United States v. Guzman

Case: 19-10783 Document: 00516044750 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/06/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 6, 2021
No. 19-10783 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Joe Guzman,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:19-CV-334
USDC No. 4:16-CR-27-1
Before Owen, Chief Judge, and Clement and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Joe Guzman, federal prisoner # 25208-177, filed a motion for a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) with the court after the district court
denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
conviction and sentence. The district court denied Guzman’s motion
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 19-10783
without an evidentiary hearing. It also denied Guzman’s request for
discovery. We granted Guzman’s motion for a COA in part as to the denial
of his § 2255 motion, denied it in part as unnecessary with respect to the
denial of an evidentiary hearing, and held the portion related to the denial of
discovery in abeyance, pending supplemental briefing. We now affirm the
district court’s judgment.
I.
A federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment against
Guzman, alleging that he possessed with intent to distribute 50 grams or
more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine. After the court appointed attorney John Stickels to
represent Guzman, he pleaded not guilty at his initial arraignment hearing.
On re-arraignment, however, he pleaded guilty without a plea agreement
while simultaneously submitting a factual resume. The factual resume
indicated that he possessed approximately 116.8 grams of methamphetamine.
Upon receipt of his factual resume, the district court questioned
whether Guzman understood that he was waiving his right to a jury trial.
After Guzman confirmed that he understood, the court turned to the
penalties Guzman was facing, informing him that the penalties included “[a]
term of imprisonment that would have to be at least 5 years and could be as
much as 40 years.” Guzman—while under oath—confirmed that he
understood the punishment that he was facing. The court accepted his guilty
plea, ordered the preparation of a presentence report (“PSR”), and set a date
for sentencing.
Shortly after re-arraignment, Guzman sent the court, and Stickels,
letters claiming that Stickels coerced him into signing the factual resume. He
also alleged that Stickels instructed him that no additional drug weight would
be attributed to him. The court consequently ordered Guzman and Stickels
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to meet to try to resolve the issues raised in the letter. The court also required
Stickels to file a subsequent report notifying the court of the outcome of that
meeting. Stickels met with Guzman approximately two weeks later. He filed
a report the same day, which represented that all issues were resolved and
that they were preparing for sentencing.
At his sentencing hearing, the district court denied all of Guzman’s
objections to the PSR and its accompanying addendum. The district court
also adopted the addendum’s recommendation to add a two-offense-level
increase for obstruction of justice to Guzman’s total offense level.
Accordingly, the court determined that Guzman’s total offense level was 37,
his criminal history category was VI, and his guideline range was 360 months
to life imprisonment. Because the statutory maximum for a violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) is 40 years, however, his range was capped at 480
months’ imprisonment.
Faced with this range, Guzman requested leniency from the court,
pleading:
I’m guilty and I accept full responsibility. I know what I was
doing was wrong. I’m a grown man, and I know that I’m going
to do a lot of time, and that’s okay, but all I ask is just to please
be lenient with me and given me a chance, 15, 20 years down
the line, to come back home to my wife and kids.
The district court noted Guzman’s request and then sentenced him to 480
months’ imprisonment—the statutory maximum—with 4 years of
supervised release. We affirmed Guzman’s sentence on direct appeal.
United States v. Guzman, 706 F. App’x 836, 837 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1602 (2018).
After his unsuccessful direct appeal, Guzman filed a § 2255 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his conviction and sentence. In his motion,
Guzman claimed that his attorney misled him to believe that: (1) he would
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only be held accountable for 116.8 grams of methamphetamine; and (2) he
was only facing 7 to 15 years’ imprisonment. Guzman asked for an
evidentiary hearing and discovery—specifically, an order to subpoena the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) for audio recordings of phone calls
between him and his attorney—to prove his claims. The government
opposed discovery and argued that the district court could rely on Guzman’s
testimony at the re-arraignment and sentencing hearings to reach its decision.
The district court agreed with the government and denied Guzman’s § 2255
motion without an evidentiary hearing or discovery. It also declined to issue
a COA.
