Woods v. TX Dept Human Serv

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 97-20771
Summary Calendar
____________________
ROSE J. WOODS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES;
SHIRLEY BARKER,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-96-CV-2707)
_________________________________________________________________
March 31, 1998
Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-appellant Rose Woods appeals the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Texas
Department of Human Services and Shirley Barker on her employment
discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. We affirm the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
judgment of the district court.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of her discharge on December 5, 1994, Rose
Woods, a black female age fifty-six years, had worked for the
Texas Department of Human Services (DHS) for twenty-two years.
For the twelve years immediately preceding her discharge, Woods
worked as a Medical Eligibility Specialist (ME) II in the
La Grange office of DHS Medical Eligibility Unit 25. As part of
her responsibilities as an ME II, Woods screened clients for
Medicaid eligibility, including making determinations as to
Medicaid payments for nursing home care and Medicare premiums.
Additionally, she provided information and referral services to
clients, providers’ staff members, and the general public.
In December 1992, DHS appointed Shirley Barker as supervisor
of Unit 25. Barker supervised Unit 25 from her office in Temple,
Texas. During her supervision of Woods, pursuant to the case
reading policy in effect for the DHS region that included Unit
25, Barker became aware of numerous errors Woods made in her
eligibility determinations. Each month the state office would
send Barker a list of case names by worker that were to be
reviewed by the supervisory staff. A committee consisting of
Barker and two ME III workers reviewed each case on the list.
2
After the committee reviewed the cases, the affected employee
would have the opportunity to re-examine the cases and rebut any
disputed errors. Barker routinely met with Woods to discuss her
errors and to refer her to the appropriate sections in the
Medicaid Eligibility Handbook.
Woods’s 1993 performance evaluation contains a “does not
meet requirements” rating, her first such rating during her
twenty-two years with DHS. Barker placed Woods on corrective
action from February 1, 1994 through April 30, 1994 and on
probationary status from September 1, 1994 through November 1,
1994. On December 5, 1994, Woods was discharged.
Woods filed her Original Complaint against the DHS and
Barker (collectively DHS) alleging race and age-based
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634. Woods also alleged that DHS illegally deprived her
of rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
by terminating her and by denying her employment in the Community
Service Worker position for which she applied.1
DHS filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on July 14,
1
Because Woods failed to include the failure-to-hire claim
in the charge filed with the EEOC, the district court determined
that this claim was barred. See Fine v. GAF Chem. Corp., 995
F.2d 576, 577-78 (5th Cir. 1993). Woods does not challenge this
determination. Consequently, this claim is not before this court
on appeal.
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1997. The judge assigned to the Woods case died on July 23,
1997. Woods asserts that the court manager informed her that
“all pending motions were vacated,” that she would be advised
when the case was transferred to another court, and that she
should timely file her joint pre-trial motion due August 25,
1997. Based on this conversation with the court manager, Woods
did not file a response to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The
district court granted DHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
entered judgment in favor of DHS on August 8, 1997.
On August 10, 1997, Woods filed a rule 60(b) Motion for
Relief from Judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); a Motion to
Enlarge Time to Respond to Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, FED R. CIV. P. 6(b); and a Response in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. After reviewing Woods’s
motions and late-filed response, the district court concluded
that even if Woods’s response had been timely, her arguments and
exhibits would have been insufficient to defeat DHS’s Motion for
Summary Judgment. Accordingly, on September 9, 1997, the
district court denied Woods’s Motion for Relief from Judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
Woods contends that the district court erred in granting
DHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment. We review the granting of
summary judgment de novo, applying the same criteria employed by
the district court in the first instance. Texas Med. Ass’n v.
4
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1996). Summary
judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In applying this
standard, we first consult the applicable substantive law to
ascertain the material factual issues. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d
653, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1992). We then review the evidence
pertaining to those issues, viewing the facts and inferences in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lemelle v.
Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994).
The moving party bears the initial burden of “informing the
district court of the basis for its motion and identifying” the
portions of the record that “it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.” Wallace v. Texas Tech
Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the moving party
meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to
establish the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986).
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
the Supreme Court established a three step process for analyzing
employment discrimination under Title VII. Id. at 803-04. This
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court applies the same requirements and evidentiary analysis to
cases brought under the ADEA. Meinecke v. H & R Block, 66 F.3d
77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., 5 F.3d 955,
957 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993). To establish a prima facie case, the
“plaintiff must prove that (1) she is a member of a protected
class; (2) she was qualified for the position she held; (3) she
was discharged; and (4) after being discharged, her employer
replaced her with a person who is not a member of the protected
class.” Id. In age discrimination cases, the plaintiff may
alternatively show either that she was replaced by someone
younger or that she was discharged because of her age. Id.
If the plaintiff has successfully established her prima
facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. Marcantel v. Louisiana Dep’t. of Transp. &
Dev., 37 F.3d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1994). If the defendant
produces a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
challenged action, it has successfully removed the inference of
unlawful discrimination raised by the plaintiff’s prima facie
case. LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th
Cir. 1996); see also Texas Dep’t. of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1980). The plaintiff must then
persuade the trier-of-fact that the defendant’s articulated
reason is merely a pretext for an intentional act of
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discrimination against the employee. LaPierre, 86 F.3d at 448
(citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11
(1993)).
