Knox v. City of Gautier

Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
December 7, 2021
No. 21-60259
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Robert Zak Knox,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
City of Gautier; Brandon Price, individually and in his official
capacity; Jeffrey Jensen, individually and in his official capacity,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 1:18-CV-220
Before King, Costa, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Robert Zak Knox appeals the judgment of the district court dismissing
his excessive force claims against the defendants-appellees. For the following
reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
I. Factual and Procedural Background
A. Factual Background
We begin by recounting the factual background as described in Robert
Zak Knox’s allegations and shown in Officer Brandon Price’s body-camera
footage.
1. The Allegations
On the evening of December 21, 2016, in Gautier, Mississippi, Knox
heard his neighbor screaming for help. He went to assist and found that his
neighbor’s adult son had committed suicide—Knox then called 911. Gautier
police officers Brandon Price and Jeffrey Jensen arrived at the scene to
investigate; the officers were acting under a standard operating procedure
that required that they treat the incident as a homicide until the crime scene
was secured. The officers entered the home.
The parties dispute what happened next. Knox claims that he
approached the officers hoping to assist, but they yelled at him to stay
outside. He asked that an officer come outside to talk to him. The officers
then closed the door in Knox’s face, causing him to ask if they had a warrant
to be inside the home. Then, Knox states that he started to walk away from
the door when the officers suddenly rushed at him. He began to back away
while the officers shouted at him to get off the property, but before he could,
they placed “Knox in an arm bar . . . [took] Knox to the ground . . . [and]
tazed [Knox] multiple times.” He alleges they did this despite his compliance
with their orders “as soon as [he] was on the ground.” The defendants
contest this interpretation, instead relying on Officer Price’s body-camera
footage.
2
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
2. The Body-Camera Footage
The district court recounted the following events based on its view of
what Officer Price’s camera recorded. After the officers entered the home
and told Knox to stay outside,
[i]nstead of complying with [the] officers’ instructions to
remain outside the home . . . the video reveals that Mr. Knox
repeatedly tried to enter the house and ask the officers to speak
with him. It is clear from the video that Mr. Knox does not
comply with several instructions to leave the premises.
Eventually, Officer Jensen approaches Mr. Knox and
tries to arrest him, but Mr. Knox resists those efforts. Officer
Price begins to assist, and one of the officers instructs Mr.
Knox to stop resisting. Mr. Knox can be heard yelling “I’m
calm” and making similar outbursts, but the video depicts that
he does not cooperate with the officers. Mr. Knox struggles and
shouts, “this is illegal,” and “I know my rights!” The officers
instruct Mr. Knox to calm down, and when he does not, Officer
Jensen appears to deploy his taser. Another individual, whom
it turns out is an off-duty police officer from a different police
jurisdiction and is not in uniform (the “Biloxi officer”),
approaches and inquires if the officers need help. One of the
Gautier officers replies in the affirmative, and all three officers
struggle to restrain Mr. Knox. One officer shouts multiple
times for Mr. Knox to put his hands behind his back, and once
the officers are able to place Mr. Knox on his stomach, he
continues to struggle as they try to handcuff him behind his
back.
3
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
At the approximate timestamp of 21:48:32 on the video,
Mr. Knox is finally handcuffed behind his back. Officer Jensen
immediately stands up and walks away from Mr. Knox and
toward the decedent’s house, leaving only the Biloxi officer
and Officer Price with Mr. Knox. Mr. Knox states that he
“can’t breath,” and the officers tell him numerous times to
calm down and relax. The Biloxi officer rolls Mr. Knox onto his
side and directs him to concentrate on his breathing, and then
helps Mr. Knox up into a seated position on the ground.
A third unidentified uniformed Gautier officer (the
“third officer”) arrives, and Officer Price leaves Mr. Knox
handcuffed in the seated position with the third officer and the
Biloxi officer. Mr. Knox can be heard continuing to shout while
seated in the yard, but at this point Officers Price and Jensen
are near the front door of the home and nowhere near Mr.
Knox. After taking about 20 seconds to catch his breath,
Officer Price returns to the yard where Mr. Knox is seated, as
Mr. Knox continues to shout about the handcuffs, not being
able to breath, and his living across the street.
