Willridge v. Barnhart

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-30403
Summary Calendar
CHARLES WILLRIDGE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANNE B. BARNHART,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 01-CV-95
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November 21, 2002
Before DAVIS, WIENER, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Charles Willridge appeals from the district court’s judgment
affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying his disability benefits claim under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision to deny disability
benefits, this court must determine whether there is substantial
evidence in the record to support it and whether the proper legal
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 02-30403
-2-
standards were used in evaluating the evidence. Bowling v.
Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994).
Willridge first avers that the administrative law judge
(ALJ) applied an incorrect legal standard to determine whether
his nonexertional impairments, major depression, illiteracy, and
borderline intellectual functioning, were severe and improperly
rejected his consultative examiner’s opinion that his
rehabilitation potential was severely limited due to his mental
impairments.
Willridge did not argue in the district court that the ALJ
failed to apply the correct legal standard in determining whether
his mental impairments were severe, and he has failed to show
exceptional circumstances to warrant review by this court. See
Kinash v. Callahan, 129 F.3d 736, 739 n.10 (5th Cir. 1997).
The ALJ properly rejected the consultative examiner’s
opinion of disability because it was inconsistent with the
examiner’s own clinical findings as well as other objective
medical evidence in the record. See Bradley v. Bowen, 809 F.2d
1054, 1057 (5th Cir. 1987). The evidence showed that Willridge
had never received treatment for his mental impairments and that
no doctor ever opined that his alleged mental impairments were
disabling. See Vaughan v. Shalala, 58 F.3d 129, 132 (5th Cir.
1995). Moreover, Willridge’s ability to effectively communicate,
work for years with below-average intelligence, and perform the
No. 02-30403
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activities of normal daily life weigh against his allegations
that he suffered disabling mental impairments.
Willridge avers that the ALJ erred in relying on the medical
vocational guidelines to determine that he was capable of
performing medium work. As discussed above, the ALJ properly
determined that Willridge’s allegations of significant impairment
due to his nonexertional mental impairments were not credible to
the extent alleged and, as such, did not significantly affect
Willridge’s ability to perform medium work. Thus, the ALJ was
entitled to rely exclusively on the medical vocational guidelines
in finding no disability. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618
(5th Cir. 1990).
Willridge, relying on Watson v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 212 (5th
Cir. 2002), argues that the case should be remanded because the
ALJ failed to make any finding that he is able to maintain
employment. Watson does not dictate a remand under the
circumstances of the instant case as Willridge presented no
evidence indicating that he could not work on a sustained basis.
Because Willridge has failed to show that the Commissioner’s
decision was not based on the proper legal standards or that it
was not supported by substantial evidence, the decision of the
district court affirming the denial of benefits is AFFIRMED.