DocketNumber： 88-4439
Judges： Gee, Reavley, Jolly
Filed Date： 10/26/1989
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/4/2024
A plaintiff injured when cleaning out a combine’s unloader brought this products liability claim against the combine's manufacturer. Finding the unloader’s danger open and obvious, the district court directed a verdict in favor of the manufacturer. We affirm.
I
Garland Melton’s arm was caught in the auger of a vertical unloader of a combine manufactured by Deere & Co. The function of the vertical unloader is to discharge grain from the grain tank. At times, the grain tank and unloading system must be cleaned out. For this purpose, a five-by-five-inch opening is located at the bottom of the vertical unloader, covered by a door. Immediately above the door is affixed a decal:
! WARNING
To avoid bodily injury from turning auger, stop engine and remove start key before opening clean out door.
Another warning decal, located over a toolbox about two feet from the cleanout door, included the following instruction:
2. Disengage and shut off all engine and/or motor power before servicing or unclogging machine.
Despite these warnings, Melton and his co-workers used a method to clean out the unloader that required the engine to be running. They would empty the loose grain through the cleanout door, engage the auger in order to release grain that had been caught up, and then scoop out by hand this additional grain and residue.
At the time of the accident, Garland Melton was cleaning out the vertical unloader by this method. Working with him were his brother, Richard Melton, and Roger Newsome. Garland placed his hand and arm through the cleanout door in order to rake out grain residue. The engine was still running. Richard meanwhile had been kicking down grain from the grain tank. Seeing Newsome return with an empty bucket and not checking to see if anyone was at the cleanout door, Richard climbed into the cab and engaged the auger. Garland’s arm was severely injured, requiring amputation.
Deere claimed at trial that several other methods can be used to clean out the vertical unloader without running the engine with the cleanout door open, including scraping out residue with a tool, washing out the unloader with a hose, or replacing the door when engaging the auger to release grain that is caught up. Melton’s witnesses, on the other hand, testified that it was necessary to run the engine and engage the auger in order to clean out the grain.
Other, similar accidents with the unloading auger have occurred. Three of Melton’s witnesses, for example, were injured in similar accidents with Deere combines. The trial court, however, limited Melton to evidence of those three accidents, all of which predated Melton’s accident, and excluded the testimony of six other witnesses. At the time Deere manufactured the combine that injured Melton, the company knew of four accidents at the auger site, and had begun affixing the warning decals. Some time later, Deere altered the design of the unloader. The new design incorporated a smaller cleanout door through which a hand does not fit.
Melton’s complaint against Deere sought actual and punitive damages. The trial proceeded solely on the theory of strict liability under Mississippi law, with Melton alleging that the combine was defective and unreasonably dangerous and that Deere’s conduct in failing to correct the known defect justified punitive damages. At the close of Melton’s case-in-chief, the district court granted Deere’s motion for directed verdict, holding that a reasonable
II
A.
We first address the legal basis for the district court’s directed verdict against Melton’s claim. In announcing its decision, the district court first noted that Melton’s case against Deere had proceeded solely on the theory of strict liability in tort. Mississippi has adopted the doctrine of strict liability as stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property....
State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.2d 113, 118 (Miss.1966). Specifically, Mississippi applies the “consumer expectations” test for when a product is unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 121; see also Restatement § 402A, comments g and i. The district court stated that the danger associated with the cleanout door of the unloader was open and obvious and therefore could not give rise to liability, citing Gray v. Manitowoc Co., 771 F.2d 866 (5th Cir.1985). In Gray v. Manitowoc, we held that “the patent danger bar adopted by the Restatement was incorporated into Mississippi’s doctrine of strict liability.” 771 F.2d at 869. In other words, a product that has an open and obvious danger is not more dangerous than contemplated by the consumer, and hence cannot, under the consumer expectations test applied in Mississippi, be unreasonably dangerous. In Gray v. Manitowoc, this court reversed a judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiffs where the danger had been Spen and obvious as a matter of law. 771 F.2d at 870.
Melton has suggested that Mississippi may now employ a test for unreasonable dangerousness other than that based on consumer expectations. In support of this contention Melton cites Whittley v. City of Meridian, 530 So.2d 1341 (Miss.1988), a strict liability case in which the Supreme Court of Mississippi made the following statement:
In determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous a reasonable person must conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product.
530 So.2d at 1347. Such a “risk-utility” test for unreasonable dangerousness is distinct from the “consumer expectations” test discussed above, and does not necessarily bar recovery when a danger is open and obvious. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, and D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 99 at 698-99 (5th ed. 1984). We cannot say, however, that Mississippi has altered its doctrine of strict liability. Whittley quoted section 402A of the Restatement as the law of Mississippi. 530 So.2d at 1347. The sentence to which Melton points was merely a description following that quote. It was unaccompanied by any discussion of unreasonable dangerousness, the “consumer expectations” test, or the “risk-utility” test. Furthermore, that section of the opinion discussed a defense based on an intervening cause; the court did not actually apply the risk-utility test. Thus, we cannot conclude from this single sentence that Mississippi has adopted a new test for unreasonable dangerousness. Accordingly, consumer expectations are still the basis of Mississippi’s test, and there is still no strict liability for a patent danger.
B.
