reasonable time
necessary for effective preparation.” This finding applies to all
the time covered by the continuance.
-25-
F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906, 106 S. Ct.
3277, 91 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1986). “The Speedy Trial Act entitles
criminal defendants to adequate time for preparing a defense, but
that right may not be used as a two-edged sword in this fashion.”
Id.; see also Kington, 875 F.2d at 1108 (endorsing “the sensible
maxim that defendants ought not to be able to claim relief on the
basis of delays which they themselves deliberately caused”); United
States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 331 (6th Cir. 1988) (concluding that
delay caused by defendant’s plea vacillation stopped speedy trial
clock because otherwise defendant “would have successfully worked
both sides of the street lulling the court and prosecution into a
false sense of security only to turn around later and use the . . .
leisurely pace of the case as grounds for dismissal”); United
States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 434 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that
delay created by defendant in mistakenly agreeing to a “waiver” of
his speedy trial rights is excludable); cf. United States v.
Willis, 958 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant did
not mislead or sandbag the district court and thus cause delay
because the district court erroneously induced defendant to “waive”
his speedy trial rights without identifying an applicable exception
for this under the Speedy Trial Act or performing an ends-of-
justice analysis under § 3161(h)(8)). Therefore, we determine that
the period from November 28 to May 1 is excludable under the Speedy
Trial Act.
In sum, we determine that the periods from November 4 to
November 8, 1994 and November 23, 1994 to May 1, 1995 are
-26-
excludable under the Speedy Trial Act. Conversely, the periods
from September 17 to November 3, 1994 and November 9 to November 22
are nonexcludable. As only sixty-two nonexcludable days elapsed
between the date the district court declared a mistrial and the
date of the second trial, Green’s prosecution did not violate the
Speedy Trial Act. Accordingly, we reject all of the defendants’
speedy trial claims.
III
Next, the defendants raise various arguments challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions or
sentences. Our review for sufficiency of the evidence following a
conviction is narrow. United States v. Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 577
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S. Ct. 1867, 134 L. Ed.
2d 964 (1996). We will affirm if a rational trier of fact could
have found that the evidence established the essential elements of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 62 L. Ed. 2d 126 (1979). We
must consider the evidence, all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, and all credibility determinations in the light most
favorable to the prosecution. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80, 62 S. Ct. 457, 469, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1942). The evidence
need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be
wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, and
the jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the
evidence. United States v. Salazar, 66 F.3d 723, 728 (5th Cir.
1995). If the evidence, though, gives equal or nearly equal
-27-
circumstantial support to a theory of guilt and a theory of
innocence, we will reverse the conviction, as under these
circumstances a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt. United States v. Sanchez, 961 F.2d 1169, 1173
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 918, 113 S. Ct. 330, 121 L. Ed.
2d 248 (1992).
A
Bledsoe, Peoples, and Green (though not Westbrook) contend
that insufficient evidence supports their conspiracy convictions.
To convict a defendant of conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence
of an agreement to violate the drug laws and that each co-
conspirator (2) knew of, (3) intended to join, and (4) voluntarily
participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Abadie, 879 F.2d
1260, 1265 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1005, 110 S. Ct. 569,
107 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1989). To be a conspiracy, an express, explicit
agreement is not required; a tacit agreement is enough. United
States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1457 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 915, 113 S. Ct. 2354, 124 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1993).
A person may be guilty as a co-conspirator even if he plays only a
minor role, United States v. Prieto-Tejas, 779 F.2d 1098, 1103 (5th
Cir. 1986), and he need not know all the details of the unlawful
enterprise or know the exact number or identity of all the co-
conspirators, so long as he knowingly participates in some fashion
in the larger objectives of the conspiracy. United States v.
Fernandez-Roque, 703 F.2d 808, 814-15 (5th Cir. 1983). Because
-28-
secrecy is the norm in an illicit conspiracy, the elements of the
offense may be established solely by circumstantial evidence.
United States v. Espinoza-Seanez, 862 F.2d 526, 537 (5th Cir.
1988). Although mere presence at the scene of the crime or close
association with a co-conspirator will not support an inference of
participation in a conspiracy, a common purpose and plan may be
inferred from a “development and a collocation of circumstances.”
