United States v. Young

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-60029
Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CHARLES L. YOUNG;
TYRONE EUGENE GREEN,
Defendants-Appellants.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:98-CR-10-2-WS
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December 15, 1999
Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Charles L. Young and Tyrone Eugene Green appeal their
convictions following a jury trial for armed bank robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), and for using and
carrying a firearm in relation to a bank robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
Their argument that the district court erred in denying
their motion to suppress the testimony of Government witnesses
because the Government procured the testimony with promises of
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 99-60029
-2-
more lenient sentences, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2), is
foreclosed by United States v. Haese, 162 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1795 (1999). The appellants’
argument that the district court erred in denying their motion
for a mistrial is also without merit.
The denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Coveney, 995 F.2d 578, 584 (5th
Cir. 1993). The appellants contend that, if Juror No. 17, who
was excused by the trial judge after the jury had been selected,
had been honest in her answers during voir dire, they would have
been able to challenge her for cause and would have been able to
use their alternate strike to challenge Juror No. 34, whom they
contend was unfavorable to them. However, the appellants chose
to exercise all of their peremptory strikes prior to reaching
Juror No. 34, and an earlier dismissal for cause of Juror No. 17
would have had no effect on the number of peremptory strikes they
had or used.
To the extent that the appellants argue that their Sixth
Amendment rights were violated by having a juror serve who should
have been excused for cause, the argument is without merit
because they did not challenge the juror for cause nor do they
allege that he was biased or incapable of performing his duties
in accordance with his instructions and oath. See Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
The appellants have failed to demonstrate any error on the
district court’s part. Accordingly, the district court’s
judgments are AFFIRMED.