U.S. v. Cannon

~ORRECTED
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U,S. COOlm De IeeEAJ!S
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT FJ.lED
IJAN 14 1993
No. 91-5697
lRlCHARD E lWINDHORST" JR~
a:fBKI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM MICHAEL CANNON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
Before WILLIAMS, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:
Police arrested William Michael Cannon during a search of his
ranch. Cannon appeals his conviction on charges of possession of
ephedrine, a proscribed precursor chemical, with the intent to
manufacture methamphetamine; conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine; maintenance of a place for the purpose of
manufacturing methamphetamine; and use of a firearm in relation to
a drug trafficking offense. After police gave Cannon Miranda
warnings, he requested the assistance of counsel. We are asked to
pass on the admissibility of statements he gave in response to
later interrogation, but cannot do so in light of inadequately
developed facts. We vacate the conviction and remand for fact
findings.
I
On the morning of February 19, 1990, state and federal agents
executed a search warrant on a ranch in Bandera County, Texas. The
warrant authorized police to search the entire 140 acre property,
including a house and barn, for evidence of methamphetamine
manufacturing. As officers approached the barn, they saw Cannon
running from it with his pants on fire. They chased Cannon,
tackled him and extinguished the flames. When Cannon was tackled,
a loaded .38 caliber pistol flew from his waistband.
Meanwhile, police entered the house on the property and
arrested Sandra Green. Both Cannon and Green were given Miranda
warnings. Cannon then requested the assistance of counsel, and
Sergeant Land ceased questioning him. Cannon was placed under the
supervision of Deputy Johnson while other officers searched the
property.
Inside the barn, police found burning residue which analysis
later showed to include methamphetamine. They also found
implements usable to produce methamphetamine. These included
litmus papers, rubber gloves, a scale, and a variety of glassware.
Officers also found a partial recipe, apparently for making
methamphetamine from the precursor chemical ephedrine. A shotgun
hung on a wall of the barn. The barn smelled strongly of
methamphetamine, and police found a small baggie of methamphetamine
powder in a matchbox.
In a closet of the house, officers found a false circuit box,
which concealed canisters holding marijuana and methamphetamine
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powder. Police also seized a small amount of methamphetamine
powder from a bedroom dresser drawer. Later that day, officers
discovered a soda bottle under a rock on the property. The liquid
in the bottle contained methamphetamine in a 13 percent
concentration. This liquid solution could have been converted into
ingestible methamphetamine powder.
Several hours after the search began, Deputy Johnson engaged
Cannon in the conversation which is the principal focus of this
appeal. The facts regarding the progression of this conversation
are not clearly established. All agree that Johnson first asked
Cannon about motorcycles located at the ranch. Their talk then
turned to the manufacture of methamphetamine at the site. Cannon
did not testify at trial, but contends on appeal that Johnson began
questioning him about such criminal activity. The government
responds that Johnson's testimony shows that Cannon initiated the
discussion of incriminating matters. Johnson testified that the
conversation turned to "the execution of the search warrant." He
did not say who turned it to that subject, and the record is
unclear:
Q: What did he initially say when you started talking
about the search warrant, got off the subject of the
motorcycles?
A: That a friend of his had gotten in trouble and told
the law about Mr. Cannon to get his self out of trouble
and that the friend had told Mr. Cannon that there was
going to be a search warrant on his place . • . .
The use of "you" in the question is ambiguous. If it meant the
singular it would indicate that Johnson initiated the discussion of
the warrant.
3
Once the search became their topic, Johnson questioned Cannon
about the manufacture and presence of drugs at the ranch. Cannon
gave incriminating answers, including an admission that ephedrine
was present. Johnson told Land that Cannon wanted to talk to Land.
Land gave Cannon another Miranda warning, and Cannon sought to
bargain for Green's release before providing information. Land
could not agree to a deal, but Cannon repeated to Land what he had
told Johnson. The character of this conversation is disputed, with
the government saying Cannon volunteered information and Cannon
claiming to have responded to police questioning. In any event,
Cannon identified persons who had manufactured methamphetamine at
the ranch, and admitted to receiving some of the product as
payment. He also admitted to helping once manufacture
methamphetamine. Later that day, Cannon led officers to a tire in
whose inner tube ephedrine was hidden. Land testified that
officers might not have found these chemicals without Cannon's
assistance.
II
Cannon claims that his statements to Johnson and Land, and
evidence found as a result of them, should not have been admitted
at his trial. He contends that such statements were obtained after
his invocation of the right to counsel in violation of Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). Before reaching the
merits, we must consider whether Cannon waived this claim by
failing to raise it before trial as required by Fed. R. Crim. P.
12.