United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.) (en
banc) (quoting Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80, 62 S. Ct. at 469), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S. Ct. 1508, 59 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1979).
Once the government has produced evidence of an illegal conspiracy,
it need only introduce “slight evidence” to connect an individual
defendant to the common scheme. United States v. Krenning, 93 F.3d
1257, 1265 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). As
long as it is not factually insubstantial or incredible, the
uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator, even one who has
chosen to cooperate with the government in exchange for non-
prosecution or leniency, may be constitutionally sufficient
evidence to convict. United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1322
(5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1087, 110 S. Ct. 1152, 107
L. Ed. 2d 1056 (1990).
The defendants offer somewhat different arguments regarding
the sufficiency of the evidence regarding conspiracy. Bledsoe
makes two points. First, Bledsoe claims that reasonable doubt
exists on whether he was part of a conspiracy because the police
did not find him in possession of any drugs other than marijuana.
-29-
However, there was voluminous testimony by many of Bledsoe’s co-
conspirators that Bledsoe was part of the defendants’ crack-selling
conspiracy. Second, Bledsoe attacks the credibility of the
witnesses against him, arguing generally that the witnesses were
liars and that they had the incentive to testify against him to
avoid being charged themselves. However, Bledsoe had ample
opportunity at trial to impeach the witnesses against him by
attacking their credibility. Moreover, he did not offer a single
witness in his defense. Obviously, the jury considered the
witnesses testifying against Bledsoe more credible than Bledsoe
himself. Considering the proof presented and construing the jury’s
credibility determinations in the light most favorable to the
government, we do not disagree. A rational jury could certainly
have found that the evidence presented against Bledsoe established
the elements for conspiracy.
Peoples takes a slightly different tack. He asserts that even
if he sold drugs on the same premises as the other defendants, he
operated independently of them. Peoples also notes that he was
never apprehended in actual possession of crack. However, police
seized thirty-seven rocks of crack from Green in a motel room
rented by Peoples and in which Peoples was present. Motel staff
had also observed what seemed to be drug traffic coming in and out
of the room. In June 1993, Peoples was present in front of a crack
house in which police found Westbrook present as well as crack.
The police also observed Westbrook, Bledsoe, Green, and Peoples
associating at the crack houses or at other locations where the
-30-
crack was stored. In addition, Reeders and Wright testified that
they sold crack for Peoples with the permission of Westbrook and
Bledsoe.
Given this proof, Peoples cannot show that a rational jury
could have found that he did not play a role in the conspiracy.
The government has produced much more than the “slight evidence” it
needs to connect Peoples to the alleged scheme; the evidence
strongly suggests that Peoples’ participated in the conspiracy in
some capacity.
Green attacks the credibility of the government’s witnesses,
arguing that their testimony was so incredible that no rational
jury could have convicted him of conspiracy. Specifically, Green
asserts that the co-conspirators who testified against him were
crack addicts, had criminal records, were liars, testified
inconsistently, and/or cooperated with the government to avoid
prosecution themselves. At trial, Green presented a witness who
testified that Reed would do anything to avoid a life sentence.
Green’s mother also testified, suggesting that Green had held a
number of jobs and did not seem to have much money.
Numerous witnesses, though, including police officers,
testified in detail as to Green’s involvement in the conspiracy.
In addition, there was evidence that police actually seized a large
amount of crack from Green. Examining the evidence offered by the
government and Green, we believe there is sufficient credible
evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
-31-
Therefore, we determine that sufficient evidence exists to
uphold Bledsoe, Peoples, and Green’s convictions for conspiracy.
B
Westbrook and Bledsoe challenge the district court
determination that sufficient evidence supported their convictions
for money laundering in connection with the purchase of two used
Mercedes Benzes. First, Westbrook contends that no evidence exists
indicating that his purchase of his Mercedes was made with drug
money. Second, Westbrook argues that there is insufficient
evidence that he intended to conceal or disguise the nature of the
unlawful proceeds. Third, Westbrook and Bledsoe aver that there is
no evidence that their alleged money laundering had any connection
to interstate commerce.
