American Federation of Government Employees Local 1 v. Stone

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 27, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-10009
Summary Calendar
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES LOCAL 1; JUSTIN MCCRARY,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
DAVID M. STONE, in his official capacity as
Acting Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas
(USDC No. 3:04-CV-1219)
_________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiffs American Federation of Government Employees Local 1 (the
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances
set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Union) and Justin McCrary appeal the district court’s dismissal of their suit for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Reviewing de novo, we
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for the following reasons:
1. Our appellate jurisdiction in this case is limited initially to determining
whether the district court had jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a). 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2); Smith v. Orr, 855 F.2d
1544, 1547-52 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
2. We conclude that the Union lacked representational standing because
McCrary’s individual involvement in the case is necessary. Friends of
the Earth v. Laidla Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (stating
that representational standing requires that neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members
of the organization); Zuspann v. Brown, 60 F.3d 1156, 1160 (5th Cir.
1995) (“We are free to uphold the district court’s judgment on any
basis that is supported by the record[.]”). We affirm the dismissal of
the Union from the suit.
3. The determination of whether a contract existed between McCrary and
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requiring payment of
the salary specified in the offer letter is determinative of both the
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district court’s jurisdiction under the Little Tucker Act and the merits
of McCrary’s breach of contract claim. The district court was
therefore required to assume jurisdiction and decide the claim on the
merits. Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415-16 (5th Cir. 1981).
Because the district court did not so here, we vacate its dismissal of the
breach of contract claim for want of jurisdiction and remand for a
determination on the merits. Review of that court’s judgment on the
merits will be available only in the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(2).
4. The district court lacked jurisdiction over McCrary’s due process
claim. The Little Tucker Act provides a waiver of sovereign immunity
and a grant of federal jurisdiction over constitutional claims for money
damages only where the constitutional provision in question mandates
payment of money damages. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392,
400-02 (1976). The Due Process Clause is not such a provision.
LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Duarte
v. United States, 532 F.2d 850, 852 (2d Cir. 1976). We therefore
affirm the district court’s dismissal of McCrary’s due process claim for
lack of jurisdiction. Zuspann, 60 F.3d at 1160.
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Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
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