Anaya v. Traylor Bros Inc

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
REVISED FEBRUARY 2, 2007
January 10, 2007
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-41872
MARIA GENOVEVA ANAYA, MARIO ANAYA,
EDUARDO ANAYA, JESSICA ANAYA, AYDHEE ANAYA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
TRAYLOR BROTHERS, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
Before REAVLEY, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge:
Humberto Anaya, an employee of Traylor Bros., Inc. (“Traylor”), suffered fatal injuries on
a barge while constructing a bridge. Soon thereafter, Traylor’s insurer began paying compensation
benefits to his beneficiaries (the “Anayas”). Approximately two months later, the Anayas filed suit
against Traylor for exemplary damages. The district court granted Traylor’s motion for summary
judgment. The court concluded that Traylor’s insurer paid the compensation benefits under the
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (the “LHWCA”), which precludes the recovery
of exemplary damages. In this appeal, the Anayas argue that Traylor’s insurer was actually paying
benefits pursuant to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (the “TWCA”). We affirm the district
court’s judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Humberto Anaya worked for Traylor as a carpenter on the Texas Department of
Transportation Galveston Causeway project. At the time of his fatal accident, Anaya was
constructing a bridge that connected Interstate 45 from Galveston Island to the mainland. On
October 15, 2004, while Anaya drilled bolt holes, a form collapsed and crushed him underneath a
concrete beam. Anaya died the same day. On October 18, 2004, the Anayas submitted an application
to the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission (the “Commission”) for survivor benefits. The
Anayas subsequently received a series of benefit checks from Traylor’s insurer. On November 16,
2004, the Anayas’ attorney sent a notice of representation to the insurer. In response, Traylor’s
insurer informed the Anayas that the benefits were paid pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act, not the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act.
On December 27, 2004, the Anayas filed a request to receive TWCA benefits. Two days
later, the Anayas filed suit against Traylor for exemplary damages based on Traylor’s alleged gross
negligence. In February 2005, Traylor’s insurer filed a dispute with the Commission to establish
whether the Anayas were entitled to benefits under the state or federal compensation scheme. On
August 25, 2005, the Commission found in favor of the insurer, ruling that the Anayas did not qualify
for TWCA benefits. Traylor then moved for summary judgment in the ongoing litigation because the
LHWCA bars gross negligence claims for exemplary damages. The district court granted summary
judgment to Traylor, reasoning that the LHWCA applied due to Anaya’s work on navigable waters.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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This court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same
legal standards as the district court. Machinchick v. P.B. Power, Inc., 398 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir.
2005). If no genuine issue of material fact exists, then the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court
must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Broussard v. Parish of
Orleans, 318 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 2003). If the evidence would permit a reasonable trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party, then summary judgment should not be granted. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Under the TWCA, an injured worker’s beneficiaries mayfile suit for exemplarydamages, TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 408.001(b), but the LHWCA prohibits the recovery of exemplary damages, 33
U.S.C. §§ 904, 905(a). To receive benefits under the LHWCA, a worker must satisfy both a situs
and status test. Munguia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 999 F.2d 808, 810 (5th Cir. 1993). The situs test
concerns geographic areas covered by the LWHCA, whereas the status test concerns an employee’s
type of work activities. P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 78 (1979). The situs test includes
injuries “occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States (including any adjoining pier,
wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by
an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or building a vessel).” Bienvenu v. Texaco,
Inc., 164 F.3d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 903(a)). The status test defines an
employee as “any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other
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person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harborworker including a ship repairman,
shipbuilder, and ship-breaker.” Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)). In addition,
a worker injured in the course of his employment on navigable waters is engaged in
maritime employment and meets the status test only if his presence on the water at the
time of injury was neither transient or fortuitous. The presence, however, of a worker
injured on the water and who performs a “not insubstantial” amount of his work on
navigable waters is neither transient nor fortuitous.
Bienvenu, 164 F.3d at 908 (footnote omitted).
At the time of his accident, Anaya was undoubtedly located on navigable waters, which
satisfies the situs test. In this appeal, the status test determines whether the LHWCA applies to the
Anayas request for benefits. Neither this Circuit nor the Supreme Court provide a definitive
explanation of what constitutes a transient and fortuitous presence on navigable water. Id.; see also
Director v. Perini N. River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 324 n.34 (1983). In Bienvenu, the Fifth Circuit
sitting en banc contrasted the holdings of Fontenot v. AWI, Inc., 923 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1991), and
Randall v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F.3d 888 (5th Cir. 1994), as modified by 22 F.3d 568. The en
banc court affirmed Fontenot, which held that “a worker who spent 40% of his worktime on shore,
30% on fixed platforms and 30% on oil exploration and production vessels was engaged in maritime
employment because he was injured while on actual navigable waters, in the course of his
employment.” Bienvenu, 164 F.3d at 908-09 (citing Fontenot, 923 F.2d at 1130). Yet, the court
overruled Randall, which held that the LHWCA covered a mechanic performing all of his work duties
on navigable waters because “[h]e was simply transported to and from his workstation-a stationary
platform-by boat.” Id.Unlike the worker in Randall, and more similar to the analysis in Fontenot, Anaya spent the
majority of his time working on navigable waters. Anaya performed his construction duties on a
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barge located on navigable waters, and a boat carried Anaya between the shore and his work site. The
district court found that Anaya regularly worked on the barge and his October 15 work assignment
was not an aberration from his normal work tasks. Therefore, the LHWCA covers the Anayas’ claim
for benefits.
B.
Section 406.091(a)(2) of the TWCA prohibits benefits to workers covered by analogous
federal laws. The TWCA reads in pertinent part that “a person covered by a method of compensation
established under federal law” is not subject to the statute. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.091(a)(2).
The Anayas argue that a twilight zone of concurrent jurisdiction, established by the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Davis v. Dep’t of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942), and Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447
U.S. 715 (1980), permits workers to elect benefits under either the TWCA or LHWCA. And
pursuant to this allowance, they elected to receive benefits under the TWCA, thus preserving their
right to file suit for exemplary damages. The Commission held that Anaya “is not entitled to all rights
and remedies under” the TWCA and is limited to recovery under the LHWCA. We agree with the
Commission’s analysis and interpretation of the federal and state compensation schemes as applied
in this instance, and therefore, reject the Anayas’ argument that Anaya was in a twilight zone. See
Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S. 272, 273 (1959) (per curiam) (“[T]he employee
could not [elect a remedy] if the case were not within the ‘twilight zone,’ for then the
Longshoreman’s Act would provide the exclusive remedy.”). An employee subject to Anaya’s work
conditions on navigable waters may only recover under the LHWCA. Accordingly, an election of
benefits was not available for the Anayas.
IV. CONCLUSION
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Based on Bienvenu and the explicit language of the TWCA, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to Traylor.
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