Walker v. Warden Winn Correctional Center

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 25, 2006
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-30402
Summary Calendar
CALVIN WALKER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN WINN CORRECTIONAL CENTER,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
(3:03-CV-740)
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Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioner-Appellant Calvin Walker, Louisiana prisoner #
407257, appeals from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
corpus petition, in which Walker challenged his 1998 guilty-plea
convictions of two counts of burglary and his two consecutive
12-year prison sentences. We granted Walker a certificate of
appealability (COA) on his claims that (1) his guilty plea was
rendered involuntary by his attorney’s having allegedly promised
Walker that he would receive a minimal prison sentence and (2) the
trial court violated his due process rights by failing to provide
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
him an opportunity to challenge information contained in his
presentence report (PSR). In the order granting COA, we emphasized
that significant portions of the state-court records appeared to be
missing, and directed the parties to brief the “effect of the
absence of [those] records in connection with these [two
substantive] claims and whether an evidentiary hearing should have
been held to remedy this problem.” We also directed the parties to
address whether Walker’s due-process claim was procedurally
defaulted. Thereafter, the respondent provided us with all state-
court materials that are pertinent to the disposition of this case.
In addition, Walker filed a pro se reply brief and a pleading that
we interpret as a motion to file the reply brief out of time. We
grant that motion.
Federal habeas relief may not be granted on any claim that was
“adjudicated on the merits in State court,” unless the adjudication
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).
Walker insists that, prior to his rearraignment, he was told by his
attorney that if he pleaded guilty, he would be subject to a
sentence of only one to two years in prison. This was based on the
attorney’s determination that Walker’s record of criminal arrests
and convictions was “spotless.” The PSR, however, reflected that
Walker had two prior burglary convictions in other states, which
resulted in the trial court’s imposition of the more severe
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sentence. Federal constitutional law requires that, before it
accepts a guilty plea, the trial court must ensure that the
defendant “‘has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and
of its consequence.’” Taylor v. Whitley, 933 F.2d 325, 329 (5th
Cir. 1991) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969)).
“When a defendant pleads guilty on the basis of a promise by his
defense attorney or the prosecutor . . . breach of that promise
taints the voluntariness of his plea.” Davis v. Butler, 825 F.2d
892, 894 (5th Cir. 1987). When a defendant can show that the
court, the prosecutor, or defendant’s counsel induced the guilty
plea by “‘clearly and unequivocally guaranteeing a lesser sentence
or some other specific leniency,’” the defendant may show that his
guilty plea was involuntarily entered. See Bond v. Dretke, 384
F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); United States v.
Amaya, 111 F.3d 386, 388-89 (5th Cir. 1997).
Although Walker has faulted his attorney for allegedly
advising him to plead guilty on the ground that his criminal
history was “spotless,” the transcripts of the hearing on Walker’s
November 16, 1998 pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his
November 18, 1998 sentencing proceeding reflect that Walker himself
misled his attorney about his criminal history. We surmise that
Walker hoped that his prior convictions would not be discovered
during the presentence investigation, and that he moved to withdraw
his plea only after his criminal background was revealed.
Moreover, the transcripts of those hearings do not support Walker’s
allegation that his attorney had “promised” that he would receive
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a sentence of only one to two years. Furthermore, Walker’s
rearraignment transcript reflects that he understood that he faced
a prison sentence of up to 24 years. Finally, Walker acknowledged
that he received the benefit of his plea bargain in the State’s
agreement to consolidate six burglary charges into two counts.
Walker’s involuntary-guilty-plea claim is refuted by the record.
Walker’s apparently unexhausted due-process claim regarding
sentencing should not have been considered procedurally defaulted
because the respondent expressly waived a contention that Walker
had failed to exhaust state remedies. See Bledsue v. Johnson, 188
F.3d 250, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1999). Nonetheless, the newly provided
state-court materials reflect that this claim, too, is not
supported by the record. Walker’s assertion that he was denied an
opportunity to challenge the information in his PSR is contradicted
by the transcripts of the November 16 and 18, 1998, proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT Walker’s motion to file
his reply brief out of time, and we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
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