Mahogany v. Stalder

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS September 18, 2007
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
)))))))))))))))))))))))))) Clerk
No. 06-30699
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RICHARD MAHOGANY, JR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RICHARD STALDER; JIM ROGERS; LYNN MCCLOUD,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
No. 2:06-CV-2293
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Mahogany, Jr. (“Mahogany”), a
Louisiana state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
appeals the district court’s order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983civil rights action against several Louisiana prison officials.
Mahogany alleges that a prison disciplinary proceeding did not
satisfy the minimum requirements of procedural due process. The
district court applied Supreme Court precedent and held that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIRCUIT
RULE 47.5.4.
Mahogany’s claims were not cognizable under § 1983. Because Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not bar Mahogany’s § 1983
claim in its entirety, we AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN PART, and
REMAND.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A prison disciplinary board found Mahogany guilty of fighting
and sentenced him to four weeks of cell confinement and forfeiture
of ninety days of good-time credits. After exhausting the two-step
prison grievance procedure, Mahogany filed a § 1983 civil rights
action, alleging that the disciplinary proceeding violated his right
to procedural due process because he did not receive a written
statement of the evidence relied on during the proceeding or the
reasons for the disciplinary action. In his prayer for relief,
Mahogany asks the court to (1) restore his forfeited good-time
credits; (2) reverse the disciplinary board’s decision and expunge
the results of the disciplinary proceeding from his prison record;
and (3) award him monetary damages.
Applying Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004), and Heck, a
magistrate judge recommended that Mahogany’s complaint did not state
a cognizable claim under § 1983. The district court adopted the
magistrate’s report and recommendation in full and dismissed
Mahogany’s suit. Mahogany appeals the dismissal to this court. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review the dismissal
of Mahogany’s complaint for failure to state a claim de novo. Ruiz
2
v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 275 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
II. DISCUSSION
The Supreme Court has held that “a prisoner in state custody
cannot use a § 1983 action to challenge ‘the fact or duration of his
confinement.’” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (quoting
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973)). Furthermore, in
Heck, the Court held that a prisoner cannot maintain a § 1983 action
for monetary damages if “establishing the basis for the damages
claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction,”
512 U.S. at 481-82, unless the prisoner can prove that “the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated,” id. at 487.2
Here, the district court rejected Mahogany’s due process claim,
reasoning that Mahogany has no § 1983 damages claim “[u]nless and
until Mahogany is able to have his disciplinary conviction reversed,
expunged, or otherwise declared invalid by a tribunal authorized to
make such a determination.” Report and Recommendation at 2 (citing
Muhammad).
Mahogany contends that Heck does not bar his § 1983 claim
because a judgment in his favor would not necessarily imply the
invalidity of the finding of guilt or the sanction imposed. To the
extent that Mahogany seeks restoration of good-time credits,
reversal of the disciplinary board’s decision, and expungement of
2
Heck applies to this case, for the term “conviction” includes
rulings from prison disciplinary proceedings. Clarke v. Stalder,
154 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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the disciplinary proceeding from his record, Preiser and Heck bar
these avenues of relief, because such relief either directly or
indirectly challenges the validity of the disciplinary board’s
finding of guilt and of the sanction imposed. See Dotson, 544 U.S.
at 78-82.
Whether Mahogany’s claim for damages arising from his failure
to receive a written statement of the evidence relied on would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the judgment in the
disciplinary proceeding is an issue of first impression in this
circuit. We conclude that it does not.
The Supreme Court has recognized an inmate’s right to seek
damages under § 1983 for the denial of procedural due process rights
during prison disciplinary hearings, including the right to receive
a written statement of the evidence relied on during those
proceedings. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55, 563-64
(1974). In Heck, the Court observed that the damages sought in
Wolff were “‘damages for the deprivation of civil rights,’” and not
“damages for the deprivation of good-time credits.” 512 U.S. at
482. The Court further noted that there was no indication in Wolff
that “using the wrong procedures necessarily vitiated the denial of
good-time credits. Thus, the claim at issue in Wolff did not call
into question the lawfulness of the plaintiff’s continuing
confinement.” Id. at 483; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 649-50 (1997)(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (suggesting that
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failure to provide facts and evidence supporting a finding of guilt
“would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of
good-time credits, and therefore is immediately cognizable under
§ 1983”).
Therefore, a claim for damages based on a failure to receive
a written statement of the evidence relied on in a prison
disciplinary proceeding is cognizable under § 1983. Consequently,
the district court in this case erred in dismissing Mahogany’s
§ 1983 claim in its entirety. The district court should not have
dismissed Mahogany’s § 1983 claim in so far as Mahogany seeks
damages for the violation of his due process rights. We therefore
REVERSE this aspect of the district court’s order, and REMAND for
reconsideration consistent with this opinion.
The district court correctly dismissed Mahogany’s claim to the
extent that he sought restoration of good-time credits, reversal of
the disciplinary board’s decision, and expungement of the
disciplinary proceedings from his record. We therefore AFFIRM this
aspect of the district court’s order.
On remand, the district court should decide Mahogany’s § 1983
claim to the extent that Mahogany seeks damages for the disciplinary
board’s failure to provide him with a written statement of the
evidence relied on during the disciplinary proceeding. We caution,
however, that the damages cannot encompass the “injury” of being
deprived of good-time credits, and must stem solely from “the
deprivation of civil rights.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 482-83, 487 n.7;
5
see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM IN PART, REVERSE IN
PART and REMAND.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.
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