Harris v. Warden La St Pen

Revised September 8, 1998
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-31220
ARCHIE HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana
August 24, 1998
Before GARWOOD, DUHÉ and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Archie Harris (Harris) appeals the
district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief as to his Louisiana
attempted second degree murder conviction. Harris raises two
issues: (1) an erroneous jury instruction deprived him of due
process and (2) trial counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous
instruction and failure to correctly present the issue to the jury
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the
district court’s denial of relief.
Facts and Proceedings Below
Harris is currently serving a 45-year sentence at hard labor
in the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola for the attempted
second degree murder of Jackie Jackson (Jackson).
On October 3, 1984, Jackson accepted a ride from Harris, with
whom she was acquainted. Together with Joseph Hunter, Jr.
(Hunter), who was also a passenger in Harris’s car, they went to a
baseball park in Logansport, Louisiana, where they drank alcohol
and smoked marihuana. Later, Jackson and Harris drove away alone,
leaving Hunter at the ball park.
Jackson testified at trial that after they left the ball park,
Harris demanded that she give him a ring that she was wearing.
Upon her refusal, he hit her several times and demanded that she
have sex with him, which she also refused. He then hit her some
more, but eventually agreed to take her to her home in Longstreet,
Louisiana. When they arrived at her home, Jackson attempted to
leave the car, but Harris grabbed her and began stabbing her with
a knife in the chest, face, neck, and abdomen. Jackson broke free
and ran, but Harris grabbed her and placed her in the back seat of
his car.
Harris drove off, but eventually ran out of gas. At that
point, he ordered Jackson into the trunk of the car. Jackson
initially refused, to which Harris responded, “well, I am going to
have to finish you off right here.” Fearing for her life, she got
2
into the trunk and Harris walked off in search of gas.
Harris went to the home of David Mason (Mason) asking for gas.
Mason agreed to help and returned to Harris’s car with him. While
attempting to start the car, Mason leaned into the car and heard a
woman asking for help. He asked whether there was anyone in the
car, and heard a woman’s voice respond “Yes,” and “He is trying to
kill me.” Mason posed the same question to Harris; Harris
responded that he had a calf that he was planning on butchering in
the car. Mason was unconvinced and called the police when he
returned home.
Deputy Arbuckle (Arbuckle) of the DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s
Office recognized Harris from Mason’s description of the car.
Arbuckle stopped Harris and explained that there was a report that
Harris might have someone in the trunk. Harris denied there was
anyone in his trunk and added that he did not have a key to the
trunk, but he offered to drive with Deputy Arbuckle to his sister’s
house, where he could secure a key. Deputy Arbuckle agreed. Not
far down the road, Arbuckle observed Harris throw an object from
his car; it was later discovered that that object was a knife. At
this point, Arbuckle placed Harris in custody.
At around this time, Mason and his brother arrived at the
scene and assisted with the arrest of Harris and rescue of Jackson.
After Jackson was rescued she was transported to the hospital with
several life-threatening wounds. The emergency room physician
testified that her blood pressure was 40/0; she had no breathing
3
sounds; she had sucking chest wounds; she had several life
threatening stab wounds to her neck, chest, and abdomen. After
Jackson’s condition was stabilized, three physicians operated on
her neck, heart, and abdomen. Jackson survived the stabs and the
surgery, and she testified against Harris at trial. Harris did not
testify.
Harris was tried for the attempted first degree murder of
Jackie Jackson on the theory that he had the “specific intent to
kill or to inflict great bodily harm and [was] engaged in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnaping . .
. .” La. Rev. Stat. § 14:30A(1)(defining first degree murder).1
In addition to attempted first degree murder, the jury was also
instructed on attempted second degree murder, attempted
manslaughter, and aggravated battery.
The jury found Harris guilty of attempted first degree murder,
and the trial court imposed a sentence of 45 years at hard labor.
On direct appeal, however, the Louisiana Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, reversed that conviction on the grounds that Harris was
not engaged in an aggravated kidnaping since he never made a ransom
demand, which is an essential element of aggravated kidnaping in
Louisiana. See State v. Harris, 480 So. 2d 943 (La. App. 2d. Cir.
1985). The Louisiana Court of Appeals found that attempted second
1
In 1990 the definition of first degree murder was enlarged by
adding “second degree kidnaping” as one of the predicate offenses
listed in section 14:30A(1). Acts 1990, No. 526, § 1.
4
degree murder was a lesser included offense of attempted first
degree murder. The court also found that the jury’s verdict of
guilty of attempted first degree murder carried with it an implicit
finding that the defendant acted with the specific intent to kill.
