Jones v. Kerrville State Hospital

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
NO. 97-50321
Summary Calendar
CORA JEAN JONES
Plaintiff-Appellee,
VERSUS
KERRVILLE STATE HOSPITAL; TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL
HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION; GLORIA P. OLSEN PH.D., in her
individual and official capacities; EDWARD BASKIN, in his
individual and official capacities; LARUE HAWKINS, in her
individual and official capacities; BERYL BOERNER, in her
individual and official capacities,
Defendants,
KERRVILLE STATE HOSPITAL; TEXAS DEPARTMENT
OF MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
June 4, 1998
Before JOLLY, BENAVIDES and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
I.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff-Appellee, Cora Jean Jones, was employed as an LVN at
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the Kerrville State Hospital (“Kerrville”), a facility operated by
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation
(“TDMHMR”) for the care and treatment of the mentally ill. Upon
being hired at Kerrville, Jones was required to complete a course
of training in the Prevention and Management of Aggressive Behavior
(“PMAB”), followed by a yearly refresher course. PMAB training
included a physical portion, wherein employees were trained to use
the weight and force of the patient to subdue them with the least
risk of harm to the employee or patient. This portion of the PMAB
training was known as the “mats” portion, because it was conducted
on padded mats.
Upon being hired at Kerrville in September, 1992, Jones took
the PMAB training course. She informed her instructors that she
could not participate in the “mats” portion, because she had
physical limitations caused by surgical treatments of
osteoarthritis and degenerative joint disease.1 She was not
required to participate in the “mats” portion, and yet her
employment records reflect that she completed PMAB training.
In March, 1993, Jones was asked to transfer to another ward to
cover for an LVN who had not been able to complete the “mats”
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Jones and her physician, Dr. James Mitchell, testified that Jones
had osteoarthritis and degenerative joint disease which had been treated
with surgery on each shoulder and a cervical laminectomy. Dr. Mitchell
testified that Jones had a maximum 45 degree rotation of her neck, which
she demonstrated on the stand, limited function and weakness in raising her
arms over her head, and limited strength and mobility in her arms. Dr.
Mitchell testified that Jones was limited in her ability to push, pull,
lift and carry objects and that these limitations were permanent.
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portion of PMAB. She notified the supervisor that she too had not
been able to complete the “mats” portion of PMAB training. Jones’
case was presented to the hospital’s Americans with Disabilities
Committee on Jones’ request for an accomodation, i.e., exemption
from the “mats” portion of PMAB. Jones’ immediate supervisor,
Barbara Gotcher, stated on a form submitted to the ADA committee
that Jones’ disability “[did] not affect safety of individuals
served, [did] not affect personal safety, and [did] not affect
safety of co-workers.” Dr. Mitchell also submitted a statement
indicating that Jones could perform the duties of her current
position. Jones testified at trial that during her time at
Kerrville, she never saw the techniques taught in the “mats”
portion actually used. The ADA committee took no action on Jones’
request for accomodation. She heard nothing further from the ADA
committee and she was allowed to remain at her original position
until September, 1993, when it came time for Jones to participate
in the PMAB refresher course. Again she could not participate in
the “mats” portion. After a consultation with Beryl Boerner,
Director of Nurses, Jones was notified on October 29, 1993, that
she could no longer work in a direct-care position.2 On November
3, 1993, Jones was placed on leave without pay.
Jones sued under the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. §12101, et seq. The case against Kerrville and TDMHMR went
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At the time of her removal from direct care, Jones was working in
the geriatric ward.
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to the jury on special interrogatories. The jury found “that
successful completion of the more physical aspects of PMAB training
is an essential function of the position of licensed vocational
nurse at Kerrville State Hospital.” The jury then found “that an
exemption from completion of the more physical aspects of PMAB
training would be a reasonable accomodation of Plaintiff Cora Jean
Jones’ disability.” The jury awarded Jones $25,000 in compensatory
damages.
Jones filed a motion for equitable relief (injunctive relief,
back pay and front pay in lieu of reinstatement), and motion for
attorney’s fees and costs. Defendants opposed Jones’ motion for
equitable relief and filed their own Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion
for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, motion for
new trial. The district court denied Defendants’ Rule 60(b) motion
and Jones’ request for injunctive relief. The district court
granted Jones’ motion for back pay and front pay “in specific
amounts to be determined by future Court order.” The district
court directed Jones to file an advisory “detailing the amount of
back pay requested[,] ... recalculating that amount to the date of
this judgment” and “also contain[ing] a detailed breakdown of all
components of Plaintiff’s request for front pay and specify[ing]
the manner in which that request has been calculated.” Finally,
the district court granted Jones’ motion for attorney’s fees and
costs.
