England v. Cain

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-30500
Summary Calendar
CARL ENGLAND,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
BURL CAIN, Warden;
RICHARD P. IEYOUB, Attorney General,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana
(94-CV-3808)
(September 28, 1995)
Before GARWOOD, WIENER and PARKER, Circuit Judges.*
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner-appellant Carl England (England) was convicted
after a jury trial of aggravated battery in Louisiana state court
and sentenced to ten years at hard labor. His conviction and
sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Louisiana First
Circuit Court of Appeal. England also filed an application for
Local Rule 47.5 provides: “The publication of opinions that
have no precedential value and merely decide particular cases on
the basis of well-settled principles of law imposes needless
expense on the public and burdens on the legal profession.”
Pursuant to that Rule, the Court has determined that this opinion
should not be published.
post-conviction relief in the Louisiana courts, which was denied.
England subsequently filed the present petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He alleged that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated
battery, that the trial court accepted a verdict that did not
clearly convey the intent of the jury, and that he had been denied
the effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel
failed to have the jury polled and failed to object to the trial
court’s acceptance of the jury’s verdict.
The magistrate judge concluded that the evidence was
sufficient to support England’s conviction, that the jury’s verdict
clearly conveyed the intention of the jury, and that England had
not shown that his attorney’s performance was deficient. The
magistrate judge thus recommended that England’s habeas petition be
denied. The district court adopted the report and recommendation
of the magistrate judge and denied England’s habeas petition.
England filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s judgment.
The district court granted England’s request for a certificate of
probable cause (CPC).
England argues that the state trial court accepted a verdict
that did not clearly convey the intent of the jury. He contends
that because the jury merely returned a verdict of “guilty” and did
not specify guilty as to which offense, the verdict did not clearly
convey whether the jury’s intent was to find him guilty as charged
or guilty of a lesser-included offense.
The verdict form given the jury was as follows:
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“We, the jury, find the defendant, CARL L. ENGLAND,
Foreman
Date”
When returned by the jury, the blank following England’s name
had been filled in with (and only with) the word “Guilty” (and the
verdict had been signed by the foreman and dated).
The verdict form as given to the jury also contained the
following statement:
“Responsive Verdicts
GUILTY
GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE BATTERY
GUILTY OF SIMPLE BATTERY
NOT GUILTY”
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
“[T]he verdicts which may be returned in this case are:
Guilty, guilty of second degree battery, guilty of simple
battery, and not guilty.
Thus, if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty of aggravated battery, the
form of your verdict should be: We, the jury, find the
defendant guilty.
If you are not convinced the defendant is guilty of
aggravated battery, but you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of second
degree battery, the form of your verdict should be: We,
the jury, find the defendant guilty of second degree
battery.
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If you are not convinced the defendant is guilty of
aggravated battery, but you are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of simple
battery, the form of your verdict should be: We, the
jury, find the defendant guilty of simple battery.
If the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is guilty of either the offense
charged or of a lesser included offense, the form of your
verdict should be: We, the jury, find the defendant not
guilty.
Under Louisiana law, there is “no formal requirement as to the
language of the verdict except that it shall clearly convey the
intention of the jury.” La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 810 (West
1995). The jury’s verdict clearly conveyed its intention to find
England guilty of aggravated battery. England’s argument is thus
without merit.
England argues that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction for aggravated battery. He contends that he stabbed
the victim in self-defense.
The standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence in a
federal habeas review of a state conviction is whether, “‘after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”
Guzman v. Lensing, 934 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This standard is applied
with reference to the substantive elements of the criminal offense
as defined by state law. Isham v. Collins, 905 F.2d 67, 69 (5th
Cir. 1990). When, as here, a state appellate court has reviewed
the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, that court’s
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determination is entitled to some weight in a federal habeas
review. Porretto v. Stalder, 834 F.2d 461, 467 (5th Cir. 1987).
England concedes in his brief that he stabbed the victim. He
contends, however, that the stabbing was necessary to protect
himself because the victim had a gun and that the stabbing was thus
committed in self-defense. Under Louisiana law, the “use of force
or violence upon the person of another is justifiable, when
committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against
the person . . . provided that the force or violence used must be
reasonably and apparently necessary to prevent such offense. . . .”
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 14:19 (West 1995).
Terrence Pichon, the victim in the case, testified at trial
that he walked up to England to buy a “joint of marijuana” and that
he gave England two dollars for the “joint.” England then asked to
use Pichon’s cigarette lighter. Pichon testified that he
eventually asked England to give him either his “money or the
joint” and his cigarette lighter, but that England would not give
him the items. Pichon “reached for the lighter and [his] two
dollars” and “pushed [England] a little bit.” Pichon testified
that England then stabbed him. Pichon further testified that he
did not have a weapon on his person at the time. Officer Rob
Callahan and Detective Louis Thompson testified that no gun was
found on Pichon’s person, in his clothing, or in his personal
belongings; nor was a gun found in the area of the stabbing.1
England did not testify. A statement he gave the police about
two weeks after the incident claims that he stabbed Pichon in self-
defense, and that he had gone over by a tree to get the knife
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state,
the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that England
stabbed Pichon and that the stabbing was not committed to
“prevent[] a forcible offense” against England’s person, nor was
England’s action either reasonable or apparently necessary to
prevent any such offense. Further, the evidence supports the state
appellate court’s finding that “the state clearly negated [the]
possibility [that the stabbing was committed in self-defense]
beyond any reasonable doubt.” The evidence is therefore sufficient
to support England’s conviction for aggravated battery.
England argues that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel in that his counsel was ineffective for failing to have the
jury polled as to their verdict and by failing to object to the
trial court’s acceptance of a faulty verdict.
To obtain habeas corpus relief based upon ineffective
assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show not only that his
attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonable competence, but that the petitioner was prejudiced by
his counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In evaluating such claims, this Court
indulges in “a strong presumption” that counsel’s representation
fell “within the wide range of reasonable professional competence,”
Bridge v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1988). Judicial
because Pichon had a gun. Defense witness Rushing testified he was
present on the occasion in question and that although he did not
see the stabbing or any knife he did see Pichon pull out a pistol.
He does not mention England going to a tree or getting a knife.
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scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
As discussed above, England’s argument that the state trial
court erroneously accepted a faulty jury verdict is meritless.
Moreover, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal in denying
England post-conviction relief held that “the verdict was not
improper.” State of Louisiana Ex Rel Carl England v. State of
Louisiana, No. 92-KW-1499 (La. App. 1st Cir. Oct. 13, 1992).
Counsel was not required to raise a meritless objection to the
court. Further, a review of the transcript shows that England’s
counsel requested that the jury be polled and that it was in fact
polled. England has failed to show that his counsel’s performance
was deficient.2
None of England’s contentions on appeal has merit. The
judgment is accordingly
AFFIRMED.
Nor is there anything to suggest possible prejudice respecting
either claim of ineffective assistance.
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