Id. at 944. Because Harris possessed the requisite intent and
engaged in an act in furtherance of that intent, the court adjudged
Harris guilty of second degree murder and remanded the case for
resentencing.
On remand, the district court resentenced Harris to 45 years
at hard labor. Later, Harris filed an application for post-
conviction relief (PCR) in the state district court. The district
court denied the application, and the Louisiana Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit, affirmed this denial. See State v. Harris, 643
So. 2d 779 (La. App. 2d. Cir. 1994). The Louisiana Supreme Court
denied review of Harris’s case. See State v. Harris, 650 So. 2d 251
(La. 1995).
After exhausting his state remedies, Harris turned to the
federal courts for relief. On August 29, 1995, Harris filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana.
On June 21, 1996, the magistrate judge filed a Report and
Recommendation suggesting that the writ be denied. Despite,
Harris’s objections to the Report and Recommendation, the district
court adopted the magistrate’s report and dismissed the petition
5
with prejudice.
On appeal, Harris has raised two issues: (1) the erroneous
jury instruction deprived him of due process and (2) trial
counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous instruction and
failure to correctly present the issue to the jury constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Discussion
The basis of this appeal is an erroneous jury instruction2
2
The jury instructions defined “attempt” as follows:
“Any person having a specific intent to commit a
crime, who does or omits an act for the purpose of and
tending toward accomplishing his object is guilty of an
attempt to commit the offense intended; and it shall be
immaterial whether, under the circumstances, he would
have actually accomplished his purpose.
An attempt is a separate but lesser grade of the
intended crime; and any person may be convicted of an
attempt to commit a crime, although it appears on the
trial that the crime intended or attempted was actually
perpetrated by such person in pursuance of such attempt.”
The jury instructions defined first and second degree murder
as follows:
“Second degree murder is the killing of a human
being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or
to inflict great bodily harm; or when the offender is
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
aggravated kidnaping, armed robbery, or simple robbery,
even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm.
Thus, in order to convict the defendant of attempted
second degree murder, you must find:
1. That the defendant had a specific intent
to commit the crime of second degree murder;
and
6
that purportedly allowed the jury to convict Harris on a lesser
state of mind than is required under Louisiana law. In order to be
guilty of attempted murder, a defendant must have the specific
intent to kill; the mere intent to inflict great bodily harm, while
sufficient to support either a first or second degree murder
conviction,3 is insufficient to convict a defendant of attempted
murder (first or second degree). Both Harris and the State agree
that the instruction was erroneous; they disagree, however, as to
the effect of this error. Assuming, arguendo, that the given
2. That the defendant did or omitted an act
for the purpose of and tending directly toward
the commission of the crime of second degree
murder.
First degree murder is the killing of a human being
when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated
kidnaping, armed robbery, or simple robbery.
Thus, in order to convict the defendant of attempted
first degree murder, you must find:
1. That the defendant had a specific intent
to commit the crime of first degree murder;
and
2. That the defendant did or omitted an act
for the purpose of and tending directly toward
the commission of the crime of first degree
murder.”
3
First degree murder under section 14:30A(1) requires both a
“specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm” and that the
offender be engaged in one or more of certain listed felonies (here
allegedly only aggravated kidnaping); second degree murder, under
La. Rev. Stat. § 14:30.1A(1) & (2), requires either “a specific
intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm” or that the
offender be engaged in one or more of certain listed felonies (here
allegedly only aggravated kidnaping).
7
instruction is constitutionally deficient for failing to
specifically instruct that Harris needed to have the “specific
intent to kill,” we must determine whether this error, either of
itself or in connection with Harris’ claim counsel was ineffective
in regard thereto, was such as to require setting aside Harris’s
conviction on federal habeas.
I. Standard of Review
A. Structural Error
At one time lower courts generally held that federal
constitutional errors could never be harmless, and required
reversal no matter how trivial the defect. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d.
Appellate Review § 723. Then, in 1967, the Supreme Court held that
some constitutional errors could be so insignificant that they
could be deemed harmless. See id. (citing Chapman v. California,
87 S. Ct. 824 (1967)). Today, most constitutional errors are
susceptible to harmless error analysis, and harmless error is the
norm rather than the exception. See id. In fact, there is a
strong presumption that constitutional errors are subject to
harmless error analysis. See Rose v. Clark, 106 S.Ct 3101, 3106
(1986).
Despite this widespread application of harmless error
analysis, there are still some constitutional violations that
require reversal regardless of their harm. These errors have been
labeled “structural” because they involve structural defects in the
8
criminal trial mechanism that infect the entire trial process.4
Structural errors stand in contrast to “trial errors”——errors
that occur during the presentation of the case to the jury that are
susceptible to harmless error analysis because the error may be
quantitatively assessed in the context of the other evidence
presented at trial.5
4
In United States v. Wiles, 102 F.3d 1043, 1056-57 (10th Cir.
