Kinzie v. Dallas County Hospital District

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 30, 2003
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 03-10111
Summary Calendar
JAMES CHRISTIAN KINZIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT,
doing business as Parkland Memorial Hospital,
Defendant-Appellee.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 3:99-CV-2825-L
--------------------
Before BARKSDALE, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
James Christian Kinzie appeals the dismissal of his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against Dallas County Hospital
District, doing business as Parkland Memorial Hospital
(Parkland), arising from his receipt of HIV-positive blood.
Kinzie argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
claim under 21 C.F.R. § 610.47 because that regulation creates
enforceable rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, that
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
No. 03-10111
-2-
regulation did not become effective until February 7, 1997, i.e.,
after Kinzie learned of his HIV-positive status pursuant to a
December 23, 1996, laboratory report. See 61 Fed. Reg. 66919(December 19, 1996). Therefore, even were the regulation a
constitutional right or a right created by federal law
enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it is not applicable to
Kinzie. See Sierra Med. Ctr. v. Sullivan, 902 F.2d 388, 392 (5th
Cir. 1990).
Kinzie argues that he stated a substantive due-process claim
by alleging that Parkland’s conduct of recklessness and
indifference shocks the conscience. However, the allegations of
his complaint with regard to the failure to screen the donor or
test the blood are, at most, allegations of negligence, and,
therefore, cannot state a claim for substantive due process. See
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1998).
Although Kinzie’s complaint used terms like “shock the
conscience” and “deliberate indifference,” as the district court
found, Kinzie’s claims regarding Parkland’s failure to screen
donors and test the blood were “analogous to a fairly typical
state-law tort claim: [Parkland] breached its duty of care to
[Kinzie] by failing to provide [safe blood].” Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992). The Supreme
Court has “rejected claims that the Due Process Clause should be
interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those
traditionally imposed by state tort law.” Id.No. 03-10111
-3-
Kinzie’s reliance on Lewis, a mid-level culpability case, is
misplaced. For Kinzie’s reliance on Lewis to prevail his
allegations must establish that Parkland had mid-level fault,
i.e., had been reckless or grossly negligent. As has already
been discussed, Kinzie’s complaint established only negligence,
not gross negligence.
Kinzie also argues that he alleged that Parkland’s
established policy of inadequate training and supervision and its
customs caused violations of his constitutional rights. However,
those arguments deal with whether Parkland is liable, which is
immaterial because no constitutional violations occurred. See
Collins, 503 U.S. at 120.
Kinzie argues that the district court should not have
dismissed his access-to-courts claim because he pleaded the
necessary elements. Kinzie has not established an underlying
claim and therefore cannot establish an access-to-court claim.
See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002).
Kinzie argues that his “special relationship” with Parkland
arising out of the federal regulation that required Parkland to
inform him of his HIV status involved Fourteenth Amendment
protection. A state’s failure to protect an individual against
private violence is not a due-process violation unless there is a
special relationship between the state and the individual.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
197-200 (1989). This special relationship exists “only when the
No. 03-10111
-4-
person is involuntarily taken into state custody and held against
his will through the affirmative power of the state.” Walton v.
Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1995)(en banc). There is
no indication of any such special relationship between Parkland
and Kinzie.
Kinzie also argues that his complaint stated the elements of
constitutional deprivations resulting from a state-created
danger. A review of the complaint reveals that Kinzie did not
allege that he was harmed by a third party. Therefore, even
assuming the existence of the state-created danger theory in this
court, Kinzie has not alleged the requisite elements. See
Randolph v. Cervantes, 130 F.3d 727, 731 (5th Cir. 1997).
Kinzie argues that the complaint alleged a violation of his
constitutional right to medical care. No general right to
medical care exists; such a right has been found only where there
exists a special custodial or other relationship between the
person and the state. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103 (1976); see also City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Kinzie has identified no special
custodial or other relationship giving rise to a right to medical
care, and this claim fails.
Kinzie argues that the district court’s analysis was flawed
because it stripped Kinzie’s complaint of “adjectival descriptors
and modifiers” when it should have considered all of his
allegations, making all factual inferences in his favor. The
No. 03-10111
-5-
district court was not required to accept Kinzie’s conclusional
allegations or legal conclusions as true simply because the
complaint used the correct technical “buzz words.” See Jacquez
v. Procunier, 801 F.2d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 1986).
Kinzie also argues that the district court improperly
considered his state-court pleadings, which were outside the
scope of his federal complaint. Although the state-court
complaint was attached to Parkland’s motion to dismiss, it was
not central to Kinzie’s claims, and the district court should not
have considered it. See Collins, 224 F.3d at 498-99. However,
the district court’s reliance on the similarity of Kinzie’s
allegation in his state-court negligence action and his alleged
constitutional violations in his federal complaint was only a
part of the district court’s reasoning, and, for reasons already
stated, Kinzie’s substantive due-process claim fails.
Kinzie also argues that the district court failed to
distinguish between gross and simple negligence, improperly
determined that a jury should not have the opportunity to
determine whether Parkland’s conduct shocked the conscience, and
misapplied Collins. As has already been discussed, the district
court did not err in dismissing his claims and did not misapply
Collins. The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.