DocketNumber: 08-30640
Citation Numbers: 400 F. App'x 925
Judges: Barksdale, Dennis, Owen, Per Curiam
Filed Date: 11/5/2010
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 11/5/2024
Case: 08-30640 Document: 00511285938 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/05/2010 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED November 5, 2010 No. 08-30640 Summary Calendar Lyle W. Cayce Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee v. SAMUEL CHARLES, III, Defendant - Appellant Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 6:02-CR-60062-1 Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and OWEN, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Samuel Charles, III, federal prisoner # 11592-035, pleaded guilty in 2003 to distribution of crack cocaine, in violation of21 U.S.C. §§ 841
(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). He appeals the district court’s summary denial of its sua sponte18 U.S.C. § 3582
(c)(2) motion to reduce Charles’ sentence based upon the Guidelines range for crack-cocaine offenses being lowered by Amendment 706. Charles contends the district court erred in not reducing his sentence by failing * Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR . R. 47.5.4. Case: 08-30640 Document: 00511285938 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/05/2010 No. 08-30640 to: (1) address the sentencing factors set forth in18 U.S.C. § 3553
(a); and (2) provide him an opportunity to be heard. Although § 3582(c)(2) directs district courts to consider the sentencing factors of § 3553(a), the reasonableness standard of United States v. Booker,543 U.S. 220
(2005), does not apply to § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. United States v. Evans,587 F.3d 667
, 671-72 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Doublin,572 F.3d 235
, 238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,130 S. Ct. 517
(2009)), cert. denied,130 S. Ct. 3462
(2010). Instead, the district court’s decision whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cooley,590 F.3d 293
, 295 (5th Cir. 2009). In exercising its discretion under § 3582(c)(2), the district court is required to consider: (1) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, (2) the nature and seriousness of the potential danger to the community if defendant’s sentence is reduced, and (3) defendant’s post-sentencing conduct. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.1B(i)-(iii). The district court explicitly considered the last two factors in denying the motion, emphasizing Charles’ criminal history and post-sentencing disciplinary infractions. By focusing on Charles’ criminal history, the district court implicitly weighed the § 3553(a) factors; it was not required to explain its consideration of them. See Cooley,590 F.3d at 298
(“[A] court is not required to state findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion”.) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, the court did not err in denying the motion without conducting a hearing because there were no contested issues of fact to be resolved. Where a proceeding involves only the correction or reduction of a sentence under § 3582(c), defendant’s presence is not required. See F ED. R. C RIM. P. 43(b)(4); see also United States v. Patterson,42 F.3d 246
, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Moree,928 F.2d 654
, 655 (5th Cir. 1991)) (“[A] defendant is not entitled to be present when the district court merely modifies an existing sentence”.) AFFIRMED. 2