The applicable money-laundering statute provides:
Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a
financial transaction represents the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to
conduct such a financial transaction which in fact
involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity
. . . knowing that the transaction is designed in whole
or in part . . . to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity . . . shall
be sentenced to a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice
the value of the property involved in the transaction,
whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than
twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1).
Evidence that a defendant’s cash outflow in a financial
transaction exceeds his legitimate income is sufficient to show
that the transaction “involves the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity,” even if the defendant claims income from other sources.
-32-
United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1308 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 927, 113 S. Ct. 355, 121 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992).
Here, Westbrook and Bledsoe spent $20,000 cash for two Mercedes.
However, there was no evidence that Westbrook had any legitimate
income; indeed, he did not file any income tax returns during the
applicable period. Moreover, ample evidence exists that Westbrook
was involved in extensive drug dealing. Thus, a reasonable jury
could infer that Westbrook bought his Mercedes using drug money.
To convict Westbrook of money laundering, the government
needed to show that he concealed or disguised the nature, the
location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the drug
money used to buy the Mercedes. There is evidence of such
concealment. First, even though Westbrook ultimately possessed the
Mercedes and drove around in it, Reeders negotiated for the car and
paid for it. Second, Trejo signed the papers for the car. Third,
Reeders stated that Westbrook and Bledsoe had the cars registered
in the names of Trejo and Brown because those individuals had jobs
and could explain the source of the money used to buy the cars.
Fourth, Trejo requested that Westbrook take Trejo’s name off the
title of the Mercedes, but Westbrook refused. Fifth, Westbrook
used Trejo’s name when he brought the Mercedes to a shop for
repairs. All of these actions could convince a reasonable jury
that Westbrook, in purchasing the Mercedes, concealed the nature,
location, source, ownership, or control of the drug money used to
buy it.
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Finally, to show that Westbrook and Bledsoe’s Mercedes
purchases violated 18 U.S.C. § 1956, the government must provide
proof of some effect on interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(c)(4) (noting that “the term ‘financial transaction’ means
. . . a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate
or foreign commerce . . . involving the transfer of title to any
. . . vehicle”). The use of the words “in any way or degree”
suggests that the link to interstate or foreign commerce need only
be slight. Indeed, before United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
115 S. Ct. 1624, 131 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1995), courts held that this
language only required evidence that the individual transaction at
issue had a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
United States v. Peay, 972 F.2d 71, 74 (4th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1071, 113 S. Ct. 1027, 122 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1993).
Moreover, after Lopez, courts have recognized that this de minimis
standard continues in effect. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d
1093, 1100 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1713, __
L. Ed. 2d __ (1997); United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1224-25
(10th Cir. 1995). This is because § 1956 regulates activities
that, in the aggregate, have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at __, 115 S. Ct. at 1629 (stating
that “where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial
relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual
instances arising under that statute is of no consequence”); cf.
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154, 91 S. Ct. 1357, 1361, 28
L. Ed. 2d 686 (1971) (holding that Commerce Clause authorizes
-34-
Congress to punish any particular criminal action, even without
proof of a relation to interstate commerce, when the activity is
part of a “class of activities” determined by Congress to affect
interstate commerce); United States v. Staples, 85 F.3d 461, 463
(9th Cir.) (rejecting Lopez challenge to 21 U.S.C. § 860, which
deals with drug trafficking in a school zone), cert. denied, __
U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 318, 136 L. Ed. 2d 233 (1996). In sum, the
government can meet its burden on the interstate commerce element
of § 1956 merely by showing that the Mercedes purchases had a
minimal effect on interstate commerce.
In United States v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1991),
the defendant was arrested while transporting about $300,000 in
cash on an interstate highway. Evidence existed that this sum was
the proceeds of a cocaine sale and that the defendant knew it. The
defendant challenged his conviction under § 1956 on the grounds
that his transportation of the money did not affect interstate
commerce. We rejected his argument, holding that, since Congress
has generally made clear in 21 U.S.C. § 801 that drug trafficking
affects interstate commerce, transportation of drug proceeds (even
if purely intrastate) affects interstate commerce. We explicitly
reserved judgment, though, on a case in which the connection
between money and drugs was not so clear.
