United States v. Jennifer Vanmeter

Case: 16-11184 Document: 00514005169 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/24/2017
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
No. 16-11184
Fifth Circuit
FILED
Summary Calendar May 24, 2017
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
versus
JENNIFER LOUISE VANMETER,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:15-CR-442-1
Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Jennifer Vanmeter was convicted of being a felon in possession of a
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Case: 16-11184 Document: 00514005169 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/24/2017
No. 16-11184
firearm and appeals her within-guidelines sentence of 46 months of impris-
onment and two years of supervised release. She contends that the court erred
by calculating her sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) and designating
her Texas conviction of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as a quali-
fying crime of violence (“COV”) as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 (2015). We
review de novo whether the district court properly characterized a conviction
as a COV. United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197, 198 (5th Cir. 2007).
Although Vanmeter contends that her Texas conviction does not consti-
tute generic aggravated assault, she concedes correctly that her challenge in
that regard is foreclosed by Guillen-Alvarez, id. at 200–01. See also United
States v. Villasenor-Ortiz, No. 16-10366, __ F. App’x __, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS
491, at *5 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2017) (per curiam) (reaffirming the continued valid-
ity of Guillen-Alvarez in the wake of Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243
(2016)). Vanmeter also avers that aggravated assault is no longer an enumer-
ated offense under § 4B1.2 because Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551
(2015), also invalidated § 4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause. In Beckles v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 886, 892 (2017), the Court held that Johnson’s holding was
not applicable to the definition of a COV in § 4B1.2(a)(2) because the guidelines
are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause. Beck-
les therefore effectively forecloses Vanmeter’s theory based on Johnson.
Accordingly, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
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