Guzman timely filed a motion for a COA, which we granted in part
with respect to the district court’s denial of his § 2255 motion. We noted
that a COA was not required to appeal the denial of an evidentiary hearing,
and requested briefing on, inter alia: (1) whether a COA is required to appeal
the denial of discovery; and (2) whether the district court abused its
discretion when denying such a request.
II.
We review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de
novo in the § 2255-context. United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 435 (5th
Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Edwards, 442 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir.
2006)). As for the denial of a request for discovery or an evidentiary hearing,
we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Reed, 719 F.3d 369, 373
(5th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted); see Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909
(1997) (“Rule 6(a) makes it clear that the scope and extent of [habeas]
discovery is a matter confided to the discretion of the district court.”
(cleaned up)).
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III.
Guzman claims that the district court erred when it denied his § 2255
motion without discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Because Guzman
cannot establish that any purported deficient performance caused him
prejudice, we affirm the district court’s decision and hold that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in foregoing discovery or an evidentiary
hearing. For the same reason, we refrain from addressing whether a COA is
required to appeal the denial of discovery.
To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a movant must
demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985)
(holding that Strickland applies with equal force in the guilty plea-context).
A movant demonstrates deficient performance by showing “that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at
688. A movant demonstrates prejudice by showing “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Because Strickland
espouses a conjunctive standard, “[a] court need not address both
components of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the movant makes
an insufficient showing on one.” United States v. Stewart, 207 F.3d 750, 751
(5th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
We need not consider whether trial counsel’s performance in this
matter was constitutionally deficient because Guzman’s prejudice showing is
insufficient. Indeed, Guzman cannot establish that, but for trial counsel’s
assumed error, there is a reasonable probability that he would have foregone
a guilty plea and exercised his right to a jury trial. See United States v. Green,
882 F.2d 999, 1002 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted); see also Hill, 474 U.S.
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at 59 (establishing the same standard). Critically, Guzman must substantiate
any preference to proceed to trial—if he had been properly advised on the
sentence he was facing—with “contemporaneous evidence,” not post hoc
assertions. United States v. Lozano, 757 F. App’x 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2018)
(per curiam) (quoting Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2017)); see
also United States v. McClinton, 782 F. App’x 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2019) (per
curiam) (“[C]ontemporaneous evidence is the key.” (quotation omitted)).
Guzman fails to carry his burden.
Guzman concedes the well-known refrain that “[s]olemn declarations
in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 74 (1997). Nevertheless, he asks us to discount two sworn
statements he made at re-arraignment and sentencing. First, at re-
arraignment, the district court explicitly informed Guzman that, by pleading
guilty, he was subjecting himself to a range of 5 to 40 years’ imprisonment.
Under oath, Guzman testified that he understood the ramifications of his
plea. Now, however, Guzman asserts that he had “nothing to lose by going
to trial, and everything to gain.”
Second, at sentencing, Guzman, having had the benefit of reviewing
his PSR and the guideline range he was facing, failed to object to the sentence
he now claims he would not have willingly faced. Then, when given the
opportunity to address the court after the court stated the range he was
facing, Guzman admitted his guilt, apologized, and requested a 15 to 20-year
sentence rather than a 40-year sentence. Despite this colloquy, Guzman
claims that we should disregard his prior sworn statements because it was
Stickel’s misrepresentations that caused him to forgo trial. We are
unpersuaded.
Guzman was instructed multiple times that he was facing a maximum
sentence of 40 years’ imprisonment. He was not only informed of this
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reality, he expressly affirmed, under oath, that he understood his prospective
sentence. Tellingly, when given the chance to speak for himself to the court,
Guzman did not argue that he misunderstood the sentence he was facing
when he pleaded guilty, nor did he claim that his sentence was
misrepresented to him. Indeed, he did not even resurrect his claim that he
signed his factual resume under coercion. On the contrary, Guzman
accepted responsibility for his actions and pleaded for a sentence near the 20-
year mark. Curiously, requesting a 20-year sentence diverges from his new
claim that he was under the impression that he would only face 7 to 15 years’
imprisonment. Simply put, Guzman’s assertion that he would have gone to
trial but for counsel’s supposed errors is belied by the record. We will not
“upset [Guzman’s] plea solely because of [his] post hoc assertions[.]”