1996), vacated sub nom. United States v. Schleibaum,118 S.Ct.
361(1997), the Tenth Circuit gave a comprehensive list of cases in
which courts have found structural error:
“Examples of structural errors are exclusion of
individuals from a grand jury based on race, Vasquez v.
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 106 S. Ct. 617, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598
(1986); denial of the right to self-representation,
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 n. 8, 104 S. Ct.
944, 950 n. 8, 79 L. Ed. 2d 122 (1984); denial of the right
to a public trial, Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.
9, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2217 n. 9, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984); a
petit jury's improper selection, and exposure to pretrial
publicity, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 86 S. Ct.
1507, 16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966); denial of the right to
counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct.
792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963) and Holloway v. Arkansas, 435
U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 55 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1978); . . .
potentially biased judges, Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed. 749 (1927)[; and a
constitutionally-deficient reasonable doubt instruction,
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124
L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993).]” Id.
5
In Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1263 (1991), the
Court gave a list of cases in which obvious constitutional errors
were held not to be structural, but rather to be subject to
harmless error analysis:
“Since this Court's landmark decision in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967),
in which we adopted the general rule that a constitutional
error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction,
the Court has applied harmless-error analysis to a wide range
9
of errors and has recognized that most constitutional errors
can be harmless. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
738, 752-754, 110 S. Ct. 1441, 1450-1451, 108 L. Ed. 2d 725
(1990) (unconstitutionally overbroad jury instructions at the
sentencing stage of a capital case); Satterwhite v. Texas,
486 U.S. 249, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 100 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988)
(admission of evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital
case in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause);
Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266, 109 S. Ct. 2419,
2421, 105 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1989) (jury instruction containing an
erroneous conclusive presumption); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S.
497, 501-504, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1921-1923, 95 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1987)
(jury instruction misstating an element of the offense); Rose
v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 92 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1986)
(jury instruction containing an erroneous rebuttable
presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691, 106 S. Ct.
2142, 2147, 90 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1986) (erroneous exclusion of
defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances of his
confession); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S. Ct.
1431, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986) (restriction on a defendant's
right to cross-examine a witness for bias in violation of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause); Rushen v. Spain, 464
U.S. 114, 117-118, and n. 2, 104 S. Ct. 453, 454-455, and n. 2,
78 L. Ed. 2d 267 (1983) (denial of a defendant's right to be
present at trial); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499,
103 S. Ct. 1974, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983) (improper comment on
defendant's silence at trial, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); Hopper v. Evans, 456
U.S. 605, 102 S. Ct. 2049, 72 L. Ed. 2d 367 (1982) (statute
improperly forbidding trial court's giving a jury instruction
on a lesser included offense in a capital case in violation of
the Due Process Clause); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786,
99 S. Ct. 2088, 60 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1979) (failure to instruct the
jury on the presumption of innocence); Moore v. Illinois, 434
U.S. 220, 232, 98 S. Ct. 458, 466, 54 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977)
(admission of identification evidence in violation of the
Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223, 231-232, 93 S. Ct. 1565, 1570-1571, 36 L. Ed. 2d 208
(1973) (admission of the out-of-court statement of a
nontestifying codefendant in violation of the Sixth Amendment
Counsel Clause); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 92 S. Ct.
2174, 33 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1972) (confession obtained in violation of
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S. Ct. 1199, 12
L. Ed. 2d 246 (1964)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53,
90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981-1982, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970) (admission of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment);
10
Although courts have attempted to define “structural error,”
the exact meaning is vague. Courts have stated that structural
errors affect the framework of the trial, rather than just the
trial process. As such, the error renders the trial an unreliable
mechanism for the determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the consequences of the error are necessarily unquantifiable
and indeterminable. See United States v. Wiles, 102 F.3d 1043,
1056 (10th Cir. 1996).
For instance, a court cannot determine whether Gideon’s lack
of counsel actually harmed him——he may have put on a better defense
and brought forth more evidence than a public defender might
have——and thus the case must be reversed. On the opposite extreme,
a trial error, such as a minor violation of the confrontation
clause, is quantifiable and can be weighed against the other
evidence that was presented in order to determine whether the error
was harmless.
The cases in between are not as obvious. Particularly
puzzling are the jury instruction cases. Most of the jury-
instruction cases have been analyzed under a harmless error
standard, but in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993), the
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11, 90 S. Ct. 1999,
2003-2004, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970) (denial of counsel at a
preliminary hearing in violation of the Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause).”