Jones filed a Supplemental Motion for Equitable Relief,
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Advisory for Back Pay and Front Pay and Supplemental Motion for
Attorney’s Fees. Defendants filed their objections. Then, before
the district court could rule on Jones’ supplemental motions,
Defendants filed a notice of appeal challenging the denial of their
Rule 60(b) motion, the award of back pay and front pay, and the
award of attorney’s fees. Subsequent to the filing of this appeal,
the district court entered its order establishing the exact amounts
of front pay and back pay awarded to Jones. Jones has filed a
motion to supplement the record with the district court’s order
establishing the exact amounts of front and back pay. That motion
is granted, and therefore we need not address Appellee’s motion to
dismiss for lack of a final order.
II.
LAW & ANALYSIS
“A motion for judgment as a matter of law ... in an action
tried by jury is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.” Harrington v. Harris, 118
F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 1997), quoting Hiltgen v. Sumrall, 47 F.3d
695, 699 (5th Cir. 1995). “On review of the district court’s
denial of such a motion, the appellate court uses the same standard
to review the verdict that the district court used in first passing
on the motion,” i.e., “[a] jury verdict must be upheld unless
‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable
jury to find’ as the jury did.” Id. citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 50
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(a)(1).
Special Interrogatory Number two asked the jury to determine
whether “successful completion of the more physical aspects [“mats”
portion] of PMAB training is an essential function of the position
of licensed vocational nurse at Kerrville State Hospital.” The
jury held that it was. Special Interrogatory Number three then
asked the jury to determine whether “an exemption from completion
of the more physical aspects of PMAB training would be a reasonable
accomodation of Plaintiff Cora Jean Jones’ disability.” The jury
held that it would be. Even given the highly deferential standard
stated above, the verdict in this case is fatally flawed.
As a matter of law, it is an unreasonable accomodation for the
employer to have to exempt the employee from performance of an
essential function of the job. See Barber v. Nabors, 130 F.3d 702,
709 (5th Cir. 1997)(“We cannot say that [the employee] can perform
the essential functions of the job with reasonable accomodation, if
the only successful accomodation is for [the employee] not to
perform those essential functions”). The ADA protects disabled
persons who are “otherwise qualified”. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To be
otherwise qualified, the disabled person must be able to perform
the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable
accomodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). If the disabled person must be
exempted from performance of an essential function of the job, then
she is not otherwise qualified and not protected by the ADA. As it
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stands, the jury clearly found that Kerrville violated the ADA by
failing to make an accomodation that is unreasonable as a matter of
law. Exemption from the “mats” portion was not a reasonable
accomodation and that alone is enough to overturn the finding of
liability in this case. The only question which remains is whether
this Court should remand this case for a new trial or render it
here and now. We conclude that we must render for defendants.
Jones built her entire case on two premises; 1) that the
“mats” portion of PMAB is not an essential function of the job; and
2) it is a reasonable accomodation for Jones to be exempted from
“mats”. The jury decided the first point against Jones, holding
that “mats” was an essential function of her job. The evidence
clearly supports the jury’s finding, implicit in their response to
Special Interrogatory Number two, that “mats” was an essential
function of Jones’ job. As we mentioned, supra, as a matter of law
that holding forecloses the possibility of exemption from the
“mats” portion as an accomodation. Jones presented no proof that
she could have performed the “mats” portion with reasonable
accomodation. Accordingly, she did not demonstrate that she is an
otherwise qualified individual--that is, that she is capable of
performing the essential functions of the direct care LVN position
with or without reasonable accomodation--and she is thus not
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entitled to recover under the ADA.3
III.
CONCLUSION
To remedy the shortcomings of this verdict, we see no
alternative but to reverse and render for defendants. Accordingly,
the district court’s award of back pay, front pay, attorney’s fees
and costs to plaintiff is vacated.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
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We express no opinion whether it would have been a reasonable
accomodation to reassign Jones to a non-direct care LVN position at
Kerrville where the “mats” portion was not an essential function, because
Jones did not pursue that possibility at trial.
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