Flatt v. City of Lancaster

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-11083
Summary Calendar
FAYE NELL FLATT, executrix
of the estate of Johnny Dee Flatt,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF LANCASTER; E. R. BEAMAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:98-CV-2945-M
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July 31, 2001
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Faye Nell Flatt, executrix of the estate of Johnny Dee Flatt
(decedent), appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment for the defendants.
Flatt argues that a dispute exists as to a material fact
affecting the legal analysis for the issues of excessive force,
qualified immunity, and substantive due process. She contends
that the district court erred in concluding that it was
undisputed that the decedent pointed his handgun at Officer E.R.
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 00-11083
-2-
Beaman before Beaman fatally shot the decedent. Our independent
review of the summary-judgment evidence fails to reveal a genuine
dispute of a material fact. Witnesses to the shooting, Roderick
Singleton and Matthew Holman, indicated through written
statements, declarations, and depositions that the decedent
pointed his firearm at Beaman and that Beaman then fired.
Singleton’s version of events does not support the appellant’s
theory that Beaman initially shot the decedent in the back.
Singleton’s testimony contradicts the statements and testimony
from the other eyewitnesses in only a minor respect: Singleton’s
description of the position of the three officers and the
decedent placed the officers at a slightly different angle in
relation to the decedent’s vehicle from the descriptions given by
Holman or the officers.
“[A] claim for excessive force in violation of the
Constitution requires (1) an injury (2) which resulted directly
and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the
need and (3) the force used was objectively unreasonable.”
Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.), clarified on
reh’g, 186 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1999). From the undisputed
material facts of the encounter between the decedent and the
officers, we conclude that the force used by Beaman was
objectively reasonable, and Beaman is entitled to qualified
immunity. See Colston v. Barnhart, 130 F.3d 96, 99-100 (5th Cir.
1997).
To the extent that the appellant argues that substantive due
process was violated by the shooting of the decedent, substantive
No. 00-11083
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due process was not implicated by the tragic events of February
28, 1998. “[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used
excessive force . . . in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard
. . . .” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-44 (1998).
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
for the defendants.
AFFIRMED.