Williams v. Office Depot, Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-50373
Summary Calendar
DAVID J. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
OFFICE DEPOT, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(SA-99-CV-1188)
October 9, 2002
Before BARKSDALE, DEMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
David J. Williams appeals the summary judgment awarded Office
Depot, Inc., on his two Title VII claims: employment
discrimination and retaliatory discharge. Summary judgments are
reviewed de novo. E.g., Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC,
277 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2001). No authority need be cited for
such judgment being proper if there are no material fact issues and
the non-movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A prima facie case for race discrimination requires plaintiff
prove: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he was
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
qualified for his former job; (3) he was discharged; and (4) after
his discharge, his former position was filled by someone not within
the protected class. E.g., Singh v. Shoney’s, Inc., 64 F.3d 217,
219 (5th Cir. 1995). If plaintiff establishes the prima facie
case, defendant must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for discharge. Id. at 219. If defendant does so, plaintiff
must show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the reason is
pretextual. Id.Williams maintains erroneously that the Supreme Court held in
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000),
that, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs are only
required to show by some evidence that the defendant’s reason for
discharge was false. The Reeves Court noted: “[T]here will be
instances where, although the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the
defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that
the action was discriminatory”. Id. at 148. Vadie v. Mississippi
State Univ., 218 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2000), elaborated on Reeves,
stating that a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only if the
evidence, taken as a whole: “(1) creates a fact issue as to whether
each of the employer's stated reasons was what actually motivated
the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that [the
alleged discriminatory conduct] was a determinative factor in the
actions of which plaintiff complains.” Id. at 373 n. 23 (emphasis
added; quoting Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993-94
(5th Cir. 1996)).
2
Williams lied on his employment application concerning his
criminal history. Given the investigation of Williams’ possible
theft of Office Depot goods, Office Depot chose to terminate him
for lying on the application. We conclude, as did the district
court: even if Williams proved a prima facie case, and viewed in
the light most favoring Williams, the record fails to create
material fact issues surrounding Office Depot’s reason for
termination. The record also fails to show that race was a
determinative factor in Office Depot’s decision.
A prima facie case for retaliatory discharge requires Williams
to show: (1) his participation in activity protected by Title VII;
(2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection
between his participation in the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. E.g., Holt v. JTM Industries, Inc., 89 F.3d
1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996). Williams fails to do so. Even if the
first two prongs are met, he fails to show that, “but for” his
filing an EEOC charge against Office Depot, he would not have been
terminated. See, e.g., Scrivner v. Socorro Independent School
District, 169 F.3d 969, 972 (5th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED
3