11
Supreme Court held that a constitutionally deficient “reasonable
doubt” instruction was structural. The Court stated that "where
the instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden
of proof, which vitiates all the jury's findings," no jury verdict
of beyond a reasonable doubt exists upon which to base a harmless
error analysis. Id. at 2082.
In Kentucky v. Whorton, 99 S. Ct. 2088 (1979) the Court held
that failure to instruct the jury on the “presumption of innocence”
was a trial error, but in Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781
(1979), the Court held that failure to instruct on “reasonable
doubt” was a structural error. The difference is that it is
possible to assess the effect on the jury of the omission of the
“presumption of innocence” instruction, while it is impossible to
determine the effect of the omission of the “reasonable doubt”
instruction. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1255
(1991) (White, J., dissenting).
As the dissent in Fulminante stated, “these cases can be
reconciled only by considering the nature of the right at issue and
the effect of an error upon the trial.” Id. The majority
essentially agreed with this characterization and held that the
error should be evaluated based on its “effect upon the composition
of the record.” Id. at 1265 (the Fulminante Court ultimately held
that the admission of a coerced confession was not a structural
error; it was a trial error, but it was not harmless).
12
Harris’s case is analogous to the jury instruction cases that
found the erroneous instructions to be trial errors and susceptible
to harmless error analysis. In Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918
(1987), the Court held that a jury instruction that misdefined an
element of the offense was harmless.6 More recently, in California
v. Roy, 117 S. Ct. 337 (1996), the Court held that a jury
instruction that did not include a statement informing the jury
that they must find intent could be reviewed for harmless error.
Based on Pope and Roy, we hold that the Louisiana court’s
erroneous instruction does not amount to a structural error and in
this habeas case is subject to harmless error review.7
B. Harmless Error
6
Pope resolved the issue of whether failing to clearly instruct
a jury is structural and automatically reversible. See United
States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938-39 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that any intimations that “merely fail[ing] to instruct clearly on
an element of the crime. . . . is always reversible. . . . were
stilled by Pope v. Illinois . . . .”). By holding that the
constitution does not require that such errors be deemed
automatically reversible, Pope put to rest an issue that had been
simmering since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sandstrom v.
Montana, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979). The Sandstrom court had held that
it is unconstitutional to instruct a jury that a defendant “intends
the ordinary consequences of his ordinary act,” but left open the
question whether such an error could be subject to harmless error
analysis. Id. at 2453
7
Because we are here faced with an attack on a state
conviction, we may grant relief only when that is required by the
constitution. We observe that that limitation is generally not
applicable when we review a federal conviction on direct appeal,
and accordingly in such cases we may treat certain properly
preserved errors as mandating reversal without assessment of
prejudice notwithstanding that such treatment of the same claim
would not be proper in a habeas challenge to a state conviction.
13
As this is a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas case, it is properly
analyzed under the harmless error standard set forth in Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993), and adopted by this Court in
Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1996).8 An error requires
habeas relief only if it “‘had [a] substantial and injurious effect
or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht, 113
S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 66 S. Ct. 1239
(1946)).
Prior to Brecht, lower courts had generally applied the more
onerous Chapman standard in habeas cases as well as in direct
appeals. Under Chapman, relief was required unless the error was
harmless “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Chapman v. California,
87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). In Brecht, the Supreme Court consciously
lowered the harmless error standard for section 2254 habeas cases.
See Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721-22 (“The imbalance of the costs and
benefits of applying the Chapman harmless-error standard on
collateral review counsels in favor of applying a less onerous
standard on habeas review of constitutional error.”). In adopting
the Kotteakos “substantial and injurious effect” standard, the
Court noted that there must still be actual prejudice and that a
8
Since this case was filed before the April 1996 effective date
of the AEDPA, we will review it under pre-AEDPA standards. See
Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding that the AEDPA does
not apply to cases that were filed before the April 1996 effective
date of the AEDPA).
14
mere “reasonable possibility” that the trial error affected the
verdict would not suffice to warrant habeas relief. See Brecht,
113 S. Ct. at 1721 (“granting habeas relief merely because there is
a ‘reasonable possibility’ that trial error contributed to the
verdict, see Chapman v. California [citation omitted], is at odds
with the historic meaning of habeas corpus——to afford relief to
those whom society has ‘grievously wronged.’”).
Thus, as we have previously stated in Woods v. Johnson, the
error must be “substantial,” and there must be something more than
a “mere reasonable possibility” that the error contributed to the
verdict, but the Brecht standard does not require a “reasonable
probability” that absent the error the verdict would have been
different; and “if our minds are ‘in virtual equipoise as to the
harmlessness’” under the stated standard, then relief must be
granted. See Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017, 1026-27 (5th Cir.
