United States v. Bradley

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 01-10406
Summary Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEVEN CARL BRADLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(4:00-CR-163-1)
December 17, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Steven Carl Bradley, co-founder of Mid-Cities Health Services
(MCHS), appeals his convictions for mail fraud, conspiracy to
commit mail fraud, and aiding and abetting mail fraud, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341, and 1342. Bradley maintains the
evidence at trial was insufficient to prove he had the requisite
intent to defraud. Bradley testified in his own defense.
The evidence regarding Bradley’s involvement at MCHS supports
finding he acted with a “conscious knowing intent to defraud”.
United States v. Kreimer, 609 F.2d 126, 128 (1980) (quoting United
States v. Kyle, 257 F.2d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 1958)). At MCHS,
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
Bradley was responsible for ordering equipment, signing claim
forms, and paying bills. Therefore, it could be reasonably
inferred that he knew about, and intended, MCHS’ practices of: (1)
overcharging insurance companies; (2) charging for items different
than those actually sold; (3) charging for items not sold; and (4)
double billing. Viewed in the requisite light most favorable to
the verdict, the evidence was sufficient to show Bradley’s intent
to defraud. See United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 387 (5th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Lawanson v. United States, 520 U.S. 1247
(1997), and cert. denied, Debowale v. United States, 520 U.S. 1219
(1997).
Bradley asserts that the district court erred in restricting
his attempt, through cross-examination, to demonstrate the double
billing was an error in every instance. The district court acted
within its discretion when it prohibited defense counsel from
redundantly asking a witness to glean the same information from
several groups of documents that were already in evidence and
available for the jury’s review. Bradley has not demonstrated that
the prohibition was clearly prejudicial. See United States v.
Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
807 (1994). Nor, along this line, did the district court abuse its
discretion in refusing to extend the allotted time for closing
argument. See United States v. Leal, 30 F.3d 577, 586 (5th Cir.
1994) (noting, in rejecting assertion that defendants were denied
enough time for closing argument, that the “defense [of] lack of
intent ... did not require an elaborate presentation”), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1182 (1995).
2
Bradley next contends that the district court improperly
injected itself into cross-examination when it admonished Bradley’s
counsel not to refer to a subsequent bill as a “correction” of a
previous bill because there was no evidence that the second bill
was submitted as a “correction”. Because Bradley did not object to
the admonition, review is only for plain error. See United States
v. Gray, 105 F.3d 956, 964 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, Luchkowec v.
United States, 520 U.S. 1150 (1997), and cert. denied, Gray v.
United States, 520 U.S. 1246 (1997), and cert. denied, Satz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 1128 (1997). Our review of the testimony
and the questioned admonishments reveals no error, plain or
otherwise.
AFFIRMED
3