4
A
Rule 12(b)(3) requires that motions to suppress evidence must
be raised before trial. Rule 12 (f) provides for waiver of argument
for the suppression of evidence not made before trial. Cannon
objected to the use of evidence seized at the ranch at a pretrial
hearing. Although the memorandum submitted with Cannon's motion to
suppress cited Edwards, it did not allege nor did his counsel
develop at the suppression hearing that Cannon had asserted his
right to counsel. No witness at the hearing mentioned that Cannon
requested to speak to counsel when first questioned. No evidence
was sought to determine whether Johnson or Cannon initiated their
incriminating discussion. Under these circumstances alone, we
might conclude that Cannon has waived any Edwards claim.
Rule 12(f), however, states that a court may grant relief from
a waiver for cause shown. In this case, unusual circumstances lead
the government to agree that the equities weigh against waiver.
The government's response to Cannon's motion to suppress stated
that "at no time subsequent to the Defendant receiving his
'Miranda' rights . . . did he request an attorney or the assistance
of counsel." Al though Cannon's counsel might have discovered that
this assertion was incorrect, the government concedes that its
statement may have unwittingly misled counsel. Any confusion may
have been aggravated when Cannon received new counsel after the
hearing and before trial. Under these particular circumstances, we
will not construe against Cannon his counsels' failure before trial
to seek suppression of his oral statements on the basis of Edwards.
5
We note that the problems of this case demonstrate the importance
of Rule 12 and its mandate that suppression matters be litigated
before trial.
B
If Johnson began interrogating Cannon after Cannon invoked his
right to counsel, Johnson violated the prophylactic rule of Edwards
v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880 (1981). Under Edwards,
once an accused invokes the right to counsel, he is not subject to
further interrogation until counsel is available to him. Id. at
484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885. The exception to this rule holds that
the accused may be questioned if he initiates further
communications with police. Id. at 485, 101 S. Ct. at 1885.
Answers Cannon gave to questions after he invoked his right to
counsel would be inadmissible unless (1) Cannon initiated further
discussions with police and (2) Cannon knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95,
105 S. Ct. 490, 493 (1984).
Cannon argues that neither requisite for admitting his
statements has been satisfied. We agree that the first element has
not been established, and do not reach the second. The ambiguous
record does not demonstrate that Cannon initiated the discussion of
drugs with Johnson. Once the topic turned to illegal conduct,
Johnson interrogated Cannon. The government urges us to infer that
Cannon initiated the conversation. See United States v. Reyes­
Ruiz, 868 F.2d 698, 701 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that facts not
expressly found by trial court in evidentiary ruling may be
6
.~
inferred from record to support ruling), overruled on other
grounds, 934 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1991). We do not find sufficient
evidence in the record to warrant such an inference. The fact that
Cannon had a motive to begin cooperating--he apparently hoped to
benefit Green by doing so--does not alone lead to the conclusion
that Cannon initiated the discussion. l
The government also argues that these facts do not present a
violation of Edwards, as that holding is construed in this circuit.
We disagree. The government correctly notes that in Plazinich v.
Lynaugh, 843 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 u.s. 1031
(1989), we stated that Edwards must be applied in a manner which
recognizes that its principal concern was police badgering. Id. at
838-39; see also United States v. Duggan, 936 F.2d 181, 183 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 404 (1991). In Plazinich--where
Edwards ultimately did not apply because the defendant initiated
further communication with police--the alleged police impropriety
occurred when an officer told the defendant that a codefendant had
attempted suicide. 843 F.2d at 839. Rather than attempting to
interrogate the defendant, police merely gave him information.
While Plazinich did not involve conduct which raises concerns about
police overreaching, this case does. If Cannon's contentions are
true, he was questioned while in custody and after requesting a
lawyer. The facts of Edwards demonstrate that the resumption of
questioning about crimes, after a request for counsel and before an
lMoreover, the trial court made no ruling on the Edwards
issue, so we have no indication that the court reached such an
inference sub silentio.
7
attorney has been made available, constitutes overreaching. 451
u.s. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct. at 1885.
The government argues that even if Cannon's statements to
Johnson were inadmissible under Edwards, his later reiteration of
the statement to Land would be admissible. If so, Land's testimony
would render the admission of Johnson's essentially identical
evidence harmless error. The government's position overlooks that
Cannon's statements to Land may have resulted from improper
questioning by Johnson. If so, the second statement would be
inadmissible under United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.
1985). In Webb, a suspect invoked his right to counsel before FBI
agents took him to jail, where a jailer asked, "What kind of shit
did you get yourself into?" The suspect responded by admitting to
his son's murder. The jailer then asked the suspect if he would
like to talk to the agents who arrested him. The suspect agreed
and the agents returned, gave him Miranda warnings, and obtained a
signed waiver of rights. Id. at 386. The resulting confession to
the FBI was held inadmissible as a violation of Edwards. Id. at
390. Like the FBI agents in Webb, Land knew that Cannon had
invoked his right to counsel. Webb shows that even if Land assumed
that Cannon had initiated further communication, Cannon's
statements to him were inadmissible if he was contacted as the
result of an improper interrogation. Id. at 389.