1996).
II. Due Process
A. Error
This Court and Louisiana courts have held that an instruction,
such as the one given in this case, that allows a jury to convict
a defendant of the Louisiana offense of attempted murder if he
merely intended to inflict bodily harm but did not specifically
intend to kill the victim is constitutionally deficient. In Gray
v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265, 269 (5th Cir. 1993); Scott v. Louisiana, 934
15
F.2d 631, 634 (5th Cir. 1991); State v. Butler, 322 So. 2d 189, 192
(La. 1975), and State v. Serigny, 610 So. 2d 857, 859 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1992), for example, it was held that a jury instruction is
erroneous where it expressly instructs that the jury can convict a
defendant of attempted murder if he merely had the intent to
inflict great bodily harm. Such instructions are unconstitutional
because they allow the jury to convict a defendant on lesser
grounds than are statutorily required. See State v. Butler, 322
So. 2d 189, 193-94 (La. 1975).
In Harris’s case, however, the instruction was less egregious.
The court provided the jury with the statutory definition of
murder, which states that the defendant must either intend to kill
or inflict great bodily harm, and then stated that in order to
convict the defendant of attempted murder they must find that the
defendant had the “specific intent to commit [murder]”. Thus, the
court’s instruction for attempted murder merely inferentially
incorporated by reference the intent required for murder, but the
court did not expressly state that the intent to inflict great
bodily harm was sufficient to convict the defendant of attempted
murder.
Several Louisiana courts have held that these type of
instructions are erroneous. See State v. Porter, 626 So. 2d 476,
478 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); State v. Hall, 606 So. 2d 972, 980 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1992); State v. Guin, 444 So. 2d 625, 635 (La. App. 3d
16
Cir. 1983) (all holding that jury charges that first define murder
as requiring specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm,
and then define attempted murder with reference to the definition
of murder, are improper). In light of these cases and the fact that
the state does not dispute that the instruction was substantively
erroneous, we conclude that the references in the instruction to
the intent to inflict great bodily harm were improper and rendered
the instruction legally erroneous and constitutionally deficient.
B. Harmless Error
As noted above, this erroneous jury instruction is not a
structural error and as such is subject to harmless error analysis;
additionally, since this is a habeas case, we analyze the error for
harm under the more lenient Brecht standard and will find relief
warranted if, but only if, the error had a substantial effect or
influence in determining the verdict so that there is more than a
“reasonable possibility” that the result would have been different
had the jury been properly instructed. Because we conclude, as did
the magistrate judge and the district court, that the error here
did not have a substantial effect or influence in determining the
verdict and that there is not more than a reasonable possibility
that a jury would have reached a different result but for the
erroneous instruction, we affirm the denial of habeas relief.
Although this Court and the courts of Louisiana have routinely
held that the inclusion of the phrase “intent to inflict great
17
bodily harm” in a jury instruction for attempted murder under
Louisiana law is erroneous, courts have also held that such error
does not necessarily require reversal. See, e.g., State v.
Serigny, 610 So. 2d 857(La. App. 1st Cir. 1992); State v. Hall, 606
So. 2d 972, 980 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992); State v. Latiolais, 453
So. 2d 1266 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1984) (all affirming the attempted
murder convictions despite the erroneous instruction); but see,
e.g., Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1993); State v. Porter,
626 So. 2d 476 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); State v. Ball, 554 So. 2d 114
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1989) (all reversing the attempted murder
convictions because of the erroneous instruction).
In State v. Serigny, 610 So. 2d 857, 860 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1992), the court upheld a conviction despite an erroneous jury
instruction similar to the one given in this case. Serigny admitted
that he wanted to kill the victim and expressed surprise over the
victim’s survival. The court concluded that based on this evidence,
“no reasonable jury could have reasonably concluded that defendant
merely intended to inflict great bodily harm on the defendant.”
Id.
In State v. Latiolais, 453 So. 2d 1266, 1269 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
1984), the court found compelling evidence of a specific intent to
kill where a defendant repeatedly stabbed the victim in the temple,
face, and neck, and then left him for dead on the side of the road.
The court concluded that the victim’s belief that he was left for
18
dead was the only reasonable construction of the events. The
Latiolais court found that the erroneous jury instruction, which
allowed the jury to convict the defendant of attempted murder if he
possessed either a specific intent or an intent to inflict great
bodily harm, was harmless in light of the compelling evidence of
specific intent to kill.
In Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1993) on the other hand,
this Court reached the opposite conclusion and reversed a criminal
conviction because the instruction allowed the jury to convict the
defendant of attempted murder if he merely intended to inflict
great bodily harm. Gray confronted the victim, who was sleeping
with a woman who had previously lived with Gray, and threatened to
“blow [the victim’s] brains out,” but rather than carry out his
threat, Gray hit the victim several times with the gun, and
ultimately fired at him when he ran away, but did not hit him. The
Court, reviewing the case for ineffective assistance of counsel,
concluded that there was a “reasonable probability” that the jury
could have had a reasonable doubt concerning Gray’s intent to kill.
The Court emphasized that Gray did not take advantage of several
“golden opportunities” to kill the victim, which raised doubts
about his actual intentions.
State v. Butler, 322 So. 2d 189 (La. 1975) presented similar
doubts concerning the defendant’s intent. Butler “taxed [his
former girlfriend] with going with another man,” and cut her on the
19
face, eyes, arms, and back, and stated that “if she did not want
him, he was going to see who wanted her.” Id. at 191. The court
reversed the conviction without much discussion of whether the
error was in fact harmful. Based on Butler’s statement, it was
reasonable to conclude that he merely intended to mutilate and not
kill his victim. Butler’s intent was clearly questionable, and
there was more than a reasonable possibility that the Butler jury,
like the Gray jury, could have had a reasonable doubt concerning
Butler’s intent to kill. Because of this more than reasonable
possibility, the instruction was harmful.9
We hold, based on the evidence presented at trial and the
arguments made by Harris, that the error in the instructions did
not have a substantial effect or influence in determining the
verdict and that there was not more than a reasonable possibility
that the jury would otherwise have had a reasonable doubt
concerning Harris’s intent to kill. Thus, the inclusion of the
erroneous “intent to inflict great bodily harm” element in the
murder definitions was harmless under Brecht.
Harris did not present any evidence and did not argue to the
jury that he lacked the specific intent to kill. At trial,
Harris’s theory was that he was not engaged in an aggravated
9
Of course, the decisions of the Louisiana courts are not
binding on us in this respect, but they do provide a useful insight
into the views of jurists experienced in the evaluation of the
prejudicial effect of such an instruction in Louisiana cases.
20
kidnaping at the time of the attack. But he never contested or in
any way called into doubt the obvious fact that he intended to kill
Jackie Jackson. The defense did not put on any evidence to counter
the obvious and compelling inference that Harris intended to kill
Jackson, and the cross-examinations do not suggest that Harris’s
intent was in dispute.10
This case is distinguishable from Butler, where the defendant
obviously had some intent other than an intent to kill. There is
no evidence that Harris merely intended to mutilate, hurt, or do
anything less than kill, Jackie Jackson. In this respect, this
case is analogous to Latiolais where the defendant brutally
inflicted life-threatening stab wounds on the victim and left him
for dead by the side of the road. Harris, like Latiolais,
inflicted life-threatening stab wounds on Jackson and basically
left her for dead in the trunk of his car. Not only is Harris’s
leaving Jackson for dead probative of an intent to kill, but
Harris’s deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to
cause death further supports the inference that he intended to kill
Jackson. See Rogers v. State, 506 N.E.2d 481, 483 (Ind. 1987).
10
Also, Harris’s failure to object to the jury instruction,
while not dispositive, is marginally indicative of the fact that he
did not consider his intent to be at issue. Cf. Lowenfield v.
Phelps, 108 S. Ct. 546, 552 (1988) (“We note . . . that defense
counsel did not object to either the polls or the supplemental
instruction. We do not suggest that petitioner thereby waived this
issue, . . . but we think such an omission indicates that the
potential for coercion argued now was not apparent to one on the
spot.”).
21
Were it not for the fortuitous intervention of external
forces, Jackson would almost certainly have died. The emergency
room physician testified that Jackson was near death when she was
admitted to the hospital, and it was only thanks to the
intervention of Mason and Deputy Arbuckle that Jackson was rescued
from the trunk and brought to the hospital where she was saved from
the brink of death by emergency surgery. The fact that it took an
external force to stop the attack on Jackson and rescue her from
death makes this case distinguishable from Gray, where the
defendant had several opportunities to kill his victim, but
ultimately failed to take advantage of these “golden opportunities”
and did not pursue the victim when he ran off.
Finally, we are persuaded that the sheer brutality of the
attack can give rise to no inference other than that Harris
affirmatively and actively intended to kill Jackson. See State v.
Cushman, 481 So. 2d 1376, 1380 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986) (upholding
a second degree murder conviction after finding that the horrible
injuries inflicted upon the victim along with the savageness of the
attack supported a finding that the defendant had the requisite
intent to kill).