Lozano, 757 F. App’x at 353 (emphasis and quotation omitted); see also
McClinton, 782 F. App’x at 314 (noting that the court generally will “not
allow a defendant to contradict testimony given under oath at a plea
hearing”).
IV.
Finally, we address Guzman’s claim that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion without discovery or an evidentiary hearing.
Given the record before it, we hold that the district did not abuse its
discretion in denying either request.
“A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his § 2255
motion only if he presents ‘independent indicia of the likely merit of [his]
allegations.’” Reed, 719 F.3d at 373 (citing Cavitt, 550 F.3d at 442). To
contradict sworn testimony, we generally require more than a “mere
contradiction of [] statements”; rather, we typically seek “specific factual
allegations supported by the affidavit of a reliable third person.” United
States v. Raetzsch, 781 F.2d 1149, 1151 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Fuller,
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769 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1985). “[S]peculative and unsupported
accusations of government wrongdoing do not entitle a defendant to an
evidentiary hearing.” Reed, 719 F.3d at 373 (citation omitted). Guzman
provided no independent indicia of the merits of his claim to warrant a
hearing. Instead, he provided conclusory allegations, supported only by his
own affidavit, which were inconsistent with the bulk of the record—including
his prior sworn testimony—before the court. United States v. Cervantes, 132
F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998).
Similarly, Guzman failed to demonstrate that the district court’s
decision to deny § 2255 discovery was reasonably debatable. 1 Like the
requirements for an evidentiary hearing, Guzman was required to make
specific allegations of fact, not speculative or conclusory statements. Murphy
v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 2000). But Guzman fell short again
as he did not offer the district court specific facts to support his request.
1
We requested supplemental briefing on whether a COA is required to appeal the
denial of § 2255 discovery. Our precedent is anything but clear on the matter. Compare
Young v. Stephens, 795 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir. 2015) (“A COA is not required to review the
district court’s ruling on a non-merits issue[.]” (citation omitted)), and Smith v. Kelly, 301
F. App’x 375, 376 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (stating, in an unpublished case, that a COA
is unnecessary to appeal the denial of a request for discovery), with United States v. Fields,
761 F.3d 443, 484 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[W]e deny a COA on Fields’s claim concerning his
entitlement to discovery[.]”), and Reed v. Quarterman, 555 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 2009)
(noting that the court granted a COA as to “whether Reed is entitled to additional
discovery”). We do not need to answer this open question now, however. If a COA is
required to appeal the denial of a motion for § 2255 discovery, Guzman did not present a
reasonably debatable claim. See Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 774 (2017). Likewise, if a
COA is not required and Guzman could proceed on direct appeal, he failed to establish the
good cause required under Rule 6(a) to merit discovery. See Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d
809, 814 (5th Cir. 2000). Because Guzman cannot meet either standard, and because our
precedent is unclear on whether a COA is required, our analysis assumes—without
deciding—that a COA is required.
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Guzman alleged that discovery would have uncovered Stickels’
apparent guilty plea misguidance. To support such a claim, Guzman could
have provided the court with, among other things, information like dates,
times, the scope of the conversations, the terms of the promises or
misstatements, and/or why the BOP would have recorded or transcribed
privileged conversations. But Guzman provided none of the above. Instead,
Guzman merely claimed that he had “reason to believe” that the BOP
possessed transcripts and/or recordings that would prove his point. He
offered no statements concerning when Stickel’s supposed misstatements
occurred or the scope of any purported promises. Cervantes, 132 F.3d at 1110.
Even worse, the little support that Guzman provided—that the statements
concerning his potential sentence were given over the phone while he was in
BOP custody—was contradicted by evidence that he was in the custody of
the U.S. Marshals, not the BOP.
Given this record, the district court’s decision to deny discovery is not
reasonably debatable; therefore, Guzman is not entitled to a COA on the
matter. Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 774 (“Of course when a court of appeals properly
applies the COA standard and determines that a prisoner’s claim is not even
debatable, that necessarily means the prisoner has failed to show that his
claim is meritorious.”).
AFFIRMED.
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