Crouse v. United States Railroad Retirement Board

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS July 14, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Clerk
____________________
No. 02-61035
Summary Calendar
____________________
GARY WAYNE CROUSE
Petitioner
v.
UNITED STATES RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD
Respondent
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States Railroad Retirement Board
A 457-98-8792
_________________________________________________________________
Before KING, Chief Judge, and SMITH and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Petitioner, Gary Crouse, appeals the determination by the
railroad retirement board that he is not entitled to a disability
annuity under 45 U.S.C. § 231a(a)(1)(v) of the Railroad Retirement
Act. Because the record contains substantial evidence that
Crouse’s conditions do not render him unable to engage in any
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
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regular employment within the meaning of 45 U.S.C. § 231a(a)(1)(v),
we affirm.
Section 2(a)(1)(v) of the Railroad Retirement Act (the “Act”)
provides that an individual who has completed ten years of service
shall be entitled to an annuity, upon application, if a permanent
physical or mental condition renders him unable to engage in any
regular employment. See 45 U.S.C. § 231a(a)(1)(v)(2000). As set
forth in 20 C.F.R. § 220.100, to be entitled to an annuity, Crouse
had to demonstrate to the hearings officer that he was “disabled
for any regular employment.”
After an independent and thorough review of the evidence
before him, the hearings officer found that Crouse’s claimed
physical and mental impairments (including anxiety, chronic fatigue
syndrome, stress-related disorders, heart problems, sleep apnea,
degenerative disc disease, hepatitis C and heart and liver
problems) did not render him unable to engage in any regular
employment, that is, none of his impairments considered alone nor
his impairments in combination significantly limit his physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities. See 45 U.S.C.
§ 231a(a)(1)(v); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 220.100. In a detailed
order, the determination of the hearings officer was upheld by a
majority of the railroad retirement board (a three-member panel).
Substantial evidence supports the board’s determination that
Crouse’s conditions do not render him unable to engage in any
regular employment within the meaning of § 231a(a)(1)(v). See Elzy
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v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 782 F.2d 1223, 1224 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the board’s findings are “conclusive” if they are supported by
substantial evidence); Davis v. Schweiker, 641 F.2d 283, 285 (5th
Cir. 1981) (describing the substantial evidence standard as
requiring more than a mere scintilla of evidence but cautioning
against substituting our judgment for that of the board); see also
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (stating that
“substantial evidence” is evidence consisting of “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion”). Crouse’s contention that the board’s determination
requires reversal because the board did not consider the side-
effects of his medication is belied by the opinion of the board,
which clearly considers this argument on the second page of the
opinion. Crouse’s only other contention – that reversal is
required because the board did not consider all of Crouse’s
ailments in the aggregate – lacks merit. It is clear from the
record (which includes the sixty-five page transcript of the
hearing before the hearings officer for the railroad retirement
board) that the board carefully analyzed the work of the hearings
officer, who thoroughly reviewed the evidence regarding the
combination of Crouse’s numerous ailments. In addition to
reviewing Crouse’s numerous medical records and examination reports
from Crouse’s treating physicians (including the statement from Dr.
Bonchak, one of Crouse’s treating physicians, as well as statements
and notations from other treating physicians, radiologists,
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chiropractors and a consulting physician), the hearings officer and
the board reviewed Crouse’s work history, Crouse’s record of daily
activities, and testimony from a vocational consultant and from
Crouse himself. This record evidence abundantly supports the
board’s finding
We AFFIRM.
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