8
C
The discovery of ephedrine at the ranch resulted from Cannon's
disclosure of its location inside a tire. Cannon argues that if
his statements to Johnson and Land were improperly obtained, the
ephedrine would be inadmissible under the derivative evidence or
II frui t of the poisonous tree II doctrine. See United States v.
Namer, 835 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 u.S. 1006,
108 S.Ct. 1731, 100 L.Ed.2d 195 91988); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). This doctrine
does not apply to the present case. Namer and Wong Sun involved
Fourth Amendment violations. Cannon alleges that officers violated
the prophylactic rule of Edwards. We have held that the derivative
evidence doctrine is not triggered by an Edwards violation. United
States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 208 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
United States v. Tedford, 875 F. 2d 446, 451 (5th Cir. 1989)
(holding that doctrine applies only when actual constitutional
violation occurs, and not violation of prophylactic rule); accord
United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 601 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc). The district court did not err in allowing the admission of
the ephedrine, regardless of the admissibility of Cannon's
statements. 2
D
"Determining who initiated the conversation after [the
suspect] invoked his right to counsel is essential to a Fifth
2We need not rule on the government's contention that the
ephedrine was admissible due to the inevitable discovery doctrine.
9
Amendment inquiry." Bradford v. Whitley, 953 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 91 (1992). In this case, that
determination has not been made. Due to its unique circumstances,
this case therefore must be remanded for fact findings necessary to
resolve the Edwards issue. If the district court finds that Cannon
did not initiate further communication with police, his statements
must be ruled inadmissible.
The government argues that the admission of Cannon's
statements, if erroneous, constitutes harmless error. 3 We test for
harmless error by asking whether the trier of fact would have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with the contested
evidence excluded. United States v. Gomez, 900 F.2d 43, 45 (5th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Roberts, 887 F.2d 534, 536 (5th Cir.
1989). The indictment against Cannon includes charges that Cannon
possessed ephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine,
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, and maintenance of a
place for manufacturing methamphetamine. The physical evidence
demonstrates the presence of ephedrine and small amounts of
methamphetamine. Some items which could have been used to "cook"
along with a partial methamphetamine recipe were discovered. On
the other hand, the most probative evidence of these charges was
Cannon's statements. Only those statements established that
methamphetamine had been manufactured at the ranch on more than one
3A harmless error analysis may be performed to examine the
effect of an Edwards violation. See,~, United States v. Webb,
755 F.2d 382, 392 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Wolf, 879 F.2d
1320, 1323 (6th Cir. 1989); cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct.
1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991).
10
occasion. Moreover, those statements alone demonstrated the
involvement of persons other than Cannon and Green. We are unable
to say that the admission of Cannon's statements, if improper, was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III
Finally, we must address a separate point of error regarding
the weapons charge alone. 4 Cannon argues that there was
insufficient evidence to convict him of the weapons charge. The
jury's verdict will be upheld if evidence, with all inferences
reasonably drawn in favor of the government, could allow a rational
trier of fact to find each element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Robles-pantoja, 887 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th
Cir. 1989). Moreover, because Cannon failed to reurge his motion
for acquittal at the close of all evidence, our review is limited
to determining whether there was a manifest miscarriage of justice,
meaning that the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt.
Id. at 1254; United States v. Ruiz, 860 F.2d 615, 617 (5th Cir.
1988) .
Cannon asserts that having a .38 caliber pistol on his person
does not show use of the weapon to facilitate the crime. The
government must establish some relationship between the firearm and
the crime. United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir.
1989). Cannon claims that no relationship was shown here, because
his incriminating statements revealed methamphetamine manufacturing
4We must reach this point in the event that the district court
finds Cannon's statements to have been admissible.
11
.........
by others but not by himself. Conviction of this offense does not
require that the defendant use, handle, or brandish the firearm in
an aggressive manner. United States v. Molinar-Apodaca, 889 F.2d
1417, 1424 (5th Cir. 1989). A relationship to drug trafficking may
be shown when the weapon was available to provide protection to the
defendant in connection with his engagement in trafficking. Id.That relationship has been shown here, as Cannon was carrying the
loaded pistol on his person at the manufacturing site. A similar
result was reached in United States v. Raborn, 872 F.2d 589 (5th
Cir. 1989), when the conviction of a defendant who had a pistol in
his truck as he left a laboratory site containing precursor
chemicals was upheld. Id. at 595. This claim lacks merit.
IV
We cannot say with certainty that the jury in this case would
have found Cannon guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of these charges
had his statements been excluded. We vacate the conviction and
remand for a hearing to determine whether Cannon's statements may
be admitted under Edwards v. Arizona. If the district court finds
either that Cannon did not initiate further communication or did
not waive his right to counsel as required by Edwards and Smith v.
Illinois, then it shall grant defendant a new trial. I f the
district court finds that Cannon initiated the communication and
waived his right to counsel the judgment of conviction will be
reinstated. Cf. United States v. Gomez, 900 F.2d 43, 45 (5th Cir.
1990) (reversing and remanding for determination of consent to
telephone interception).
12
VACATED and REMANDED.
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