The evidence that was presented at trial supports only one
rational inference concerning Harris’s intent——he intended to kill
Jackson. Based on the trial evidence, it is inconceivable that
Harris merely intended to inflict great bodily harm on Jackson.
22
Nor was his intent in this respect a theory of defense at trial.
We conclude that the erroneous instruction was harmless under
Brecht.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Harris also argues that his conviction ought to be set aside
based on ineffective assistance of counsel, because his counsel
failed to object to the erroneous jury instruction and this error
was prejudicial. Under the Strickland test, a defendant must show
that (1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See Strickland v.
Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984).
Based on the numerous cases that have held jury instructions
similar to the one given in this case to be erroneous, we hold that
trial counsel’s performance was deficient and thus the first prong
of the Strickland test is satisfied. However, for the same reasons
stated above, we hold that Harris was not prejudiced by his
counsel’s deficient performance.11
11
Prejudice under Strickland requires that “[t]he defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome” and “[a]n assessment of the
likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude
the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, ‘nullification,’
and the like.” Id. at 2068. However, “a defendant need not show
that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not altered the
outcome in the case.” Id. If an error is harmless under Brecht,
it would appear not to be prejudicial under Strickland. See Kyles
v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566-67 (1995).
23
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
denial of habeas relief.
AFFIRMED
ENDRECORD
24
DeMoss, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Everyone agrees that the instructions given at Harris’ trial
were infected with error of constitutional magnitude. Based upon
our precedent in Gray v. Lynn, 6 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1993), and my
independent review of this record, I believe there is a reasonable
possibility that the jury’s verdict was not based upon the required
showing that Harris had a specific intent to kill. I likewise
believe that the erroneous jury instructions, coupled with the
erroneous argument presented by both defense counsel and the
prosecuting attorney, create a reasonable probability that, but for
trial counsel’s unprofessional errors, the outcome might have been
different. For those reasons, I must register my dissent.
The jury instructions used at Harris’ trial allowed the jury
to convict upon a showing of less than all of the essential
elements of the offense. Specifically, the instructions permitted
Harris’ conviction for attempted murder upon a showing of an intent
to commit great bodily harm. The panel majority has nonetheless
concluded that that error was harmless because (1) Harris did not
argue at trial that he did not have a specific intent to kill, and
(2) because Harris’ trial counsel did not object to the erroneous
instructions.
While it is true that Harris did not present any evidence
25
tending to negate the specific intent to kill at trial, it is also
true that the state presented absolutely no evidence designed to
show that Harris had such an intent. That is simply because intent
was not an issue at trial. The entire case was tried upon the
erroneous assumption that a specific intent to commit great bodily
harm, coupled with Harris’ perpetration or attempted perpetration
of aggravated kidnaping was sufficient to support his conviction
for attempted murder. Similarly, while it is true that Harris’
defense counsel did not object to the erroneous instructions, that
fact made clear that defense counsel simply did not understand what
was required to convict his client; and that is the very deficiency
that serves as the foundation for Harris’ ineffective assistance of
counsel argument.
I.
There is no dispute that Louisiana law does not permit an
attempted murder conviction to be based upon a mere showing of
intent to commit great bodily harm. That principal has been well-
established since at least 1975. State v. Butler, 322 So. 2d 189,
192 (La. 1975).
Nonetheless, the jury was first informed by defense counsel,
then informed by the prosecuting attorney, and then instructed by
the trial court that the statute permitted conviction upon a
finding that Harris either (1) had a specific intent to kill, or
26
(2) had an intent to commit great bodily harm and was engaged in
the perpetration of one of the listed felonies, in this case
aggravated kidnaping. Defense counsel told the jury:
First degree murder is the killing of a human
being. Okay, you have got First Degree Murder, and
then you have got another Article says Attempted.
What is an attempt? He read both of those to you.
They intend to prove in this case that the
Defendant had first of all a specific intent to
kill, that’s going to be up to you, that’s the
element of the crime, or to inflict great bodily
harm and is engaged in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnaping.
The prosecuting attorney told the jury:
[A]nd so at this point the State would tell you
that we have presented our case and it is up to you
if in fact you find beyond any reasonable doubt
that this Defendant attempted to take the life of
this person, or at least inflicted enough serious
injury upon her that he should have known that her
life was threatened and moreover that he forced her
into the car under threats and carried her away
against her will then in fact it would be your duty
to vote to find the Defendant guilty as charged.
Having heard those erroneous arguments, the jury was then read the
objectionable charge, which likewise permitted a conviction for
attempted murder upon a showing of intent to inflict great bodily
harm.
