Lopez v. Houston Independent School District

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT January 27, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-20604
Summary Calendar
DAVID T. LOPEZ, Individually and for the
Benefit of GALA D. MITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division
02-CV-4965
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant David T. Lopez appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction. We
AFFIRM.
Lopez represented Gala D. Mitchell in her dispute with
her current employer, Houston Independent School District (HISD).
The parties went through a mediation process and ultimately
resolved their conflict. Mitchell received a new, higher paying
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
position with HISD without ever resorting to litigation. Lopez
requested attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12205, arguing
under the “catalyst theory” that his litigation threats and
assistance in the negotiations entitled him to fees. HISD rejected
this claim. Lopez then filed suit himself in district court
seeking attorneys’ fees.1 The district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s memorandum and recommendation, which held that
Lopez, having failed to file any lawsuit or institute any
administrative proceeding whatsoever under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) on behalf of his client, lacks any claim to
attorneys’ fees under that law.
Lopez appeals to this court. We affirm based on the
district court’s well-reasoned opinion (and the thorough memorandum
and recommendation of the magistrate judge). Specifically, we
agree that Lopez lacks standing to sue solely for attorneys’ fees.
The relevant provision of the ADA permits a “prevailing party” to
secure attorneys’ fees. 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Lopez is not a
“prevailing party” in any litigation with HISD; his client,
Mitchell, is not part of the instant suit. Lopez thus lacks the
requisite “personal injury” to have standing in federal court.
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3324, 82
1
Mitchell was not a party in the district court. Lopez’s effort to
include her as a party on appeal is unavailing. See Marino v. Ortiz, 484 U.S.
301, 304, 108 S. Ct. 586, 587, 98 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1988) (“The rule that only
parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an
adverse judgment, is well settled.”).
2
L. Ed. 2d 556, (1984). Alternatively, under recent Supreme Court
precedent, even if Lopez had standing, he cannot recover attorneys’
fees under the statute in question through his conduct in this
case, which never resulted in the filing of any lawsuit or
administrative action. See Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v.
West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 605,
121 S. Ct. 1835, 1840, 149 L. Ed. 2d 855 (2001) (“[Supreme Court]
precedents thus counsel against holding that the term ‘prevailing
party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a
corresponding alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.”
(emphasis in original)); see also North Carolina Dep’t of Transp.
v. Crest St. Community Council, 479 U.S. 6, 107 S. Ct. 336, 93
L. Ed. 2d 188 (1986).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. All
costs shall be borne by Appellant.
3