Woods asserts that her failure to timely file a response to
DHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment was due to “excusable neglect,”
such that the court should relieve her from the judgment pursuant
to Rule 60(b). Woods does not explicitly argue that the district
court erred in denying her Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from
Judgment. Rather, in articulating the standard employed to
review the denial of Rule 60(b) motions, she argues that the
district court granted summary judgment without considering the
merits of her belated response. Assuming arguendo that Woods
could successfully demonstrate excusable neglect in failing to
timely respond to the Motion for Summary Judgment, her claims of
race and age-based discrimination nonetheless fail as a matter of
law. The summary judgment evidence included in Woods’s late-
filed response fails to establish the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact.
We note as an initial matter that, in arguing that a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether DHS’s proffered
reason for her discharge is pretextual, Woods relies heavily on
Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir.
1988). Her reliance is misplaced. The test she cites for
establishing intentional discrimination derives from language in
7
Bienkowski, id. at 1506 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256), that
the Supreme Court has declared to be dictum. See St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 517-18.
This court analyzes the pretext prong of the McDonnell
Douglas test by the traditional sufficiency-of-the-evidence
standard. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc). “There must be a conflict in substantial
evidence to create a jury question.” Id. (quoting Boeing Co. v.
Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 375 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc)). Evidence
must exist that the employee’s protected trait prompted the
employment decision and “had a determinative influence on the
outcome.” Id. (quoting Hazen Paper co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
610 (1993)).
In her late-filed response, Woods submitted the Unit 25
staff directory, Barker’s travel records, interoffice memoranda,
discovery requests and responses, a list entitled “CCAD staff,”
letters from the nursing homes she serviced, her Employment and
Development Plan and Evaluation, and her Original Complaint.
Much of Woods’s evidence substantiates DHS’s proffered reason for
her discharge rather than refuting it. In her unsworn memoranda
responding to her supervisor’s conferences, Woods admits errors
and delinquency in her work. Nothing in her exhibits contradicts
her deposition statements in which she admits errors in her
casework. Her annual evaluation demonstrates that she failed to
8
satisfy the statistical performance criteria DHS employs to
measure whether ME employees “meet” or “exceed requirements” of
the job. Woods maintains that the errors resulted from a
personal situation requiring her attention during the latter part
of 1993 and a turnover in staff in the La Grange office.
However, she has admitted that, during the pertinent time frame,
she never informed Barker of problems in completing applications
nor did she request assistance with her casework. Even if DHS
had ignored requests for assistance, this fact would not entitle
Woods to relief under Title VII or the ADEA. Neither of these
statutes “protects against unfair business practices, only
against decisions motivated by unlawful animus.” Nieto v. L & H
Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621, 624 (5th Cir. 1997).
Woods argues that, after her discharge, “only white, younger
similarly situated workers remained in her unit.” However, the
evidence she cites as establishing this fact is a list entitled
“CCAD Staff” containing the names of seven white female employees
ranging in age from thirty-three to forty-nine, all but one in
her forties. Woods does not indicate what position any of these
employees held. The Unit 25 directory which she submitted with
her late-file response contained the names of ten ME specialists
and trainees and five secretarial and clerk-typist employees.
This list does not categorize employees by race or age. Only one
name appears on both lists, that of Lynette Wiederhold, who is
9
identified as a clerk-typist on the Unit 25 directory. Woods
submits no other evidence to indicate that the employees named on
the list are similarly situated.
Moreover, DHS presented evidence (1) that Barker lowered
Woods’s caseload in 1993, (2) that her caseload remained lower
than the average caseload of the remaining eight workers in Unit
25, and (3) that Barker and other supervisory personnel provided
assistance and training to Woods to improve her performance.
Woods failed to discredit this evidence. Although Woods claims
that DHS never assigned any of her cases to other workers under
the lend-lease program, she does not dispute DHS’s contention
that she did not meet the criteria for having her cases removed
and assigned to other workers through the lend-lease program.2
DHS submitted evidence that the absence of documented problems
and unacceptable evaluations prior to Barker becoming supervisor
in 1992 resulted from leniency and upward adjustments by a prior
supervisor and from a 1992 policy change by DHS in the manner in
2
The DHS lend-lease program provides a mechanism for
transferring cases from certain categories of workers to other,
tenured workers within the unit. Woods argues that Barker
required her to work lend-lease cases for other employees, yet
never assigned any of her cases to other workers during the time
of her personal problems or during her period of corrective
action or probation. DHS submitted evidence that cases were
assigned on a lend-lease basis only for new workers in training,
for workers on extended sick leave, or for vacant worker
positions. Woods never requested or took extended leave during
any of the applicable time periods. Nor did she meet the other
criteria for having her cases assigned. After July 5, 1994, no
lend-lease cases were assigned to Woods.
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which files were reviewed for error. Woods did not rebut this
evidence.
Woods has offered no evidence that DHS’s discharge based on
repeated, significant errors in her work was merely a pretext for
intentional discrimination. She has not sustained her burden of
establishing a genuine issue of material fact as to whether age
or race animus constituted a motivating factor in DHS’s decision
to fire her. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
granting DHS’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
judgment.
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