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal rejected
Harris’ challenge to his sentence, but held sua sponte that the
evidence was insufficient to establish that Harris was engaged in
an aggravated kidnaping. Given that aggravated kidnaping was an
essential element of the first degree murder conviction, the Court
27
of Appeal held that the conviction could not stand. The Court of
Appeal further held, however, that Harris’ conviction could be
upheld on the lesser responsive verdict of attempted second degree
murder because “[i]n order for this jury to have determined that
the defendant was guilty of attempted first degree murder, the jury
must have concluded that the defendant has the specific intent to
kill this victim.” That statement would generally hold true. But
because the deficient performance of Harris’ counsel continued on
appeal, Harris did not raise the possibility that his verdict was
impermissibly based upon an intent to commit great bodily harm.
Given the argument of counsel, the evidence presented, and the jury
instructions, the Louisiana Court of Appeal’s statement that the
jury necessarily found a specific intent to kill was in error.
The majority opinion makes no attempt to evaluate the impact
of the erroneous arguments presented by defense counsel and the
prosecuting attorney. That omission is notable given this Court’s
decision in Gray, 6 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1993). Gray’s jury was
likewise instructed that it could convict of attempted murder on a
showing of specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
At Gray’s trial, however, the law was correctly argued to the jury
by both defense counsel and the prosecutor. See id. at 270 & n.13.
The prosecutor’s opening statement, which is quoted at length in
Gray, makes plain that the specific intent to kill is required for
conviction of attempted murder. Id. The Gray panel nonetheless
28
found that the correct rendition of the law by both counsel was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that the jury could have
followed the instructions given by the trial court and could have
based its finding of guilt on the erroneous intent. Accordingly,
the Court held that counsel’s failure to object to the erroneous
instruction was itself ineffective assistance of counsel that
required relief. See id. at 265 (reversing denial of habeas relief
and remanding for issuance of writ absent prompt retrial). Here in
Harris, the majority is willing to sweep the same error under the
rug and to ignore completely the unsavory effect of incorrect
argument by both defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney.
The majority argues that Gray is distinguishable because Gray
availed himself of an opportunity to terminate his offense,
supporting an inference that he had only a specific intent to
commit great bodily harm, while Harris did not avail himself of
several opportunities to terminate his offense, suggesting that he
had a specific intent to kill Ms. Jackson. But Gray was undeniably
tried on the theory that he intended to kill his victim. See id.
at 270 & n.13. Harris, on the other hand, was tried on the theory
that he was trying to kidnap his victim, the theory that was
overturned on appeal. Given that kidnaping was the state’s
controlling theory at trial, the majority is in effect deciding
that the jury based its verdict upon a theory that was never argued
or presented at trial.
29
I conclude that there is more than a reasonable possibility
that the jury convicted Harris upon a finding that Harris had an
intent to inflict great bodily harm while engaged in an attempt to
kidnap Ms. Jackson. Such a showing is insufficient to support an
attempted murder conviction in Louisiana. I would, therefore, not
find the error harmless.
II.
I am also troubled by the panel majority’s conclusory
statement in footnote 11 that a finding of harmless error under
Brecht necessarily requires a finding that a habeas petitioner
cannot make a showing of prejudice under Strickland. While it may
be true in the abstract that the threshold for establishing
harmless error is semantically more lenient to habeas petitioners
than the threshold for establishing Strickland prejudice, I do not
believe that there is such a congruence of interests and factual
circumstances that we can establish such a precedent without
thoughtfully considering each habeas claim under its own
appropriate standards. Whether trial counsel’s failure to
understand and to require an appropriate instruction upon the
essential elements of the crime with which his client was charged,
compounded by counsel’s own erroneous presentation of those
elements to the jury, prejudiced Harris in this case should be
fully developed in the opinion. We should not avoid our obligation
30
to consider the impact of counsel’s conceded deficiencies by simply
formulating some equation between the standards governing Harris’
due process claim and the standards governing his ineffective
assistance claim. Moreover, I do not read Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.
Ct. 1555, 1566-67 (1995), cited in footnote 11 by the majority, as
even inferentially supporting such notion.
With regard to the Strickland prejudice inquiry, I would once
again rely heavily upon our precedent in Gray. I realize that
harmless error analysis and Strickland prejudice analysis are both
highly dependent upon the factual circumstances of each case. That
does not mean, however, that we are free to abandon what we have
said before about the various factors and circumstances that are
significant to those inquiries. I am unable to reconcile this
Court’s conclusion that counsel’s failure to object to an obviously
erroneous instruction with respect to an essential element of the
crime was prejudicial in Gray, with the panel majority’s holding
that the same failure, coupled with egregiously incorrect argument
from both sides, was not prejudicial here in Harris.
I respectfully dissent.
g:\opin\96-31220.dis 31