At this point, the Biloxi officer appears to be the only
one with his hands on Mr. Knox, and he helps Mr. Knox stand
by placing his hands under Mr. Knox’s arms. The Biloxi officer
then assists Mr. Knox in the direction of a marked police
vehicle, and the third officer eventually takes over and walks
Mr. Knox to the patrol car. At this point Officer Price is
apparently beside them as he walks toward the vehicle as well.
Once outside the patrol car, Mr. Knox is bent over near
the trunk of the car, with his hands handcuffed behind his back,
4
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
as the third officer has his right arm under Mr. Knox’s left arm.
Officer Price appears to open the back door of the car. The
third officer places Mr. Knox in the backseat of the car, and
Officer Price’s body camera reflects that he walks away from
the vehicle while speaking with the Biloxi Officer. Officer Price
returns to Mr. Knox’s neighbor’s home, where Officer Jensen
is waiting for him.
The record does not reflect any further interactions between the defendant-
officers and Knox.
B. Procedural Background
1. Criminal Proceedings
After this incident, Knox was charged and convicted of disorderly
conduct and resisting arrest in the Gautier Municipal Court under
Mississippi Code Annotated §§ 97-35-7 and 97-9-73 respectively. Knox
appealed his convictions to the County Court of Jackson County, Mississippi,
which affirmed, and then to the Circuit Court of Jackson County,
Mississippi, which also affirmed.
The circuit court explained: “[I]t is clear that Knox’s actions may
have led to a breach of the peace. Knox had to be subdued by two officers
with one deploying his taser and one off-duty officer. The Court finds those
circumstances satisfy the elements of obstructing or resisting lawful arrest.”
The circuit court further credited the testimony of the officers, who testified
that, “Jensen attempted to detain Knox by placing handcuffs on him at which
point Knox resisted. Knox began thrashing around and yelling at the officers
that what they were doing was illegal” and that “[d]espite Knox’s claim that
he was not resisting . . . his actions were non-compliant. Officer Price felt it
necessary to use the drive-stun feature of his taser to subdue Knox. Knox
5
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
continued to resist. . . . It took all three officers to detain Knox.” These
convictions remain final and valid.
2. Civil Proceedings
While his criminal appeals were ongoing, Knox filed a civil suit in
Mississippi state court against the City of Gautier and Officers Price and
Jensen (collectively, the “defendants”). The defendants removed the case to
the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, which stayed the
case pending resolution of the criminal appeals. On May 8, 2020—after the
circuit court affirmed the convictions—the district court lifted the stay. Knox
proceeded to file an amended complaint claiming that the defendants
violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for use of
excessive force, as well as various state-law claims. Knox further claimed that
the City of Gautier violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to train and supervise
the officers.
The defendants all filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They argued that the excessive force claims were
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The officers also claimed
that, in the alternative, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district
court treated these motions as ones for summary judgment under Rule 56,
then dismissed the federal claims and remanded the state-law claims to state
court.
First, the district court concluded that any pre-restraint excessive
force claims brought by Knox conflicted with his resisting-arrest conviction
and were barred by Heck. Turning to the post-restraint claims—wherein
Knox claimed that the officers “continued to taser, push, and kneel on him,
and twisted his arms over his head, injuring his shoulder”—the district court
explained that the body-camera footage clearly discredited Knox’s version of
events. Relying on the footage, the court concluded that there was no post-
6
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
restraint excessive force. The court first explained that when the officers
were applying the force at issue, “there was no ‘cessation’ of the misconduct
which supported Mr. Knox’s convictions.” Second, it found that once the
officers did successfully restrain Knox (and thus ended his resisting arrest),
there was no evidence that Officer Jensen had any contact with Knox and no
evidence that Officer Price exerted any significant force on Knox. In the
alternative, the court held, the two were entitled to qualified immunity.
Finally, the court found that Knox failed to state an excessive force claim or
a failure-to-train-or-supervise claim against the City of Gautier. 1 Knox moved
for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Now, he timely appeals.
Knox challenges the district court’s holdings that (1) the video was
sufficiently clear to discredit his factual allegations; (2) Heck barred his
claims of excessive force prior to his being handcuffed; and (3) the officers
would be entitled to qualified immunity should Heck not apply. 2
II. Standard of Review
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.”
Aguirre v. City of San Antonio, 995 F.3d 395, 405 (5th Cir. 2021). “Summary
judgment is appropriate ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.’ ” Darden v. City of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 727 (5th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
1
Knox does not appeal the judgments regarding these claims, so we do not further
address them.
