Kamman Inc v. City of Hewitt

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-50386
Summary Calendar
KAMMAN INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF HEWITT,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. W-00-CV-78
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December 21, 2001
Before DeMOSS, PARKER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Kamman Inc. (Kamman) appeals the district court’s summary
judgment in favor of the City of Hewitt (the City) on each of its
takings or inverse condemnation claims, i.e., that there was a
regulatory taking without just compensation, that its substantive
due process rights were violated, and that its equal protection
rights were violated when the City denied its request to rezone a
parcel of land by changing its designation from residential to
commercial. A grant of summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 01-50386
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
In order to establish a regulatory taking or inverse
condemnation, a landowner must show (1) that the application of
the zoning ordinance to the particular property does not substan-
tially advance legitimate state interests or (2) that it deprives
an owner of all economically viable use of his land. Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Mayhew v. Town of
Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933-34 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 526
U.S. 1144, 119 S. Ct. 2018, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1999). Kamman does
not assert that it has been deprived of all economically viable
use of its land, nor does it dispute that traffic is a concern at
the intersection where its property is located. Kamman asserts
that the district court failed to analyze whether the City
substantially advanced solving the traffic problem at the
intersection by refusing to rezone the property at issue. This
argument is meritless. Controlling traffic growth substantially
advances legitimate state interests. See Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1926). Moreover,
Kamman’s argument is an attempt to challenge the quantity and
quality of data underlying the city engineer’s advice, as well as
the wisdom of the City Council’s decision to deny its rezoning
request, none of which is appropriate for judicial inquiry. See
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-33, 35-36 (1954); Reid v.
Rolling Fork Public Utility Dist., 854 F.2d 751, 753 (5th Cir.
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1988); Shelton v. City of College Station, 780 F.2d 475, 480-81
(5th Cir. 1986)(en banc).
As for Kamman’s substantive due process claim, a state’s
zoning decisions must have a rational basis. Jackson Court
Condominiums v. City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1077 (5th
Cir. 1989). The key to such an inquiry is whether the question
is "at least debatable." Id. Traffic control is a legitimate
objective of a zoning regulation or decision. The City was
concerned that the increased traffic resulting from a commercial
establishment on Kamman’s property would increase the potential
for accidents at an already dangerous intersection. This was a
legitimate concern of the city. The City’s denial of Kamman’s
rezoning request had a rational basis and thus reaches the
threshold established for substantive due process. See id. at
1078.
Kamman’s equal protection argument echoes his substantive
due process claim and adds that it was treated differently from
two landowners who have corner lots zoned commercial at the same
intersection. When there is no fundamental right or suspect
classification involved, the applicable standard of review for
both equal protection and substantive due process claims is
rational basis. Jackson Court Condominiums, 874 F.2d at 1079;
Reid, 854 F.2d at 753. As already noted, the City’s concern that
increased traffic at the intersection would be unduly hazardous
had a rational basis in the city engineer’s opinion and therefore
was “at least debatable.” See Jackson Court Condominiums, 874
F.2d at 1079. Under-inclusivity alone, i.e., failure to make the
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other corners of the intersection residential, is not sufficient
to state an equal protection claim. Id. Kamman’s equal
protection argument is without merit.
AFFIRMED.