United States v. Jones

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED MARCH 7, 2005
November 24, 2004
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-10189
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALVIN EUGENE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:03-CR-183-1-A
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Alvin Eugene Jones appeals his conviction and sentence
for aiding and abetting the establishment of a methamphetamine
manufacturing facility, manufacturing methamphetamine, possessing
a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime,
and being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Jones contends that the district court erred by denying
his motion to suppress. Because the fire investigator’s
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
discoveries came during the course of his investigation into the
cause of the fire, the district court did not err. See Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 511 (1978). Accordingly, the search warrant
issued on the basis of the fire investigator’s observations was not
invalid. See United States v. Pigrum, 922 F.2d 249, 252 (5th Cir.
1991).
Jones contends that the district court erred in granting
a for-cause juror challenge. Jones has not asserted that the jury
was not impartial. See United States v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d
1218, 1222 (5th Cir. 1994). Further, as the prospective juror
clearly expressed his uncertainty regarding his ability to apply
the law, the district court did not err in granting the challenge.
See United States v. Duncan, 191 F.3d 569, 573 (5th Cir. 1999).
Jones argues that the district court erred when it
rejected his proffer of evidence of a prior inconsistent statement
made by a government witness. Jones has alleged neither that the
inconsistent statements were made during the course of the agency
relationship, see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2), nor that the inconsistent
statements were uttered while Deeds was acting at the direction of
the Government, cf. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 203-04
(1964).
Jones contends that the district court erred by denying
his motions for acquittal. A review of the trial transcript
indicates that there was sufficient evidence offered to support
each element of each of the convictions. See United States v.
2
Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 151 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Izydore,
167 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 1999).
Jones contends that the district court erred by denying
his request for relief under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8(a)(2), by imposing a
six-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(5)(C), and by
sentencing him as an armed career criminal. Because Jones
personally participated in the underlying offense and possessed a
dangerous weapon in relation to the underlying offense, the
district court did not err in denying a reduction under U.S.S.G.
§ 2d1.8(a)(2). In light of the children living in Jones’s home,
the proximity of the exposed chemical material to a play area, and
the amount of unsecured chemical materials, the district court did
not err in imposing the enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2d1.1(b)(5)(C). Because the jury convicted Jones of possessing
a firearm, a conviction supported by sufficient evidence, the
district court did not err in sentencing Jones as a career
criminal. See, e.g., United States v. Myers, 198 F.3d 160, 164
(5th Cir. 1999).
AFFIRMED.
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