2
Because we affirm that Knox’s claims are barred by Heck, we do not reach the
district court’s alternative holding based on qualified immunity.
7
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
III. Analysis
Knox argues that the district court erred by applying Heck to bar
claims arising from all acts of force prior to his being handcuffed rather than
just the acts of force prior to his being wrestled to the ground. 3
Knox contends that the district court erred in holding that Heck barred
any excessive force claims until after he was handcuffed. In Heck v.
Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that “when a state prisoner seeks
damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction
or sentence.” 512 U.S. at 487. If so, “the complaint must be dismissed unless
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.” Id. If the conviction may co-exist with the § 1983 claim,
however, Heck is no bar to suit. See id.; Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th
420, 426-27 (5th Cir. 2021). A claim and conviction may co-exist if they are
“temporally and conceptually distinct.” Poole, 13 F.4th at 426-27 (quoting
Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008)). “Accordingly, a claim that
excessive force occurred after the arrestee has ceased his or her resistance
would not necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction for the earlier
resistance.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498 (5th Cir. 2008).
Knox contends that his resisting-arrest conviction started and ended
the moment he first “pulled away” from the officers. By the time he was on
the ground, he had completely “given himself up.” Therefore, he argues, the
3
Knox also contends that the district court erred when it applied Scott v. Harris to
the body-camera footage to discredit his allegation that he had ceased resisting arrest by the
time he was pushed, tased, and twisted. Because we find the district court correctly found
that Heck bars Knox’s claims, we do not reach Knox’s alternative argument.
8
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
district court erred by finding that the resisting-arrest conviction was
premised on all of Knox’s conduct up to and until getting handcuffed.
Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2020), provides an archetypal
framework for examining a temporal argument like this one. There, the
plaintiff, Aucoin, was found guilty of defiance, aggravated disobedience, and
property destruction related to misconduct within his prison cell. Id. at 381.
He then brought excessive force claims against the guards who detained him.
Id. First, he alleged that the guards “ ‘snuck up’ on him and sprayed him
with a chemical agent” while he was in his cell. Id. Second, he alleged that,
after he was removed from his cell, the guards took him to the showers and
“maced” and beat him. Id. Applying Heck, we barred claims arising from the
first incident but not the second. Id. Regarding the first incident, we
explained that the underlying convictions were because:
Aucoin disregarded repeated, direct orders . . . . He screamed
profanities at the officers. He attempted to force a paper gown
down the sink in an effort to flood the cell. And he spat in [an
officer’s] face. Only after the prisoner repeatedly refused to
cooperate voluntarily did [an officer] deploy a one-second
burst of chemical agent into the cell before restraining him.
Id. We found that because Aucoin was claiming the guards had snuck up on
him, he was continuing to maintain his innocence. Id. at 383. That is to say,
if we accepted that allegation as true, it would undermine and negate the facts
that sustained his convictions. Id. Thus, it was Heck barred. See id. On the
other hand, his second claim was premised on events that took place entirely
outside of his cell and after the misconduct that supported his convictions
had ceased. Id. at 383-84. Therefore, it was a temporally and conceptually
distinct claim and could survive. Id.; see also Bush, 513 F.3d at 495, 498-99(finding an excessive force claim distinct when plaintiff alleged that a
9
Case: 21-60259 Document: 00516120625 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/07/2021
No. 21-60259
detective pushed her head through the rear window of a car after she was
already arrested for resisting arrest and was otherwise compliant with the
officers).
Here, like the first incident in Aucoin, we cannot accept Knox’s
contention that his misconduct started and ended when he initially pulled
away from the officers without also implying that his state-court convictions
are invalid. The circuit court did not rest its affirmance of Knox’s convictions
only on the fact that he pulled away from the officers, but also on his behavior
once on the ground. The court took particular note of the fact that an officer
believed he had to tase Knox to halt him and the fact that Knox was not
detained until all three officers were involved—none of which occurred prior
to Knox’s being wrestled to the ground. Because the circuit court deemed
Knox’s on-the-ground conduct to be part and parcel of his conviction for
resisting arrest, we cannot conclude that the officer’s on-the-ground
reactions were either temporally or conceptually distinct from his conviction.
Cf. Bush, 513 F.3d at 498. Therefore, the district court did not err.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
10