Hernandez v. Texas Department of Human Services

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 2, 2004
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT Charles R. Fulbruge III
_____________________ Clerk
No. 03-51227
Summary Calendar
_____________________
ADOLPH R. HERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA:03-CV-526-FB
_________________________________________________________________
Before JOLLY, WIENER, and PICKERING, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
I
Adolph Hernandez sued his employer, the Texas Department of
Human Services (“TDHS”) for gender discrimination under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (West 2004) and
age and disability discrimination under the Texas Commission on
Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”), Texas Labor Code § 21.101 et seq. (West
2004). He also sought damages and equitable relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a)(2)(b) (West 2004).
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
TDHS answered Gonzalez’ complaint by asserting the affirmative
defense of Eleventh Amendment immunity. It then the filed a motion
to dismiss the TCHRA claims, arguing that a district court may not
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims without
independent subject matter jurisdiction over them.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss because it
found federal question jurisdiction over the Title VII claims, and
thus could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the TCHRA
claims.1 TDHS appeals. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
the collateral order doctrine, because the appeal involves a claim
(and denial) of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Puerto
Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139,
142-45 (1993).
II
The State of Texas has waived its sovereign immunity in state
courts for TCHRA violations. King v. Texas Dept. of Human Svcs.,
ex rel. Bost, 28 S.W.3d 27, 30 (Tex. App. - Austin, 2000).2 Texas’
waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts, however, is not a
waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts.
1
The district court also dismissed Hernandez’ claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 and denied TDHS’ request that the court order
Hernandez to re-plead his Title VII claim. These rulings are not
before us on appeal.
2
See also College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd., 527, U.S. 666, 675-76 (1999) (a State’s consent to
suit must be unequivocally expressed).
2
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent
state law claims against nonconsenting state defendants in federal
court. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldermann, 465 U.S. 89,
120 (1984). And the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367 (West 2004), which codified pendent jurisdiction, does not
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Raygor v. Regents of the
Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2002).3
This Court clearly held that the TCHRA does not waive Texas’
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Perez v. Region 20 Educ. Serv. Ctr.,
307 F.3d 318, 332 (2002). We now hold, therefore, that the
district court is barred from exercising jurisdiction over
Hernandez’ TCHRA claims; it should have granted the motion to
dismiss. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
REVERSED, with instructions to dismiss the state law claims.
3
In addition to the numerous Supreme Court rulings, there is
nothing in this Court’s jurisprudence supporting the proposition
that jurisdictional statues overcome a State’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
3