In light of Gallo, we think that the government has shown that
Westbrook and Bledsoe’s purchases of the two Mercedes had a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce. First, Congress has
determined in § 801 and elsewhere that narcotics trafficking, as a
-35-
class of activities, affects interstate commerce. Second, the
government presented much evidence that Westbrook and Bledsoe
conspired to sell crack, that they bought the two Mercedes with
proceeds from their crack sales, and that all cocaine distributed
in the United States is manufactured outside the country. Third,
the Mercedes purchases facilitated Westbrook and Bledsoe’s crack-
selling conspiracy. The evidence indicates that this conspiracy
generated large amounts of surplus cash. Narcotics traffickers
generally try to launder drug proceeds to make it more difficult
for law enforcement to trace the illegal activity, prosecute them,
forfeit their assets, and assess back taxes. H.R. Rep. No. 746,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986). Here, Westbrook and Bledsoe’s
purchases of the two Mercedes through Trejo and Brown “cleaned” a
large amount of drug proceeds, making it easier for the two
defendants to continue the conspiracy. In addition, there is
proof that Westbrook and Bledsoe used the two Mercedes as part of
their conspiracy. For instance, the police testified that they
routinely saw Westbrook and Bledsoe drive the two Mercedes, and
Walker testified that he observed Westbrook and Bledsoe drive the
cars to a crack house. Thus, we find that sufficient evidence
exists that Westbrook and Bledsoe’s purchases of the two Mercedes
affected interstate commerce “in any way or degree.”
Accordingly, we determine that there is enough proof in the
record to support Westbrook and Bledsoe’s convictions for money
laundering.
C
-36-
Westbrook argues that the district court’s two-point increase
in his offense level on count 1 for possession of a dangerous
weapon lacked sufficient evidentiary support. This increase
helped ensure that Westbrook received a guideline range of life
imprisonment on count 1 under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The
district court’s imposition of the two-level enhancement is a
factual determination that we review for clear error. United
States v. Rodriguez, 62 F.3d 723, 724 (5th Cir. 1995).
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provides
that “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed,
increase [the offense level] by 2 levels.” The relevant
application note states that “[t]he enhancement for weapon
possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug
traffickers possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if
the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense.” Id. comment. (n.3).
There was much evidence in the district court suggesting that
Westbrook possessed firearms in connection with his drug
trafficking. First, Wright stated that he saw Westbrook and
Bledsoe carrying “Uzis.” Second, an anonymous caller reported to
the Temple police on February 16, 1993 that she saw Westbrook,
Bledsoe, and others carrying guns in the 900 block of South 18th
Street, a location near a crack house operated by the defendants.
Third, there was testimony about two 9 mm handguns at a crack house
and about Bledsoe carrying a TEC-9 9 mm pistol, though this was not
directly connected to Westbrook. Fourth, and most significantly,
-37-
the police found three weapons in the residence occupied by
Westbrook and his mother: a .32 caliber pistol under a cushion of
the couch in the living room, and a TEC-9 9 mm pistol and a .45
caliber pistol in the closet of one of the bedrooms. It is unclear
who owned the guns or whether Westbrook occupied the bedroom in
question. Westbrook claims that, “at one time or another,” various
other people lived in the house. He also notes that Reeders, a
main government witness, testified that he had never seen Westbrook
with a gun. In addition, the police found no drugs in the house.
However, it is undisputed that Westbrook lived in the house; police
found documents belonging to Westbrook in the house; and police
uncovered a drug ledger and drug paraphernalia in the house as well
as crack hidden in a neighbor’s garage (which one witness connected
to Westbrook).
On balance, sufficient evidence exists to indicate that
Westbrook possessed a firearm in connection with his drug
trafficking. While it is possible that Westbrook did not possess
the weapons for use in his crack business, any other explanation
for the guns found in his home is highly improbable (for example,
that his mother or someone who had formerly stayed in the house
secreted all the weapons). In the drug business, guns are tools of
the trade, United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1057 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1032, 107 S. Ct. 1962, 95 L. Ed. 2d
533 (1987), and there was ample evidence that Westbrook possessed
dangerous weapons in connection with the sale of crack. Therefore,
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the district court did not clearly err in adding two points to
Westbrook’s offense level.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
judgments of conviction as well as its sentences.
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