With this legal framework in mind, we review the facts and evidence of this case. On the motion for directed verdict, the district court was required to view all the evidence in a light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the nonmov-
We agree with the district court that the testimony in this case left no question for the jury. Melton presented six witnesses, including himself, who were familiar with the combine that injured him. These witnesses testified that they knew the auger was dangerous when moving. Furthermore, the location of the auger just inside the cleanout door was unobscured and familiar to all the witnesses. They testified that they would not put a hand through the door if they knew the auger would be engaged. It may be true, as Melton and one other witness, Adams, testified, that a nonmoving auger is itself not obviously dangerous. Nevertheless, the risk that the auger may be engaged whenever the engine is running is a matter of common sense with which a reasonable user of the combine must be charged. Indeed, there is no question here that Melton knew that the lever for activating the auger was in the combine’s cab, and that nothing on the machine or elsewhere prevented anyone from engaging the auger at any time that Melton’s hand was in the unloader while the engine was running. Melton testified that he knew that the auger would be activated from time to time during the cleanout process he and the other workers were using, and that he knew he would be hurt if the auger were activated while his hand was in the clean-out opening. We find, therefore, that the only reasonable conclusion from this testimony is that the danger of injury from the auger while the combine’s engine was running was open and obvious. As a result, Deere was entitled to a judgment against Melton’s strict liability claim as a matter of law.
Melton relies on two particular items of evidence to support his argument to the contrary. First, he maintains that the unloader was unreasonably dangerous in that, once engaged, the auger started up and reached top speed faster than expected. Melton’s brother, Richard, and their supervisor, Danny Campbell, both testified to this effect. Both of these witnesses also testified, however, that they had seen the auger start up before. There was no contention that the combine acted differently on the day of the accident than on any other day. In addition, Melton testified that he did not actually think he would have time to get his hand out of the door if the auger were engaged. Thus, the testimony of these two witnesses regarding the start-up speed of the auger is not substantial enough to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that the auger started up faster than a normal user would expect.
Melton also points to a second particular item of testimony as sufficient to defeat Deere’s motion for directed verdict. Specifically, each witness stated his opinion that the combine’s cleanout area was more dangerous than expected. This testimony, however, is unsupported by any other facts. Except for the allegation about the start-up speed of the auger, discussed above, the witnesses did not explain why they could not appreciate the full danger when they knew that a moving auger is dangerous and when the risk that the auger may be engaged whenever the engine is running is apparent. Without some explanation, this conclusory testimony is not substantial enough to raise a jury question. Accordingly, the directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer was proper.
Ill
A.
Melton also presents two challenges to evidentiary rulings by the district court that, if meritorious, would change the evidence on the record and could, therefore, alter our review of the propriety of the directed verdict. First, Melton claims that the court improperly restricted the testimony of an expert witness, John Sevart. Melton sought to have Sevart, a mechanical engineer experienced with combines and other agricultural equipment, state his
“The admission or exclusion of expert testimony is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge and his or her decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous.” Smogor v. Enke, 874 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir.1989) (quoting Perkins v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th Cir.1979)). Melton argues that Sevart’s testimony was relevant and admissible, and cites various cases where expert testimony about the dangerousness of a product was admitted even though the question of an unreasonably dangerous defect turned on consumer expectations. See, e.g., Lenoir v. C.O. Porter Machinery Co., 672 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.1982). Melton’s argument ignores our standard of review. As we put it in a recent case, “simply because it would not be error to admit certain expert testimony does not mean it is error to exclude that testimony.” Smogor, 874 F.2d at 297. Indeed, the idea of discretion necessarily means that the court has room to decide the issue either way without committing error. The district court’s ruling on Sevart’s testimony was not even remotely, let alone manifestly, erroneous. As the court noted, the only import of such testimony would have related to some theory of negligent design, on which the case was not being tried, or for a theory of strict liability that, as discussed above, is not the law of Mississippi. As to consumer expectations, Sevart’s opinion would not have aided the trier of fact. The exclusion of Sevart’s opinion, therefore, is not grounds for reversal.
B.
Melton also challenges the district court’s exclusion of evidence of similar accidents occurring after the date of manufacture of the combine that injured Melton. The district court excluded the testimony of six witnesses who had been injured in accidents at the cleanout door of similar Deere combines. Melton also had a document listing nineteen other serious accidents.
At the outset, we again note that the district court has discretion to admit or exclude evidence, including evidence of similar accidents. See Ramos v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.1980). The court’s reasons for excluding evidence of accidents post-dating the manufacture of the Melton combine are not clear. If the reason was that evidence of the later accidents was not relevant as a matter of law, see Fed.R.Evid. 401, we disagree. In a strict liability case, the dangerousness of a product does not necessarily depend on the date of manufacture or on the manufacturer’s knowledge of a defect as of that date. See Jackson v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 788 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir.1984). Here, evidence of similar accidents does tend to show that the cleanout system was more dangerous than the users contemplated. A better reason for excluding the evidence, however, is provided by Fed.R.Evid. 403, which provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The district court did allow evidence of three similar accidents. Thus, this category of relevant evidence was before the jury. It was within the court’s discretion to exclude evidence of additional accidents as unnecessarily cumulative, even though relevant. Furthermore, a parade of accident victims carries a risk of unfair prejudice, and could confuse the issues since the question is not simply danger itself but unreasonable dangerousness as measured by consumer expectations. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of the additional similar accidents.
IV
In conclusion, we hold that based on the evidence presented in Melton’s case-in-chief, the danger of the combine’s loading
AFFIRMED.